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Abstract 
Philosophy is an academic discipline whose practitioners are subject to forces of 
professionalization. These forces shape the discipline in ways that often go unnoticed. I 
present an analysis of the currently dominant image of philosophy that working 
philosophers have, one that focuses on philosophy's formality, fundamentality, and the 
widespread use of intuitions, showing that it is partly determined by the history of the 
professionalization of the discipline. I argue that readings of historical philosophers that 
are informed by this image tend to obscure the thought of those philosophers. In 
particular, John Dewey's work in logic is misunderstood when it is evaluated according to 
the now dominant conception of logic as the study of validity; and the moral writings of 
John Dewey and Henry David Thoreau are neglected because they do not engage in the 
contemporary project of grounding normativity. Finally I propose that thinking of 
philosophy as a practice can help to recover lost historical insights at the same time that it 
can appropriately focus our attention as philosophers on institutional problems that 
currently bedevil the discipline. 
 
  vi 
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER(1(INTRODUCTION:((PHILOSOPHY(IS(A(PRACTICE(...................................................(1!I.!!PHILOSOPHY!AND!ITS!PREDICAMENT!................................................................................................................!1!II.!!HATING!SCHOOL!...................................................................................................................................................!5!III.!!THE!PROFESSIONAL!IMAGE!..............................................................................................................................!9!IV.!!DISCIPLINE!.......................................................................................................................................................!11!V.!!SITUATING!THIS!DISSERTATION!.....................................................................................................................!16!VI.!!SUMMARY!OF!CHAPTERS!................................................................................................................................!29!
CHAPTER(2(THE(PROFESSIONAL(IMAGE(......................................................................................(33!I.!!INTRODUCTION!...................................................................................................................................................!33!II.!!WHAT!IS!PHILOSOPHY?!...................................................................................................................................!36!III.!THE!DOMINANT!PICTURE!–!THE!PROFESSIONAL!IMAGE!...........................................................................!41!
III.1$$$A$penchant$for$formalism$...................................................................................................................$41!
III.2$$A$penchant$for$generality,$fundament$and$timeless$questions$...........................................$46!
III.3$$A$penchant$for$intuitions$and$thought$experiments$...............................................................$51!IV.!!CONCLUSION!....................................................................................................................................................!56!
CHAPTER(3(A(MODEL(OF(CHANGE(IN(PHILOSOPHY(.................................................................(58!I.!!INTRODUCTION!...................................................................................................................................................!58!II.!!CHANGE!IN!PHILOSOPHY!.................................................................................................................................!61!III.!!MODELS!OF!CHANGE!.......................................................................................................................................!63!IV.!!(HAP)HAZARDS!OF!PHILOSOPHY!..................................................................................................................!64!V.!!EXPLAINING!PHILOSOPHICAL!CHANGE!..........................................................................................................!66!
  vii 
VI.!!PROFESSIONALIZATION!..................................................................................................................................!71!VII.!PHILOSOPHY!....................................................................................................................................................!79!VIII.!!CONCLUSION!.................................................................................................................................................!86!
CHAPTER(4(DEWEY(AND(THE(PROFESSIONAL(IMAGE(............................................................(87!I.!!INTRODUCTION!...................................................................................................................................................!87!II.!!!DEWEY’S!PICTURE!OF!PHILOSOPHY!..............................................................................................................!91!III.!!!DEWEY!MEETS!THE!PROFESSIONAL!IMAGE!...............................................................................................!98!IV.!!DEWEY’S!CONTEMPORARY!RECEPTION!.....................................................................................................!103!V.!!CONCLUSION!....................................................................................................................................................!108!
CHAPTER(5(DEWEY,(LOGIC(AND(EPISTEMOLOGY(..................................................................(110!I.!!INTRODUCTION!–!THE!CONTEMPORARY!CONCEPTION!OF!LOGIC!.............................................................!110!II.!!RESITUATING!DEWEY,!OR!WITH!FRIENDS!LIKE!THESE!…!.......................................................................!117!III.!!WHEWELL,!INDUCTION,!AND!THE!EPISTEMOLOGY!OF!SCIENCE!...........................................................!123!IV.!WHEWELL’S!REPLY!TO!MILL!.......................................................................................................................!131!V.!!DEWEY!AND!THE!CONTEXT!OF!STUDIES$IN$LOGICAL$THEORY!.................................................................!133!VI.!DEWEY!ON!INDUCTION!IN!LOGIC!.................................................................................................................!140!VII.!COMMON!SENSE!AND!SCIENCE!...................................................................................................................!143!VIII.!!CONCLUSION!...............................................................................................................................................!145!
CHAPTER(6(DEWEY,(THOREAU(AND(MORAL(PHILOSOPHY(...............................................(147!I.!!INTRODUCTION!K!CONTEMPORARY!MORAL!PHILOSOPHY!..........................................................................!147!II.!!THE!RECENT!RECEPTION!OF!DEWEY'S!WORK!IN!MORAL!PHILOSOPHY!.................................................!152!III.!!DEWEY!AND!THE!PHILOSOPHY!OF!EDUCATION!.......................................................................................!157!
  viii 
IV.!!THOREAU!AND!CONTEMPORARY!MORAL!PHILOSOPHY!...........................................................................!167!V.!!THOREAU,!THE!IMAGINATION,!AND!ROMANTIC!PHILOSOPHY!.................................................................!169!VI.!!CONCLUSION!..................................................................................................................................................!175!
CHAPTER(7(CONCLUSION:((TENSIONS(IN(THE(PROFESSIONAL(IMAGE(...........................(177!I.!!INTRODUCTION!.................................................................................................................................................!177!II.!!TENSIONS!AND!UNSETTLEMENT!..................................................................................................................!178!III.!!AN!EXTERNAL!TENSION!...............................................................................................................................!180!IV.!!INTERNAL!TENSIONS!....................................................................................................................................!181!
IV.1$History$.........................................................................................................................................................$181!
IV.2$$Reasoning$and$writing$........................................................................................................................$184!
IV.$3$Knowing$nothing$means$knowing$everything$..........................................................................$186!V.!!CONCLUSION:!!LOOKING!BACK,!LOOKING!AHEAD!......................................................................................!187!BIBLIOGRAPHY!......................................................................................................................................................!191!
 
  1 
 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction:  Philosophy is a Practice 
The notion that a philosophy arises in purely individual excogitations upon 
existences and truths which nakedly and directly confront a thinker is an 
absurd legend.  Theoretical reflection arises in a social medium.  The 
conflicts and discrepancies within the traditions of a social group, or 
between them and newly forming beliefs, are the occasion of 
philosophizing.  The philosopher’s problems come to him in this context … 
He casts his imaginations in material drawn from tradition and from the 
peculiar context of his day and place. 
 -Dewey, Unmodern Philosophy and Modern Philosophy 
 
I.  Philosophy and its predicament  
 In the popular imagination all scholars are aloof.  Whether this is a negative 
perception – of scholars worrying over trivial details that can have no bearing on ordinary 
life – or a positive one – of a commitment to truth – it is one that inflects ordinary 
thinking about intellectuals and academics.  This perception is even stronger with respect 
to philosophers.  Ever since Thales stumbled into the well because he was busy 
contemplating the universe, philosophers have been thought of as having concerns that go 
beyond the everyday demands of life.  And many philosophers embrace the distance 
between what they do and the patterns of ordinary life that hold it hostage to fashion, 
conformity and tradition.  Philosophers regularly appeal, as a kind of disciplinary mission 
statement, to the Socratic commitment to truth even above one’s own claim to life. 
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 But many philosophers are also beginning to appreciate that their working life is 
structured by forces not directly responsive to reasoned argument and that these forces 
shape the work they do. The practice of philosophy is conditioned by forces outside the 
control of individual philosophers.  For example, although many philosophers favor 
increasing diversity among philosophers, the evidence concerning the deplorable 
treatment of women in the profession1 is now so overwhelming that even the high status 
champion of philosophy as a profession, Brian Leiter,2 has noted it on his blog.  Leiter 
also regularly notes the attempts of administrators and deans to shrink or shut down 
philosophy graduate programs, majors and even whole departments.  Brian Leiter tends 
to dismiss these attempts as mere shortsightedness.  But combined with the revelations of 
the way women have been treated, and with the experiences of black, Hispanic and other 
                                                
1 In addition to the work cited below, see the website What is it Like to be a Woman in 
Philosophy (http://beingawomaninphilosophy.wordpress.com) (but prepare to be outraged) as 
well as updates on philosophy conferences with no female participants at the blog NewAPPS 
(http://www.newappsblog.com). 
2 Brian Leiter is currently the Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of 
Chicago Law School; he is also the founder and director of University of Chicago's Center for 
Law, Philosophy, and Human Values.  In addition, he writes a blog, Leiter Reports: A Philosophy 
Blog, about the profession of philosophy: he makes public information about philosophers taking 
new appointments, he regularly comments on issues of interest to professional philosophers, and 
he fields questions from undergraduate and graduate students about the profession.  (In November 
of 2012, Leiter's blog had its 20 millionth visitor:  
http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/2012/11/twenty-million-visits.html).  More importantly, 
Leiter oversees the publication every other year of the Philosophical Gourmet Report, which uses 
surveys of professionals to rate faculty at graduate programs in philosophy.  Since there is no 
other comparable rating service, Leiter's report exercises significant influence over the decisions 
graduate students make about where to apply and where to attend, and, importantly, it influences 
university hiring decisions: philosophy departments use their Leiter ranking to convince deans 
and administrators to agree to hire people with status sufficient to either cement or increase their 
ranking.   
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minority philosophers,3 the trend can seem more troubling.  There is also evidence that 
other academics tend to have a low regard for philosophers, especially as colleagues on 
committees. 4  Brian Leiter's explanation is that generally people outside of philosophy 
don't really know what philosophy is, and he places much of the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of a few bad philosophers: 
If real philosophy … is less familiar to readers and scholars outside the 
field, the explanation is, in part, that a handful of philosophers who have, in 
recent years, reached a wide audience outside the discipline have generally 
done a poor job representing the actual state of affairs.  Richard Rorty is 
both the best-known and worst offender on this score… (Leiter (2004) p. 18, 
emphasis in original) 
 
But this move is typical of the kind of arrogance that many academics, according to 
Lamont's study presented in her book How Professors Think (2009), think is standard 
among philosophers: outsiders do not really understand philosophy and so they are taken 
in by charlatans.  The situation calls for some difficult self-scrutiny.  (I discuss these 
contemporary issues in more detail in the conclusion to this dissertation).   
 These facts concerning the predicament of professional philosophy add urgency to 
recent calls for reconstruction of the discipline.   Philip Kitcher, a prominent philosopher 
(he currently teaches at Columbia University, which consistently ranks in or near the top 
10 in Leiter's rankings) who specializes in the philosophy of biology and epistemology, 
recently criticized what he sees as the increasingly insular, technical and narrow focus of 
professional philosophers (Kitcher (2011)).  Kitcher cites John Dewey as an important 
                                                
3 See, for example, the essays in Sullivan and Tuana (2007) and Yancy (2012). 
4 See Lamont (2009).  Lamont provides evidence that academics outside of philosophy tend to see 
philosophers as at best exceptionally clever. (I discuss this point in more detail in the conclusion). 
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influence on his critical stance towards contemporary professional philosophy – he says 
that "[t]he approach I shall elaborate renews Dewey's concerns with respect to our own 
times" (Kitcher (2011) p. 249).  That is to say, Kitcher takes himself to be renewing 
Dewey's critical attitude towards the tendency professional philosophers have of isolating 
themselves from contemporary public problems.5  Kitcher highlights the importance of 
technical language in isolating philosophers.  In this dissertation, I make a similar 
criticism of professional philosophy, and Dewey's thought is both a central influence on 
and an example in what follows (indeed many of the passages from Dewey's work that 
Kitcher cites are discussed here).  So it will help to situate this work if I indicate the 
central way in which it differs from Kitcher's critique.  
Kitcher does not connect the trends he identifies in contemporary philosophy – 
the ever increasing specialization, the widespread use of technical notation, and its 
irrelevance to "the broader human condition" (Kitcher (2011) p. 251) – to the structures 
that condition the work being done, and so, in light of the views presented in this 
dissertation, he ends up sounding rather naïve in arguing that philosophers should simply 
                                                
5 Kitcher admits to being late in coming to this appreciation of Dewey: 
Like most of my contemporaries in philosophy departments in the 
Anglophone world, [twenty years ago] I would have seen the three 
canonical pragmatists – Pierce, James, and Dewey – as well-intentioned but 
benighted, laboring with crude tools to develop ideas that were far more 
rigorously and exactly shaped by the immigrants from Central Europe 
whose work generated what is … known as 'analytic' philosophy. (Kitcher 
(2012) p. xi) 
Kitcher's explanation of the evolution of his thinking is personal and does not appeal to 
institutional or sociological factors: "During the past decade, I have become increasingly moved 
by this reformist approach to philosophy…" (Kitcher (2012) p. xiii).   
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begin to concern themselves in a different way (without, for example, resorting to 
technical notation) with different questions and different problems.   Philosophers work 
in ways that respond to features of the world beyond their control.  The practice of 
philosophy – the teaching and presenting and writing – influences the content of 
philosophy.  We have to abandon the picture of the philosopher as the rational mind 
selflessly pursuing timeless truth. 
 
II.  Hating school 
I thought that I could never dislike anything as much as I disliked junior high and 
high school:  the never-endingness of it, the routines, the tedium of the classes, the 
enforced and weird social situations, the arbitrary uses of power.  But it was a visceral 
dislike, a dislike of reflex and instinct that I didn’t really understand until I had some 
distance from it, distance I got studying philosophy as an undergraduate and then for a 
brief time immediately after as a graduate student.   
Some of this study was explicitly about education, though very little.  I read John 
Dewey as an undergraduate – he was the first philosopher I ever read, really – but I read 
Human Nature and Conduct and some essays, and it wasn’t until the summer following 
graduation that I read Democracy and Education.  Sometime that summer I also read Art 
as Experience, and it was reading these books and thinking back on my time in junior 
high and high school that allowed me to understand it better, to see what I reacted 
against, and to begin to theorize my dislike. 
  6 
Dewey tried to focus attention on the role that social institutions and practices 
play in giving content to particular experiences, in making them meaningful.  In his 
Ethics, for example, he treated systems of morality and ethical codes as growing out of 
the material conditions faced by social groups.  His general orientation, described in his 
late Freedom and Culture, is that 
…the idea of culture that has been made familiar by the work of 
anthropological students points to the conclusion that whatever are the 
native constituents of human nature, the culture of a period and group is the 
determining influence in their arrangement; it is that which determines the 
patterns of behavior that mark out the activities of any group, family, clan, 
people, sect, faction, class.  (Dewey, LW 13, p. 75) 
 
The hopeful strand of his thought is that, with these analytic descriptions of the relation 
between social institutions and experience at hand, a course can be mapped for the 
progressive transformation of social institutions with the aim of enriching experience.  
What counts as enriching experience is a vexed question, but Dewey’s account begins 
with making it more democratic, more humane and more shared.  I didn’t see all this 
then, but I did think that philosophy, at least practiced this way with a keen focus on 
actual particular experience combined with a hope for better life, offered the potential for 
a kind of self-understanding that was worth working for. 
 It turned out that I did dislike something more than I disliked being in junior high 
and high school, and that was teaching junior high and high school.  After my first round 
of graduate study (I earned an MA in philosophy in 1994), and under the influence of a 
mostly idealistic idea of Dewey that I had gradually acquired, I thought that I understood 
the experience of schooling well enough that, as I teacher, I would be able to improve 
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dramatically the experiences kids would have.  That was a mistake. It was all there, still, 
when I was in the classroom as a teacher: the endless routines, the boredom, the arbitrary 
flexing of power.  And there was very little I could do about it.  In coming to my 
appreciation for Dewey’s idealism I hadn’t yet really understood his more pessimistic or 
realistic strain concerning the way habits and institutionalized ways of dealing with 
people were stubbornly persistent conditions of the world and were in fact part of the 
structure that made the thing go.  These social institutions act as forces in the world with 
as much inertia and constraining power as the classroom walls and the desks.  This 
understanding I didn’t acquire until very recently, during my graduate study of 
philosophy the second time around, and it is this understanding that I develop in this 
dissertation. 
 My brief first round of graduate study was, aside from two courses in the history 
of philosophy, not to my liking, though I didn’t really understand why.  I thought:  I don’t 
understand what’s going on, I’m not smart enough.  Towards the end of my more recent 
second round of graduate school – the one that led to this dissertation – I came to see that 
philosophy too is structured by habits and institutionalized ways of acting, that it isn’t 
really an ideal perch from which to see the world but a practice affected, like all 
practices, by the world.  It is determined by patterns of activities, social structures, and 
habits of mind, too.  But it is hard to see that, or at least it was for me.  In this dissertation 
I try to bring some of this to light.  I dislike much of the philosophy that goes on in 
seeming willful ignorance of these conditioning structures because of the pretense 
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involved in assuming that philosophy is unconditioned.  But I owe the insight I think I 
have gained to philosophy, to the teachers I have had and the space of reflection that 
philosophy opened to me, so that even if I don’t finally know what philosophy is, I do 
know that I am grateful to philosophy and to many philosophers for the small bit of 
understanding of my own experience that I now have. 
 That way of putting it leads directly into the argument of the dissertation: I care 
about philosophy because it has – directly but more indirectly – helped me to understand 
my experience.  But what I love is precisely the way philosophy has of being unlike a 
discipline, "undisciplined" (which is not the same as lazy or lacking rigor).  The 
introduction I received to philosophy led me to believe that just about everything one 
does has to do with philosophy – that was certainly Dewey’s notion about philosophy.  
That will strike many professional philosophers as an old-fashioned, or uninformed, way 
to think about philosophy.  There is a much more specialized conception of philosophy, 
as a particular predominately formal academic discipline with a definite subject matter of 
its own, capable of progress, supported by a hierarchical ranking of graduate schools, 
journals and conferences, textbooks and guides, all embracing a system of abstract 
knowledge and methods the acquisition of which makes one a professional.  This 
conception frames the way philosophers are read in academic contexts, all philosophers, 
even those who wrote long before such a conception had taken hold.  Some historical 
philosophers fare better than others when they are read through the prism of this 
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professionalized conception; John Dewey and Henry David Thoreau have not fared very 
well.  And this conception now dominates philosophy. 
As a philosopher, Dewey thought his role was to present a kind of bridge between 
the ordinary life of people (which of course takes account of the values and beliefs, the 
ideology, people actually live with) and a more hopeful, humane way of life that, for 
Dewey, could be summed up simply: it would be democratic.  Dewey was interested in 
ordinary life.  And this is why he is not often included in undergraduate instruction in 
philosophy nowadays. 
 
III.  The professional image 
According to the now more familiar picture of philosophy, certain features of 
Dewey’s practice of philosophy, focused as it was on contributing to the building of 
democratic communities, look like serious difficulties, even weaknesses: his informal 
style of writing, his lack of engagement with the most up to date developments in 
technical philosophy, his at times simplified historical narratives.  According to this 
picture – I will call it the professional image – philosophers ask questions that have been 
around at least since Plato.  The questions get at central problems that face anyone trying 
to think, that is to use reason to understand the world.  What distinguishes philosophy 
from other disciplines that also pursue central problems is a) the general and fundamental 
nature of the questions philosophers ask; b) an understanding of the rules of reasoning as 
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purely formal;6 and c) a methodological practice that privileges fanciful thought 
experiments and appeals to intuitions.  Philosophers present arguments that can be 
analyzed independently of any particular context or subjectivity; these arguments aim to 
use true premises (or at least plausible and uncontroversial premises) linked together in 
the correct way to derive conclusions that then must be accepted by anyone thinking 
reasonably.  Often these conclusions are in at least apparent conflict with what seems 
true, and so there is a puzzle.  When a philosopher is being reflective he will say that to 
work on such puzzles, patiently, is to take very very small steps towards figuring out the 
truth about the world. 
   This familiar picture is in fact a relatively recent development.  That is the 
argument I will pursue here.  I will show that it emerged during the 20th century as the 
result of pressures associated with philosophy becoming a well-behaved discipline.  
When the picture is seen in this light – as a historical development conditioned by extra-
philosophical factors – it loses some of its charm; this opens a new perspective on the 
history of philosophy.  The familiar picture contrasts with one that sees philosophy as 
less unified and more diverse; as pursuing specific questions in contexts and with 
methods that cannot easily be reinterpreted as universal questions susceptible to formal 
analysis.  In this alternate picture it isn’t always clear who the philosophers are or what 
are the philosophical questions.  Unfamiliar figures play central and important roles, and 
                                                
6 Gerson (1997, unpublished manuscript) provides an excellent history of how formalism 
emerged as the dominant orientation in American philosophy in the mid 20th century.  He 
attributes formalism's triumph over instrumentalism in part to pressures exerted by the structure 
of the research university.   
  11 
familiar figures are seen in unfamiliar ways.  My aim is to model a way of doing 
philosophy that challenges the familiar picture because the familiar picture obscures the 
history.  If we can get a glimpse of what philosophy looked like prior to the familiar 
picture, we might be able to conceive of a way of going on doing philosophy in the 
contemporary setting that doesn’t distort the history.  This is important for the future of 
philosophy, particularly given the way in which its home – the university – is changing. 
 
IV.  Discipline 
In spite of its familiar rhetoric of presentation – that philosophy is pure inquiry; 
that philosophy cares simply for truth; that philosophy contrasts with literary theory and 
other humanities in being immune to academic fashions – in spite of it explicitly taking 
for its subject any and everything, restrained only by curiosity and, of course, truth, and 
in spite of the seemingly categorical nature of the argument that, in examining 
foundations, philosophy leaves nothing outside itself to constrain it, philosophy is a 
discipline.  It is a discipline in the sense of occupying a definable position in the modern 
university, and this fact, the fact of the institutional nature of the practice of philosophy, 
accounts for certain of its features.  Philosophy has achieved a complete disciplinary 
identity; it is now fully professionalized.   
To say that philosophy has been fully professionalized is not to express a value 
judgment; it is to say that according to widely accepted accounts of what it is to be a 
profession, being a philosopher (like being any other stripe of academic) means being a 
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professional (this claim is elaborated and defended in chapter 3).  Professions function in 
several important ways, not the least of which is in allowing for the development of 
certain kinds of knowledge and skill protected on the one hand from the harmful effects 
of selfishness and on the other from bureaucratic interference.7 Professions license 
knowledge claims and claims to authority.  Critics of professions correctly point to their 
anti-democratic monopoly on the skills and knowledge that tend to accrue power (though 
even they are sometimes happy to let their doctors rule tyrannically).  Academic 
professionals have long tried to blunt such criticisms by claiming to be disinterested in 
power and by swearing fealty to truth.  Nevertheless academics do exert power and 
influence.8  
 I set aside the general question of the value, culturally and politically, of 
professionalization and claim this:  there are recognizable patterns that mark the behavior 
of professionals and their clients and that modify the context of their interactions; when 
those professionals ignore or disregard this they lose control over the conditions of their 
own determination.  And that is a bad thing to lose control over.  Philosophers 
overwhelmingly ignore or disregard those features of their interactions that are here 
lumped together under the category of professionalism.  Even if such disregard were to 
improve the philosophy that is created, the conditions under which it is created are left to 
                                                
7 The claim that professions never had real power is appropriately refuted in Freidson (1986). 
8 Today academic scientists are often appealed to as experts, in venues like The New York Times, 
and their contributions to the cultural conversations about issues like genetic testing and testing in 
schools are often presented as definitive.  Academics are also frequently called upon to advise 
politicians about economics, for example.   
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operate by themselves or, more likely, in the hands of those who do not disregard such 
things:  deans, university board members and presidents, and political overseers of the 
funding.  But I will argue, primarily in chapters 5 and 6, that the philosophy that is 
created is weakened by this disregard because it tends to disregard sources of insight that 
have been in effect banished for no good philosophical reasons.  It is bad for philosophers 
not to try to understand some of the determinants of their precarious status in the 
university9 (a subject I return to in the conclusion), and blocking access to insights and 
novelties of style and thought for no very good reasons produces bad philosophy.   
But do philosophers working under the sway of the professional image create bad 
philosophy? Professional philosophers say that philosophy has never been better, never 
produced finer work in the quantities it is now being produced.  There is agreement 
(among philosophers) that the work produced today is clearer, sharper and more technical 
than at any other time.  There is agreement, too, that progress is being made on the core 
questions that philosophy exists to answer.10   
                                                
9 I have in mind here the relatively frequent, these days, threats to shut down or consolidate 
philosophy departments for budgetary reasons (for example, Brian Leiter, on his blog, has in the 
past two years reported on proposals to close or make drastic cuts to the philosophy departments 
at UNLV, Northern Iowa, Royal Holloway, London Metropolitan University, The University of 
Greenwich, Keele University, Arizona State, Howard University, and The University of Southern 
Mississippi), but also the isolation of philosophers from their academic peers documented by 
Lamont (2009), for example.  The problem academic philosophy has with diversity adds to its 
precarious status.  So long as it is an outlier among the humanities in terms of gender ((Paxton, 
Figdor and Tiberius (2012), (Buckwalter and Stitch (2010)), and minority participation ((Sullivan 
and Tuana (2007), (Dotson (2012)), and so long as there is no good explanation for this, the 
impression is abroad that something is not right.    
10 For example this is the thesis of Gutting (2009). 
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 This is the assessment of professionals according to their own scale of value, 
which judges work meritorious when it is technical, sharp, clearly reasoned and 
addressed to some ongoing controversy within the discipline.  And of course it is within 
the province of professionals to make such determinations.  But consider: in spite of the 
perennial popularity of lawyer jokes, lawyers continue to provide services that are in high 
demand, as do doctors and accountants and most of the other professionals.  It becomes 
problematic for a profession when it no longer seems to provide anything that lay people 
want or understand.  This is more or less the condition of philosophy today:  no one 
doubts that its membership values work that its members judge to be worth valuing; but it 
isn’t at all clear that this work provides value or that it even aspires to be the work that 
many people (outside philosophy, and so comprising its potential clients) still think 
philosophy should aspire to be. 
 This sort of criticism is often met with impatience:  this is philosophy after all, 
and philosophy is central to any picture of a cultivated citizenry, let alone a respectable 
research university.  But this just evades the real issue through obfuscation enabled by the 
indefiniteness of the label philosophy. If philosophy is central to culture, it is 
undisciplined philosophy, philosophy as a subject with a long historical tradition that is 
not reducible to the discussion of "perennial problems": it is a long and diffuse tradition, 
one that has at different times played many different roles.  But that isn’t how most 
philosophers think of philosophy.  That, conveniently, is a matter of professional 
expertise.  So there is a sense here of an elaborate shell game:  philosophers know what’s 
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good (the professional image) but philosophy is vital to the culture (the lay image).  
Threats to the former are taken to be threats to the latter, and those are easily shunted.  
But then there is no attempt to connect the former to the latter.  
The professional image of philosophy – that philosophy is formal, general and 
fundamental, and that it often relies on fanciful thought experiments and appeals to 
intuition (a characterization I elaborate in chapter 2) – constitutes the shared conception 
that operates for most academic philosophers today and frames for them the reading of 
philosophical texts.  There have always been strands of philosophy concerned with 
fundamental questions, and so the professional image does have roots in work that has 
historically been thought of as philosophy, work by people who have identified 
themselves as philosophers.  But historically philosophy has been many things, not all of 
which are together consistent.  It is this large mass of historical work, much of it 
addressed to contemporaries facing shared problems and not to all rational creatures 
facing universal problems, that lay folk have in mind when they agree that philosophy 
should be a part of what students get at the university.   
 This still may be as it may be:  philosophers can still claim professional privilege.  
But the professional image is false since in practice it implies (incorrectly) that it captures 
what has always been essential to philosophy and it mystifies because it prevents 
philosophers from seeing some of the real determinants of their practice.  I don’t argue 
for replacing the professional image with Dewey’s image, but I do argue for a) 
acknowledgement of the pluralistic and undisciplined nature that characterizes 
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philosophy historically and b) understanding that philosophy, since it is a practice and so 
something people do, is subject to ordinary forms of social determination. 
 
V.  Situating this dissertation 
 This is a work about philosophy written by a philosopher.  But there is a question 
about whether it is a work of philosophy.11  This question arises because the work does 
not conform to the expectations one has under the influence of the professional image of 
philosophy.  So it is necessary here to explain the aim of this work, which is to be a work 
of philosophy about how philosophers can improve their practice. 
Studies having most in common with this dissertation are those that present some 
form of critique of a discipline from within the discipline.  There are many such works.  
Gouldner (1970) offered an explanation for the predominance of functional explanations 
in American sociology and predicted, as the title had it, a Coming Crisis of Western 
Sociology because it was no longer tenable to think of sociological science as “value 
free.”  Gouldner’s study is explicitly reflective:  he tries to present a sociology of 
sociology, something that is, of course, fraught with difficulty yet that nevertheless has 
                                                
11 Dotson (2012) entitles her paper:  “How is This Paper Philosophy?”  Her paper primarily 
addresses the coercive nature of the implicit norms of the discipline that tend to silence what is 
potentially distinctive in the voices of female and minority philosophers.  But the mechanism she 
identifies is general:  work that in any way veers away from fundamental questions posed as 
universal and mostly formal can be met with the demand for proof of identity:  how is this 
philosophy?  That this question is so often asked in this rhetorical way suggests both that a) there 
really is no explicit theoretical agreement about what philosophy is and b) the background 
assumption that philosophy is identical with the professional image is fairly widespread. 
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the potential to yield genuine insights about a certain kind of intellectual practice.  
Gouldner chides sociologists for not taking themselves as objects of their own study but 
instead thinking of themselves as somehow immune from normal social determinants:  
“Sociologists must surrender the human but elitist assumption that others believe out of 
need whereas they believe because of the dictates of logic and reason”  (Gouldner (1970) 
p. 26).  Something similar applies to philosophers, who are disinclined to think of 
anything constraining their work beyond logic and reason. 
Graff (1987) argues that his discipline, English, could be reinvigorated by 
including in its teaching the very theoretical disputes that he describes in giving a 
historical account of the development of the discipline in the United States.  He argues 
that there are disciplinary pressures preventing this:  it is thought that to expose these 
disputes might invite the charge that the discipline itself lacks unity and coherence.  
Graff’s book combines insider disciplinary knowledge (he has published widely on 
English theory) with a keen sense of the history of the discipline and ends up presenting a 
vivid and challenging critique of the practice of English. 
Like Gouldner and Graff, Clarke & Primo (2012) offer a critique of their 
discipline, political science, from the inside.  For Clarke and Primo, the problem facing 
political science is its inadequate grasp of some of the finer philosophical points 
concerning what it is to try to model reality.  They say, “Our goal in this book is to 
provide political scientists with a coherent way of thinking about the models that pervade 
our discipline” (Clarke & Primo (2012) p. 1), and they begin by arguing that much work 
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in political science betrays incoherent thinking about these models.  Interestingly, they 
draw on work in the philosophy of science to support their view about how models 
represent.  (See also Strickland (2011) for an insider history of the development of 
composition studies, and Townsend (2013) for an insider analysis of the 
professionalization of the discipline of history). 
So there is a (small) body of work that can be thought of as disciplinary critique 
from the inside, and this dissertation is an addition to that body.  Such works fulfill an 
important function in that they create some breathing room in the otherwise shrinking 
balloon of space that each discipline inhabits (to borrow a metaphor from Andrew Abbott 
that is fleshed out in chapter 3).  Think of them as blowing some air into the balloon 
when it is about to collapse: just when it might appear that literature professors have 
nothing more to say about Jane Austen, a literature professor can pose the question:  what 
institutional features of the world make it possible for us to write and lecture about Jane 
Austen as we do?  What are the conditions under which we work?  Is there any value to 
what we do?  Suddenly the intellectual space inhabited by literature professors is 
enlarged, and new important questions get asked.  The questions are important because 
they focus attention on practice. 
 One difficulty is that there is no clear sense in which a literature professor has the 
competence to answer such questions – speaking squarely as a professional matter, the 
knowledge and skills acquired in the course of his training make the literature professor 
an expert about literature but not about academic practices, or social value, or the 
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political economy of the university.  This perhaps explains why it is that sociologists are 
much more likely to engage in this sort of project – they at least have the professional 
credentials to raise and answer questions about social practices (even though, as 
Gouldner says, sociologists are inhibited from seeing themselves in the same way as they 
see their typical subjects). 
 Still there is a tension in either horn of this dilemma:  the literature professor who 
takes on the critique of his discipline lacks expertise in the critique of academic 
disciplines, or social systems, or social values.  On the other horn the sociologist or 
political scientist lacks insider knowledge about what literature professors actually know 
and do.  The sociologist who decides to study literature professors risks missing her 
target due to ignorance of her subject; the literature professor who studies literature 
professors risks missing the target through mishandling his methods.  Short of acquiring 
full on training and membership in two academic specialties, this dilemma might seem 
irresolvable:  some intellectual space is paradoxically there for everyone to see yet 
unapproachable.  
 But if we can’t have a work that inhabits both the worlds of the philosopher and 
the social scientist, it is good to have studies from both worlds:  work that tries to situate 
philosophy in a social and political economy without insider knowledge and work that 
tries to describe from the inside the ways in which social determinants appear to infect 
philosophy.  This study aspires to be one of the latter. 
  20 
 There are works by non-philosophers that treat philosophy as a social practice 
within a structure of other such practices; Collins’s The Sociology of Philosophies (1998) 
at 1,098 pages is by far the most ambitious.  But Collins, in looking to uncover the 
general social structures that influence philosophy, is forced to reify philosophy: he 
begins with a conception of what it is, and then finds something like it in a variety of 
world cultures (e.g. Ancient Greece, Ancient China, India, modern Japan, Medieval 
Europe, etc…).  This is perhaps unavoidable in a work such as his, but the pre-emptive 
identification of the essence of philosophy as “…the turf of intellectuals who perpetually 
re-dig their conceptual foundations” (Collins (1998) p. 856) ends up just treating the 
professional image of philosophy as philosophy.     
In a similar manner Stan Godlovitch’s “What Philosophy Might be About: Some 
Socio-philosophical Speculations” (2000) just begins with noting that philosophy is 
concerned with questions like “What is X?” and “What is the fundamental nature or 
essence of X?” (Godlovitch (2000) p. 3), and then considers explanations for this that are 
all taken from earlier works of philosophy.12  He explicitly forbears looking outside 
philosophy for explanations of its practice:   
This account is socio-philosophical with a mildly Socratic seasoning.  It 
says:  Seek not the content of philosophy outside the practice of 
philosophers, and further, seek not the practice of philosophers outside the 
conventions of institutions which make and have made that practice and its 
transmission of content both possible and reliable…. this account takes 
philosophical content to be stably, because willfully, self-perpetuating.  
(Godlovitch (2000) p. 17) 
                                                
12 Godlovitch publishes in philosophical journals but his departmental home is the Department of 
Community Health Sciences at the University of Calgary. 
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But this assumes that the practice of philosophy just is the articles and books that are 
published, and it assumes that philosophers shape their own practice independently of 
surrounding social conditions.  Works about philosophy by non-philosophers like this 
tend to look to high status works of philosophy for sources, and this ends up treating 
assumptions that are part of the professional image as truths about philosophy per se. 
 Joel Isaac’s recent (2012) Working Knowledge:  Making the Human Sciences 
from Parsons to Kuhn does draw attention to the way a particular university’s 
departmental structure affected the development of a school of thinking, and so is an ally 
of this dissertation in bringing to light the ways in which academic thought is conditioned 
by social structures; but as the title indicates, even though he discusses prominent 
philosophers like Quine and an important school of philosophical thought (logical 
positivism), his work is primarily oriented towards the social sciences and not philosophy 
(and it focuses on just one university: Harvard).13 
 There are works by philosophers that explicitly aim to address the social 
structures that influence philosophical practice, though these are rare.  Campbell (2006) is 
one, a laudatory official history of the American Philosophical Association (APA).  It is a 
valuable work of history, but it refrains from theorizing about causal relationships 
between professional organization and philosophical content and instead tries to identify 
particular philosophical contributions that, for example, APA addresses have made to the 
discipline.  It is, that is, still a history of ideas separated from material conditions.   
                                                
13 Isaac is a member of the Faculty of History at Cambridge. 
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 The criticisms of philosophy developed in this dissertation are similar to some 
works of philosophy, works like Rorty’s Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature (1979), 
Kitcher’s “Philosophy Inside Out” (2011) and Rohatyn’s Two Dogmas of Philosophy 
(1977), all of which draw explicitly on Dewey’s work.  Rohatyn’s two dogmas are that 
“(1) philosophy is a branch of knowledge, and (2) the essence of philosophy lies in 
reasoned argument” (Rohatyn (1977) p. 16), and his argument is that like all dogmas 
these mystify the folks who hold them.  He is right, as I argue in this dissertation, but, 
unlike him, I argue that the explanation for this lies at least partly in the fact that 
philosophy is a practice of human beings and so is determined and constrained by 
institutions of social life.  Kitcher, Rohatyn and John Cottingham, in his “What is 
Humane Philosophy and Why is it At Risk” (2009) all claim that part of the problem is 
that philosophers, impressed with the way scientific disciplines have advanced and have 
achieved a kind of cultural authority, want philosophy to be more scientific.  This leads 
philosophers to consider as philosophy only work that has the formal sheen and elegance 
of some scientific work.  Again, this thesis is a close cousin of the one developed here, 
but what I add is an attempt to explain these developments in philosophy in part by 
appealing to institutional features of academic work.   
 Finally there are many histories of philosophy written by philosophers, but these 
almost never take seriously the influence of social structures on philosophical styles and 
content.  John Passmore’s A Hundred Years of Philosophy (1968) occasionally appeals to 
particular styles associated with either Cambridge or Oxford (Passmore (1968) p. 212), 
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but there is no attempt to analyze the development of these characteristic styles in terms 
of the institutions themselves or the different working conditions of philosophers in 
different universities.  Again he does say that “[attempts] to found a new discipline – 
theory of objects, phenomenology, analysis, logical syntax, semantics – were to be a 
feature of twentieth-century philosophy” (Passmore (1968) p. 182), but his explanation 
appeals to conscious decisions philosophers made to distinguish themselves from 
“…psychology or political theory or sociology…” (Passmore (1968) p. 182).  He doesn’t 
explain why such pressures existed or how they determined these philosophical 
responses.  More recent histories like Scott Soames’s two volume Philosophical Analysis 
in the Twentieth Century (2003) explain developments only as philosophical responses to 
philosophical theses and arguments.  Often books that seem superficially to be about the 
way institutions and social practices affect the work philosophers do turn out to be simply 
about the ideas of philosophers.  Chauncey Maher’s The Pittsburgh School of 
Philosophy: Sellars, McDowell, Brandom (2012) seems to promise a reading of these 
influential philosophers focused on their institutional setting.  But the book turns out to 
be an analysis and comparison of the ideas of the three philosophers with scant attention 
paid to the material conditions they shared in virtue of having the same academic home.  
(This point was made in a perceptive review of the book:  Wanderer & Levine (2013)). 
 More historical work often does gesture at situating philosophy in a historical 
context, and there are some works that succeed in showing the way a particular 
philosophy makes sense given what is known about the history (e.g. Snyder (2006)).  But 
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very few works analyze the way the particular social structures that philosophers inhabit 
influence the work they produce – these very few works being for that reason invaluable.   
One such work is Neil Gross’s Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher 
(2008), which does draw connections between Rorty’s philosophical development and 
conditions of work in the changing American academic institutions. 
 The present work draws a connection between a social structure – professionalism 
– and the content of philosophical work.  It does so from inside philosophy, with a 
practitioner’s understanding of what counts as good philosophy, of what professional 
philosophers think the philosophical questions are, and of the mechanisms for achieving 
success in philosophy.  It borrows from the literature on social structure and 
professionalism, undoubtedly in a way that betrays a lack of expertise.  That this is 
unavoidable makes it no less regrettable.  Nevertheless, it is hoped that, in combination 
with studies more grounded in the social sciences, this work from its perch within 
philosophy advances understanding more than it evinces its shortcomings. 
 Finally, to complete this attempt to situate this work, I mention two sorts of 
inspiration.  The first is the work of John Dewey and, to a somewhat lesser extent, 
Theodor Adorno.  A part of what follows is given over to an attempt to rehabilitate 
Dewey’s thought for ongoing work in philosophy, to show where his insights are 
neglected and to show where his view of philosophy can enlighten.  But his work serves 
as inspiration too for the project as a whole.  When Dewey wrote about philosophy he 
always wrote about it as an activity that people engage in.  But it wasn't just his work in 
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philosophy; Dewey took his thought about art, about education and about science to be 
similarly concerned with the way these practices were animated by people and the way 
people lived with them.  This is an avowedly anti-professional stance to take, of course, 
but it is one that is consonant with a picture of philosophy, and of intellectual work more 
generally, that has at least a pulse throughout much of our intellectual tradition.  It is 
currently out of favor, though this work argues that it needn’t be and shouldn’t be.   
 Many years ago when I was an undergraduate philosophy major considering 
graduate school, an advisor (one of three philosophy professors at the liberal arts college 
I attended) scolded me for excluding Arizona from among my options because I didn’t 
think I could tolerate the heat. This same advisor suggested that I disguise my interest in 
India in my application materials (I had studied in India and I was interested in Indian 
classical music and Indian literature).  I didn’t understand at the time that this was merely 
well-intentioned sound professional advice: becoming a philosopher these days means 
making it as easy as possible for other philosophers to see you as a philosopher, and 
concern for such philosophically irrelevant material conditions as climate or interest in 
subjects that are not obviously susceptible to formal or technical treatment looks un-
philosophical. 
 Dewey’s understanding of philosophy was very different.  He thought that 
philosophy could (and did) come out of virtually any form of living, from virtually all 
activities and practices.  And in saying that, it should be added that he understood 
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philosophy to be not something in addition to other activities and practices but something 
that could be an ongoing part of whatever activities one engaged in.  
 So Dewey’s view that doing philosophy is just another way of doing whatever 
people do implies that it has to be understood as responsive to, as in part determined by, 
the conditions of life that people are subject to.  Philosophers of course know that the 
reason farmers don’t grow bananas in Wisconsin is the climate, so that climate sets 
conditions on the ways farmers live and make their living.  And they will acknowledge 
that the public education system determines much that goes on in schools, and that 
control of public resources influences the structures of the universities in which they 
work.  And on and on.  But you won’t find philosophers admitting that philosophy 
responds to such things.14 Of course it is simply common sense and consistent to 
acknowledge that what people do is partly conditioned by the structures in which they 
live, and philosophy is something that people do, after all.  This may not be Dewey’s 
most breathtaking thesis, but it is one that is well worth holding on to because it connects 
the work philosophers do with the rest of life. 
                                                
14 Except for Nietzsche:  
One will ask me why on earth I've been relating all these small things which 
are generally considered matters of complete indifference: I only harm 
myself, the more so if I am destined to represent great tasks.  Answer: these 
small things –nutrition, place, climate, recreation, the whole casuistry of 
selfishness – are inconceivably more important than everything one has 
taken to be important so far.  Precisely here one must begin to relearn. 
(Nietzsche (1989 (1908), p. 256) 
 
But Nietzsche is a special case because, from within the professional image, his writing takes a 
lot of reconstruction to make it philosophical. 
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 My training in philosophy has left me incapable of understanding lots of work 
that others think of as philosophy.  I cannot claim to understand Adorno.  But what even 
a reader like me cannot fail to notice is the strength of Adorno’s commitment to 
preserving the significance of the particular.15  In extremity this means the significance of 
the particularity of people.  What he condemns in instrumental rationality is just that it 
neglects what is particular in service of whatever concept motivates it.  Adorno once 
praised what he called of all things Dewey’s humanity, which is surprising for many 
reasons, perhaps especially to philosophers who think they know that Adorno and other 
critical theorists are anti-humanists.  It is more genuinely surprising because of Adorno’s 
unsparing identification of pragmatism with American consumer culture and instrumental 
reason grown monstrous.   
 But it shouldn’t be so surprising.  What Adorno resisted was the pressure exerted 
in all sorts of ways to see someone as representative of a school or, worse, a view or 
position, to affix to the individual the appropriate ruling concept.16  And this resistance is 
clear in Dewey as well.  The present work then seeks to show what it takes to find Dewey 
the particular philosopher, not Dewey the representative of pragmatism.   
                                                
15 What I do know about Adorno I learned in Richard Leppert's Adorno seminar, one of the best 
and most challenging courses I have ever taken.  I am still trying to come to terms with what I 
read that semester.   
16 This tendency, in many ways responsive to the professional image, is explicit in the survey 
David Chalmers and David Bourget did of the "views" professional philosophers have of the 
"important" philosophical questions.  The assumption was that all philosophers would have easily 
identifiable views.  The assumption is reinforced by the decision to "collapse" all of the responses 
that did not match one of the main options into the category of "other" (Chalmers and Bourget 
(forthcoming), p. 11).   
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 The second inspiration for this work is the large and growing literature in the 
history and philosophy of science, by which I mean work inspired by Kuhn and carried 
on by Bruno Latour and Ian Hacking, among others.17  It is work that goes on in places 
like the philosophy department at the University of Minnesota, where it simply isn’t 
necessary to defend an approach to science that sees it as something that people do and so 
subject to all sorts of external influences and determinants.  It was necessary to defend 
such an approach when it was new, when it made everyone uncomfortable to think of 
science as just another thing people do.  It was necessary to defend such work because it 
did seem to some to threaten the entire tradition of scholarly thought – that is, the 
tradition of seeing scholarly thought as committed to trying to come closer and closer to 
an objective understanding of the way things are anyway, independently of our thinking 
about them.  
Many philosophers continue to take this threat seriously:  philosophers, they say, 
are the ones who reason about the most fundamental things like truth and knowledge; 
unlike sociological studies of ethics, for example, in which the aim is, as Durkheim saw 
it, to establish ethics as “…a social science beside and in the midst of others” (Durkheim 
(1993 (1887)) p. 127), some philosophers have positioned their study of morality as the 
study of unconditioned reason.   Philosophy as understood according to the professional 
image is necessary so long as so many other disciplines ignore these fundamental 
                                                
17 See, for example, Hacking (1983), Hacking (1990), Hacking (1995), Latour and Woolgar 
(1986), Latour (1987), Longino (1990), Shapin and Schaffer (2011 (1985)) and Wimsatt (2007).  
Zammito (2004) is critical of some of this work. 
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questions in pursuit of smaller game:  the norms of actual social groups, or the values of 
actual people.18  For Dewey, as for Mill and Durkheim, for example, this poses a false 
dilemma:  either study morality a priori, and so make it philosophical, or concede that 
here there is only historical and social contingency. 
 The historical and philosophical study of science is now taken for granted in 
many places, even in many philosophy departments, but it isn’t particularly popular with 
practicing scientists.  If the present work succeeds in being a work of ‘philosophy 
studies,’ it won’t be surprising if it isn’t popular with practicing philosophers.  But that is 
no proof of its worth or competence; that's in the pudding. 
 
VI.  Summary of chapters 
 Part 1 of this dissertation, consisting of chapters 2-4, presents a general argument 
about the way academic philosophers read historical philosophers. 
Chapter 2 Even as philosophers frequently say that there is a kind of uncertainty about 
what philosophy is, there is agreement about who the philosophers are and how what they 
do is unique.  In chapter two I offer an analysis of the professional image of philosophy 
                                                
18 In the introduction to The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, Durkheim explicitly positions 
his study of the social origins of religion as a challenge to philosophical studies of religion, which 
he says limit themselves to seeing the problem of religion as one for a priori reason.  But it isn’t 
clear why religion should be unconditioned by social life, he says, and similarly there is no clear 
reason why we should expect philosophy itself to be unconditioned.  It is, after all, like religion, a 
human practice.  An important facet of Dewey’s ethical thought is missed when he is read as a 
philosopher and not in a kind of conversation with Durkheim and other early sociologists. 
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that now dominates academic philosophy.  Briefly it conceives of philosophy as formal, 
fundamental, and committed to a methodology that gives priority to intuitions and 
thought experiments, and it identifies as philosophical historical work that can be read 
according to this conception. 
Chapter 3 The professional image can be thought of as a set of background assumptions 
about philosophy, and then we can ask:  why are these assumptions made?  How do we 
explain the prevalence of these assumptions? I argue that the forces accompanying the 
professionalization of the discipline of philosophy are a significant part of the explanation 
for the prevalence of this way of thinking about philosophy.  This means that the 
professional image doesn’t capture the essence of philosophy but is instead a conditioned 
and contingent way of thinking about what philosophy is.   
Chapter 4 My conclusion of chapter three is important because, as I argue, the set of 
assumptions about what philosophy is leads to misunderstanding of historical work.  
When these assumptions are projected onto historical works, they are read as if they are 
engaged in the same pursuit as contemporary philosophers.  This leads to 
misrepresentations and, more importantly, the loss of insights that are available in this 
historical work.  The particular significance of a historical figure’s thought is lost when 
s/he is under these assumptions.  I show in chapter four that Dewey’s thought has, in a 
general way, been systematically misunderstood by both his admirers and critics because 
these assumptions project onto his work a conception of philosophy that he did not have. 
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 In part 2, consisting of chapters 5 and 6, I present two more detailed accounts of 
historical work that is misrepresented in contemporary philosophy.  I argue that this 
leaves philosophy poorer and less vital than it could be. 
Chapter 5 In contemporary philosophy logic is taken to be the formal study of 
implication.  Epistemology is understood to be the fundamental study of knowledge, 
where that typically means the attempt to refute a set of skeptical problems that arise for 
the knower simpliciter.  When read in these lights, Dewey’s Logic and his earlier writings 
about logic look naïve.  Similarly his interest in scientific method and empirical 
knowledge are often presented as bad philosophy:  he mistook particular problems 
besetting particular enquirers for philosophically fundamental problems of knowledge.  I 
show that in fact Dewey was working within a set of assumptions about philosophy that 
is at odds with the professional image, and that this accounts for persistent 
misunderstandings of his thought.   
Chapter 6 Philosophical studies of ethics typically seek universal, fundamental 
principles of reason that are thought to underlie normative judgment.  I argue that this 
marginalizes important historical work that sees ethics as always engaged in particular 
social settings and confronting particular social problems.  The professional image works 
like this: a philosopher such as Thoreau, who was avowedly speaking to his neighbors 
about shared problems confronting them at a particular time and place, is read by many 
contemporary philosophers as if he were trying to answer the timeless question about the 
good.  This risks losing what is most distinctive about his work.  Similarly Dewey’s 
  32 
educational thought is often presented as work concerning fundamental and timeless 
concepts like learning and teaching, whereas he saw his work as oriented towards solving 
specific problems arising from social movements that occupy a particular historical 
period.  Again, his contributions are misunderstood when they are so situated. 
Chapter 7 The conclusion argues that the professional image is beset with tensions.  I 
identify these and argue that the tensions help to explain the marginal status philosophy 
has in contemporary academic life.  The first step to resolving the tensions is to identify 
their causes.  I argue that philosophers should concern themselves, professionally, with 
their practice.  This would involve identifying the material and institutional conditions of 
their work and noting the roles such forces have on thought.   
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Chapter 2 The Professional Image 
"The cow is there," said Ansell, lighting a match and holding it out over the 
carpet. No one spoke. He waited till the end of the match fell off. Then he 
said again, "She is there, the cow. There, now."  
"You have not proved it," said a voice.  
"I have proved it to myself." 
"I have proved to myself that she isn't," said the voice, "The cow is not 
there." Ansell frowned and lit another match. 
"She's there for me," he declared. "I don't care whether she's there for you or 
not. Whether I'm in Cambridge or Iceland or dead, the cow will be there." 
It was philosophy. They were discussing the existence of objects. Do they 
exist only when there is some one to look at them? or have they a real 
existence of their own? It is all very interesting, but at the same time it is 
difficult. Hence the cow.  
 -E. M. Forster, opening to The Longest Journey (1907) 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 One day my son asked:  “Is pain an emotion?”  We had been talking about what I 
do (philosophy) and, bored with that, he had tried to change the subject.  He didn’t know 
that this is the sort of question that any philosopher will pounce upon, and so I said, 
“Well, let’s think about that.  What is pain?”  And for the rest of the drive home we were 
doing philosophy. 
 At least, we were doing something that looks like what many philosophers have 
come to think philosophy is.  But this activity – asking very general “What is x?” 
questions, framing off-the-cuff definitions and theories (“an emotion is something you 
feel”), using (often fanciful) thought experiments to test these definitions (“what if you 
were given a drug that, without doing anything else, made it impossible for you to feel 
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sad?”), all the while taking our own extemporaneous thoughts as the relevant guide – is it 
philosophy?  It bears a certain similarity to the questioning that goes on in some of 
Plato’s dialogues, and it looks a lot like what Forster’s characters thought philosophy was 
(especially the way objections are given by “a voice,” since what is said is what is 
important, not who’s saying it).  And it is a (much simplified) version of what counts as 
philosophy in many undergraduate courses and in many philosophical journals.  But it 
isn’t what one finds in Hegel, or Nietzsche, or Dewey, or Thoreau.19  So, the question is, 
how does one go about answering the question whether what my son and I were doing 
was philosophy? 
 Well, clearly (one is tempted to say) what is needed is some account of what 
philosophy is, and this account can be arrived at by trying to answer the “what is 
philosophy?” question through framing possible definitions and then looking for counter-
examples.  But then the activity starts to seem essentially circular and potentially endless.   
This accounts for some frustration undergraduates sometimes feel in introductory courses 
in philosophy: philosophy doesn’t seem to get anywhere.   
 Here I pursue a different method.   I begin by developing a picture – I call it the 
professional image – of what many philosophers think philosophy is.20   This picture 
                                                
19 Many philosophers working within the professional image do try to reconstruct the thought of 
these thinkers so that it aligns with the “what is x?” approach.  I discuss the examples of Dewey 
and Thoreau in chapters 5 and 6.. 
20 In most of what follows when I talk about philosophy I mean the academic discipline as it is 
configured in most of the major research universities and colleges in the United States and 
England.  I mean the enterprise that comprises the leading journals, the APA meetings, the 
courses taught to undergraduates, the introductory and other textbooks that are used in those 
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makes a certain kind of activity philosophical – that is to say, the picture is a bundle of 
disciplinary presuppositions that a social group – academic philosophers – projects onto 
the world.  But the picture is one that developed over the course of the 20th century, and it 
developed contemporaneously with the professionalization of the discipline of 
philosophy.  The more substantive thesis I pursue in this dissertation is that the picture 
developed as philosophers professionalized.  So that in fact my son and I were doing 
philosophy given the picture of philosophy that dominates the discipline.  When the 
picture dominates our thinking, we are able to distinguish philosophers from other 
thinkers.  And we are able to identify in a historical work the parts that are genuinely 
philosophical.  But other pictures of philosophy have dominated at different historical 
periods, and there are others operating today along the margins of the academic 
discipline.     
 
                                                                                                                                            
courses, the canonical texts published by Hackett, for example, and in these days the highly 
reflexive and sometimes imperial blogs that track important activities in the discipline.  At times 
it will simplify matters to make use of the term ‘analytic philosophy,' because, as Hans Glock, 
one of its advocates, says, analytic philosophy is “…now the dominant force within Western 
philosophy" (Glock (2008(b)) p. 1).  (Glock supports this claim with a reference to an article by 
the prominent philosopher John Searle, in which Searle says that analytic philosophy dominates 
Western philosophy!)  I mostly avoid referring to ‘analytic philosophy,' because it is part of my 
argument that philosophy under the professional image isn’t just what it is easy to call ‘analytic 
philosophy,’ because philosophy in this sense certainly includes people interested in Hegel and 
Heidegger and Nietzsche and the other ‘continental' philosophers.   They are treated as 
philosophers under the dominant picture, for the most part.  But, as I hope will become clear, I 
don’t at all mean to imply that everyone who calls him or herself a philosopher buys into the 
picture that I present here.  For an interesting critical history of analytic philosophy, see Preston 
(2007); Chase and Reynolds (2010) try to identify the different methodological assumptions made 
by analytic and continental philosophers.  For a brilliant account of the historical episode that 
many see as the commencement of the division between analytic and continental philosophy, the 
confrontation between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer at Davos in 1929, see Gordon (2010).   
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II.  What is philosophy? 
 Philosophers frequently say that the question, "What is philosophy?" is one of the 
central philosophical questions.  Brian Leiter, for example, in his introduction to a 
collection of essays on the state of the discipline, begins this way: 
Philosophy, perhaps more than any other discipline, has been plagued by 
debates about what the discipline is or ought to be.  … Meta-philosophical 
questions, i.e. questions about what philosophy is, its proper concerns, 
methods, and limitations, and its rightful ambitions are inevitably on the 
table in any consideration of philosophy’s future.  Yet ‘what philosophy is’ 
is also the implicit subtext anytime one ‘does philosophy’.  (Leiter (2004) p. 
1) 
 
In a similar vein, Hans-Johann Glock says: 
The very nature of philosophy is itself a contested philosophical issue, and 
views about this issue are philosophically controversial.  Although the 
investigation of the proper aims and methods of philosophy is nowadays 
known as ‘metaphilosophy’, it is not a distinct higher-order discipline but an 
integral part of philosophy itself.  (Glock (2008) p. 6) 
 
Still, and surprisingly if Leiter and Glock are correct about all of this uncertainty, there is 
remarkable agreement about who the philosophers are, about what counts as good 
philosophical writing, and about the sort of question a philosophical question is.  How 
can there be so much agreement if no one knows what philosophy is?  Why don’t we find 
people constantly making mistakes about who the philosophers are? 
 Under the guidance of an experienced teacher or writer there is never any doubt 
that Socrates is a philosopher, or that Descartes and Mill are philosophers, or that Brian 
Leiter is a philosopher.  There is no room for questioning whether the speaker on an APA 
panel is a philosopher.  If you don’t know that, you probably haven’t been doing the 
reading or listening to the lectures.  From the inside there is conviction.  The enterprise 
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depends on there being this conviction: philosophy is a field of study.  One comes to 
know one’s way about in it.  One learns to see things the right way (or one decides to 
study comparative literature or science).  The key fact, seldom acknowledged in these 
discussions, is that one’s certainty about what philosophy is emerges from social 
interactions and is realized or actualized in social interactions: lectures, classroom 
discussions, suggestions from trusted advisors about what to read, comments on papers, 
etc…..  The importance of this conviction often emerges in discussions where one might 
expect it to come under scrutiny.  For example, in mildly defending the use of labels in 
philosophical discussion, Glock says that “… some labels are essential if we are to detect 
important similarities and differences between various thinkers and positions, and if we 
are to tell a coherent story about the historical development of our subject” (Glock (2008) 
p. 8).  In other words, the professional image of philosophy as a coherent discipline 
requires that certain kinds of similarities and differences be reified into disciplinary facts 
while others are ignored.  Labeling key views performs this work. 
 But once we try to look at philosophy from the outside, without making the 
assumptions and tacit agreements that we make in order to do philosophy, the question of 
what philosophy is looks like a very deep and difficult question.  The historical texts have 
very little on the surface in common (compare Plato’s dialogues to Spinoza’s Ethics, 
written in the form of definitions and proofs; or compare anything from the 18th or 19th 
century with what gets published today).  Trying to consider philosophy as a whole, it 
doesn’t look like it has a set of problems or subjects or methods.  From the outside, and in 
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the absence of the kinds of implicit agreements that the picture of philosophy furnishes, it 
isn’t at all clear that there is anything to ask the “what is it?” question about. 
 But the nature of philosophy isn’t a central question of philosophy from the 
inside.  Philosophers think of it as the philosophy of philosophy and call it 
'metaphilosophy', and, even though it has a technical name, it isn’t a highly regarded part 
of the discipline.21  This is because, in spite of the fact that we are frequently reminded at 
the beginning of discussions of the profession or in reflections on the profession or in 
introductions to the profession that the nature of philosophy is a central philosophical 
problem, it isn’t.  It’s a historical problem, or perhaps a sociological or cultural problem, 
and it is an educational problem.  From within the professional image, it’s pretty clear 
what philosophy is: philosophy is the discipline that asks very general, foundational and 
timeless questions and that uses reason to try to answer them.  There is no mystery about 
that. 
 In this chapter I characterize the professional image of philosophy, the picture 
within which so much philosophy gets done.  In his book about Heidegger and Cassirer, 
Peter Gordon describes the disagreement between them as originating in competing 
images of mankind; he says “I will refer to it as an image largely because I wish to 
underscore the point that intellectuals often ground their argumentation in a basic picture, 
the character of which is as much aesthetic and metaphorical as it is rational” (Gordon 
                                                
21 At a talk given in my department recently a high-status professor’s criticism was that the 
speaker was doing metaphilosophy, and when you start doing metaphilosophy “no philosophy 
gets done.” 
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(2010) p. 5).  This is how I see the professional image: it provides the grounds for doing 
philosophy, though it isn’t arrived at by philosophers doing philosophy.  Students are 
initiated into it, not overtly taught about it: nobody ever teaches philosophy students to 
make up weird examples.  It is discussed, when it is discussed at all, in value-laden 
aesthetic terms: philosophers are told to write clearly, some are said to write elegantly.  
The image is doing the work of sorting out the philosophers from other writers.  Without 
the image there really would be no agreement about what philosophy is. 
But what picture of philosophy does the professional image furnish?  First, this 
picture, unsurprisingly given the broad range of things that philosophers have been 
interested in, is primarily formal (you can do philosophy about anything, from objects to 
emotions, from science to art).  Second, according to the picture the properly 
philosophical questions are general, fundamental and timeless: do objects exist?  What is 
beauty?  Finally, the picture includes a methodological practice: many philosophers use 
thought experiments and appeals to intuitions or general background shared beliefs to 
establish their conclusions.  These three characteristics are connected.  The subject matter 
is identified most simply by a list of very general questions about which many people 
have strong intuitions; and what makes form formal is that particulars have been washed 
of their particularities.  But it will be helpful to discuss each one separately to try to gain 
a clearer focus on the picture.   
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The picture is doing a lot of work but mostly behind the scenes – it makes us 
think that a philosopher, whatever period he is from,22 is someone who has views about 
the main questions, views that can be stated quickly using specialized language and, 
oftentimes, formalisms.  The views are meant to be supported by arguments that can be 
assessed independently of knowledge of any other specialized disciplines so that they are 
amenable to formal analysis.  This picture determines a way of reading even historical 
works of philosophy.  Jonathan Barnes makes this picture explicit in his book on the Pre-
Socratic philosophers:     
Philosophy lives a supercelestial life, beyond the confines of space and 
time; and if philosophers are, perforce, small spatio-temporal creatures, a 
minute attention to their small spatio-temporal concerns will more often 
obfuscate than illumine their philosophies. (Barnes (1982) p. xii) 
 
More recently, here is Don Garret, a respected scholar of modern philosophy, on how one 
can profitably interpret modern texts: 
One especially useful strategy for accurate evaluation is the simple one of 
reconstructing an author’s argument formally, in the words of the text itself, 
with individual propositions as numbered steps and with relations of 
inferential support clearly labeled.  When done well, this provides specific 
and accurate objects for critical assessment, since each undefended premise 
can be assessed for truth or falsehood, and each inference can be assessed 
for validity or invalidity, strength or weakness; the restriction to outlining 
material that is actually present in the text helps to provide an accurate 
version of the argument to be evaluated. (Garret (2004) p. 68 (emphasis in 
original)) 
 
Garret is careful here to stress the importance of using original words, but of course that 
requirement gets weakened when it comes to interpreting the claims.  Garret’s interesting 
                                                
22 Canonical philosophers are all men and most philosophers still are men.  The problem 
professional philosophy has with women was mentioned in the introduction and is discussed in 
the conclusion. 
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article defends the notion that, by doing this sort of work – formally restating a view so 
that truth and validity can be assessed more easily – one is advancing the philosophical 
project:  “Much of the excitement of the history of modern philosophy lies in the range of 
its application to contemporary philosophical debate – which has arguably never been 
greater” (Garret (2004) p. 69).  And, more programmatically, Bennett says in his two 
volume work on six modern philosophers, “Sometimes, I contend, a philosopher’s 
proclaimed doctrine may be better understood as a misformulation of something 
different, more interesting, and closer to the truth” (Bennett (2001) v. I, p. 8).  Getting at 
the true doctrine obviously implies reformulating what has been misformulated; attending 
to formal matters assists this reformulation because it abstracts away from historical and 
other forms of contingency and allows the focus to be on the purported answers to the 
timeless questions. 
 
III. The dominant picture – the professional image 
III.1   A penchant for formalism 
 We have seen Don Garrett’s advice that, when we read historical works, an aim is 
to extract arguments and display them “formally.”  This attention to form is explicable 
mainly as the result of the development of the understanding of logic and validity; the 
powerful tools of logical analysis that were developed in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries gave philosophy a language of its own (this is discussed in chapter 5).  A 
prominent feature of contemporary philosophical practice is the use of variables and 
  42 
symbols in written work.  This signals that the argument under consideration is amenable 
to formal analysis.  Moreover, one of the primary justifications for the development of 
the tools of logical analysis was that it could overcome sources of unclarity and general 
messiness that plague natural languages – the ideal way of presenting reasoning is in a 
formal language that is clear because unambiguous and untainted by allusion, 
connotation, metaphor, and the rest of the adornments of natural language.  For an 
example drawn more or less randomly from a very recent edition of one of the most 
important all-purpose journals in the profession (The Philosophical Review), here is 
David Chalmers describing “…a common proposal for characterizing verbal disputes…”: 
A dispute over the truth of S is verbal if S is definitionally equivalent to S1 
for one party and definitionally equivalent to S2 for the other, and the parties 
agree on the truth-values of S1 and S2. (Chalmers (2011) p. 518) 
 
We see here, in this utterly typical example, a characteristic presentation of philosophy:  a 
putative definition containing variables.  It isn’t clear, from the outside, what is gained by 
the use of variables in this case, and, while this form of writing isn’t necessarily any 
worse than any other, using it is a mark of membership, and definitions of this sort are 
primed for being plugged into more elaborate logical matrices. 
 Garrett alludes to the tools of logical or formal analysis when he mentions 
numbering of premises.  The idea that guides formalism in philosophy is that the proper 
philosophical aspect of a piece of writing can be captured in a form of writing that has 
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sloughed off all forms of literary adornment.23  What is literary in a work of philosophy is 
then thought of as not central to the core philosophical content.  In this way the 
commitment to formalism allows philosophers to think of their work as continuous with 
historical works that, plainly, do take advantage of the same characteristics of natural 
language that philosophers try to silence in their formalisms.24  In this way the penchant 
for formalism does end up making a substantive contribution to the reading of historical 
figures by selectively treating parts of what is written as philosophical content.  The 
contemporary picture is projected into the past and serves to justify itself.   
                                                
23 Mulhall (2001) opens with a description of what Anthony Kenny wrote in a review of Stanley 
Cavell’s The Claim of Reason as giving “…a particular picture of the essence of philosophical 
writing” (p. 1).  Mulhall’s book concerns the ways in which some philosophers – Cavell, 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Kierkegaard – have tried to develop a philosophical voice that 
doesn’t make some substantial commitments that one makes by writing in the dominant style.  
Part of my aim in this dissertation is similar though more limited: I want to explain how the 
dominant picture interferes with a reading of Dewey and of Thoreau that accepts their 
conceptions of philosophical reflection.  
24 Sandra Peterson draws attention to a famous example:  Gilbert Ryle called the digression in the 
Theaetetus “philosophically quite pointless” (Peterson (2011) p. 59).  Plato’s texts have tended to 
be read by philosophers for the last 150 years as containing arguments for views that are at times 
hard to pin down because of the literary qualities of the texts and as containing much else besides 
that is not philosophical.  Typically philosophers have tried to separate the literary qualities from 
the philosophical content.  For example, they tend to ignore the scene setting that goes on at the 
beginning of many dialogues, they tend to ignore the fact that what are depicted are discussions, 
and they tend to ignore wordplay and other “ornaments.”  Peterson’s account takes all of these 
things as relevant to interpreting the texts, and, unsurprisingly, her interpretation is at odds with 
the dominant readings.  
 While it is true that there are similarities between a picture of philosophy that emerges 
from the dominant way of reading the texts (Peterson gives an outline of one that emerges from 
the Theaetetus on pp. 61-62) and the picture I claim emerged in the 20th century, there are many 
ways in which the pictures differ and, moreover, it is because one can find elements of the 
currently dominant picture in historical texts that the dominant picture seems to capture 
something essential about what philosophy is.   
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 George Pappas’s recent monograph on Berkeley makes this explicit.  Towards the 
end of the introduction in an “Excursus on Methodology,” Pappas says about Berkeley’s 
literary style: 
The main difficulty with the Three Dialogues comes with the occasional 
passage in which Philonous gives an oratory on the beauty and organization 
and design of nature.  While this is of great literary value, philosophically it 
causes difficulties, because it falls short of explicitly stating some thesis.  
(Pappas (2000) p. 21) 
 
If philosophers really were uncertain about what philosophy is, this sort of reasoning 
would beg the question.  But most philosophers are quite confident about what 
philosophy is – the picture they have is not at all fuzzy.  Philosophy, at a minimum, 
explicitly states theses and defends them with argument.  The problem with writing that 
has “literary value” is that it cannot straightforwardly be rendered symbolically or 
formally, simply because a part of its value is the particular vehicle of its expression.  The 
language is doing more than containing a content that can more easily be contained or 
presented in an artificial formal language.  But with a picture in place according to which 
what cannot be rendered formally is not philosophical, patterns of thought, modes of 
argumentation, and methods of reflection that do not assume the picture or that cannot be 
rendered legible by the picture,25 are either missed or actively ignored.  We see this in 
Pappas’s monograph – whereas Berkeley is throughout his writing committed to 
defending the views of the common people and so almost never indulges in any kind of 
                                                
25 Philosophers – like Rousseau, Thoreau, Wittgenstein and Cavell, to name a few – who 
experiment with forms of writing to draw attention to deep-seated habits of reasoning are 
persistently misunderstood when the picture is projected onto readings of their texts. 
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specialized or technical language, and whereas he indulges in poetic writing meant to 
attract a wide audience (much to the annoyance of some contemporary philosophers), 
Pappas’s work is replete with reconstructions like the following, purported to capture 
Berkeley’s thesis about immediate perception: 
(1) An object O is immediately seen by an observer S at time t = (i) O is 
seen by S at t, and (ii) it is false that O would be seen by S at t only if S 
were to see some object R at t, where R is not identical to O.  (Pappas 
(2000) p. 149) 
 
The justification for this kind of violence to the original expressions of historical figures 
is that, when put this way, their work can more easily be seen to be a part of the project of 
philosophy.26  Jonathan Bennett makes this clear in the preface to his volume on Locke, 
Berkeley and Hume:   
I do not aim to be scholarly… Nor are my concerns historical: they relate 
primarily to three topics, and only secondarily to three philosophers.  I hope 
to contribute to the understanding of the latter, not by presenting an amply 
rounded picture of their thought (even on central themes), but by making it 
easier to get a firm hold on the logic of some of what they wrote.  (Bennett 
(1971) p. v) 
 
Here what is interesting is not so much the constriction of interest – all writing blinds 
itself to some things – but the idea that what the philosopher is most keenly interested in 
(as against the historian or biographer) is the logic of what was written.  This is what 
merits philosophical attention.   
John Dewey avoided formal expression; he advocated against exclusive 
philosophical attention to formal logic because he thought that it tended to solidify 
                                                
26 It is part of the dominant picture that philosophy is written for philosophers.  This is an 
important difference between the dominant picture and the picture that Dewey had – Dewey, like 
Thoreau and in his way Berkeley, thought of themselves as participating in a public discussion. 
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patterns of thinking that were as yet not fully understood.  In his preface to his Logic 
(1938) Dewey explained his reasons for eschewing formalisms: 
In the present state of logic, the absence of any attempt at symbolic 
formulation will doubtless cause serious objection in the minds of many 
readers.  This absence is not due to any aversion to such formulation.  On 
the contrary, I am convinced that acceptance of the general principles set 
forth will enable a more complete and consistent set of symbolizations than 
now exists to be made.  The absence of symbolization is due, first, to a point 
mentioned in the text, the need for a development of a general theory of 
language in which form and matter are not separated; and, secondly, to the 
fact that an adequate set of symbols depends upon prior institution of valid 
ideas of conceptions and relations that are symbolized.  Without fulfillment 
of this condition, formal symbolization will (as so often happens in the past) 
merely perpetuate existing mistakes while strengthening them by seeming to 
give them scientific standing.  (Dewey (LW v. 12 (1938) p. 4) 
 
The “existing mistakes” he has in mind are precisely those associated with thinking that 
reasoning can be given a fully formal analysis.  The penchant for formalism in the 
contemporary picture has made Dewey’s work hard to read for many philosophers. 
 
III.2  A penchant for generality, fundament and timeless questions 
Philosophers claim no monopoly on conceptual analysis, just generic 
expertise. 
 -Sorenson (1992) p. 111 
 
 If the picture that dominates contemporary philosophy is one that privileges 
formalism, there is still the question about content:  what are philosophers concerned with 
when they apply their formal tools?  As a discipline philosophy must mark out a territory 
that distinguishes it from other university departments.  Typically philosophers mark their 
territory by highlighting the sort of questions they ask, questions that are normally not 
asked by other disciplines and certainly not with the kind of abstractness and formal rigor 
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with which philosophers ask them.  These questions are general conceptual questions 
that, in virtue of their generality, can be thought of as timeless – anyone at any time, it 
seems, can ask:  what is beauty?  When they do, they are asking the core question of 
philosophical aesthetics.  Such questions are also thought to be fundamental questions, 
though there is seldom any explicit attempt to explain why the most general questions are 
also the most fundamental.  This is one of the a priori disciplinary commitments that 
gives the picture its solidity.   
 This penchant for the big questions is apparent most clearly in works addressed to 
the lay reader.  One such work is called The Big Questions:  Philosophy for Everyone.  In 
it, Nils Rauhut defines philosophy as “…the attempt to develop a ‘big picture’ view of 
the universe with the help of reason” (Rauhut (2006) p. 5).  We have seen that 
philosophers typically understand reason as a capacity for performing formal analyses of 
arguments.  The “big picture” that Rauhut describes is achieved by framing answers to 
big, general, timeless questions.  For example, the chapter entitled “What do we know?” 
begins with the paradigmatic philosophical question:  “What is knowledge?”  (Rauhut 
(2006) p. 62).  This question, Rauhut says, marks out the field of epistemology:  “This 
project of determining the scope and limits of knowledge is the main part of 
epistemology” (Rauhut (2006) p. 18).   
Another such book, Simon Blackburn’s Think:  A Compelling Introduction to 
Philosophy, offers this on the inside flap of its cover:  “This is a book about the big 
questions in life:  knowledge, consciousness, fate, God, truth, goodness, justice.  It is for 
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anyone who believes there are big questions out there….” The book begins this way 
(obviously the source of the list on the cover flap): 
This book is for people who want to think about the big themes:  
knowledge, reason, truth, mind, freedom, destiny, identity, God, goodness, 
justice.  These are not the hidden preserve of specialists. They are things 
that men and women wonder about naturally, for they structure the ways we 
think about the world and our place in it.  They are also themes about which 
thinkers have had things to say.  In this book I try to introduce ways of 
thinking about the big themes.  (Blackburn (1999) p. 1) 
 
Blackburn goes on to say that these questions arise from "self-reflection" (Blackburn 
(1999) p. 4).  In other words, these are questions that are not tied to any particular 
historical time or social milieu.  Blackburn’s writing makes clear that they are, for him, 
simply natural questions that arise for any human who thinks.  It follows that they are the 
same questions for any human at any time; hence they are timeless.  This is the picture of 
philosophy that its practitioners describe when they address the general reader. 
 But it is also the picture that animates these practitioners when they are 
addressing other professionals.  Wilfrid Sellars, described in the entry about him in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as a “philosopher’s philosopher” (deVries (2011)), 
famously said:  “The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how 
things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible 
sense of the term” (Sellars (2007 (1962)), p. 369).  Leiter in his edited collection says, in 
characterizing the influential “naturalist turn” in recent philosophy, that “…naturalists 
believe that the problems that have worried philosophers (about the nature of the mind, 
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knowledge, action, reality, morality, and so on) are indeed real” (Leiter (2004) p. 3).  And 
here again is Glock:27 
Philosophy as a distinctive intellectual pursuit is constituted at least in part 
by problems of a peculiar kind.  These problems are supremely abstract and 
fundamental, and they include questions such as ‘Can we acquire genuine 
knowledge?’, ‘How is the mind related to the body?’, and ‘Are there 
universally binding moral principles?’.  (Glock (2008) p. 872) 
 
It is clear, then, that the picture philosophers have is of a subject that is primarily 
concerned with answering general, fundamental questions that occur to anyone, at any 
time or place, when he reflects.28  
 This focus on general questions ironically serves the further purpose of giving 
philosophy a history.  Though the questions are timeless, there is a history of asking them 
and trying out answers to them.  The importance of this history is debated among 
philosophers,29 but there is virtually unanimous agreement that there are key historical 
thinkers who were philosophers in virtue of their having addressed these fundamental 
questions.   This allows the writing of histories of philosophy, and the teaching of courses 
                                                
27 Leiter and Glock, of course, were seen above repeating the canard that philosophers don’t know 
what philosophy is!   
28 See also Cohen (1986) for a defense of the claim that philosophy is characterized by pursuit of 
general questions: 
The philosophical question might be ‘What makes a belief a reason for 
doing something?’ but not ‘Why did you go to London yesterday?’  
Similarly the reason for the prevalence of malaria in a hot and swampy 
country is not philosophically important, but the general nature of causal 
explanation (or of truth) is.  (Cohen (1986) p. 55) 
29 Glock (2008(a)) defends analytic philosophers against the charge that they are ahistorical by 
arguing that they are appropriately concerned just with the philosophical content of the thought of 
historical philosophers.  But he warns that reading historical philosophers can breed laziness:  
what is philosophically interesting about Hume, for example, ought to be independently 
discoverable by anyone who thinks hard enough! 
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in history of philosophy – indeed, this interest in its own history is taken to be distinctive 
of the discipline of philosophy when it is thought of as akin to the sciences.30  Bertrand 
Russell’s immense History of Western Philosophy aims to describe the “milieu” from 
which each significant philosopher he treats emerged, but lest this become merely an 
exercise in intellectual history Russell, in his introduction, articulates the conception of 
philosophy from which the book springs:  philosophy exists somewhere between science 
and religion: 
Almost all the questions of most interest to speculative minds are such as 
science cannot answer, and the confident answers of theologians no longer 
seem so convincing as they did in former centuries.  Is the world divided 
into mind and matter, and, if so, what is mind and what is matter?  Has the 
universe any unity or purpose?  Is it evolving towards some goal?  Are there 
really laws of nature or do we believe in them only because of our innate 
love of order? … Must the good be eternal in order to deserve to be valued, 
or is it worth seeking even if the universe is inexorably moving towards 
death?  (Russell (1945) p. xiii) 
 
Identifying the subject matter of philosophy in this way makes it possible to identify 
philosophical content in historical writing that is often presented in forms (dialogues, 
poems, aphorisms) that have fallen out of favor among professional philosophers.  Hence 
the central importance of the development of formal languages for the presentation of 
historical writing.  Even a more recent work dealing with more recent history depends on 
this picture of philosophy – John Passmore in his A Hundred Years of Philosophy 
(covering English philosophy from 1850 to 1950) worries about coverage but hopes to 
                                                
30 Though it is not uncommon to hear philosophers compare philosophy to science, and indeed for 
self-proclaimed naturalists to say that science has the final word, still many philosophers have an 
idealized and simplistic conception of science.  See the essays in Wimsatt (2007) for an account 
of science, unfamiliar to many philosophers, that emphasizes its messiness. 
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have “… drawn attention … to a reasonable proportion of the most important work in 
‘pure philosophy’ which has been published since 1957” (Passmore (1968) p. 9).  The 
‘pure philosophy’ he has in mind is philosophy addressing the central questions of 
epistemology, metaphysics and logic. 
 In sum, then, generality and formalism work together to enable philosophers to 
think of themselves as contending with a subject that is both very old and at the same 
time timeless.  Historical works are read for their way of attending to the timeless 
problems.  Works of philosophy that discuss historical figures typically differentiate 
themselves from purely historical works by attending to the content in the work that can 
be seen as responding to the very questions that define the discipline today.  Differences 
in expression are seen as contingent and ideally overcome through the introduction of 
formal techniques of interpretation and analysis.  We will see how this picture treats an 
historical figure like Dewey, whose main philosophical interest was in seeing how the 
historical and social contexts in which humans live open up possibilities for improving 
life.  That is, for Dewey, philosophy is not timeless but historical.   
 
III.3  A penchant for intuitions and thought experiments 
The traditional methods of philosophy are armchair ones:  they consist of 
thinking, without any special interaction with the world beyond the chair, 
such as measurement, observation or experiment would typically involve. 
(Williamson (2007) p. 1) 
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If philosophers picture themselves as asking general, fundamental questions for 
which formal means of expression are taken to be ideal, what sort of method is 
appropriate?  Clearly no naïve empirical investigation is going to be sufficient – you 
cannot observe the concept GOOD to determine its necessary and sufficient conditions, 
and you cannot bring it into the lab to perform experiments on it.  This presents a prima 
facie problem for contemporary philosophers under the sway of the dominant picture 
because they like to think of themselves as aligned with the sciences in producing 
knowledge, and not aligned with what they consider the “softer” disciplines of English, 
Comparative Literature and the like.  Roy Sorenson makes this explicit in his defense of 
the method of thought experiment: “…philosophy differs from science in degree, not 
kind.  Understand science, understand the parameters to be varied, and you understand 
philosophy” (Sorenson (1992) p. 3). On this picture the sciences are characterized by a 
kind of theoretical elegance that incorporates simplicity and formal expression.  And they 
have experiments to rely on.  The humanities typically lack such elegance and they lack 
experimental methods.  So how does one do philosophy rigorously? 
  Williamson (currently holder of the esteemed Wykeham Professor of Logic chair 
at Oxford, a position fraught with disciplinary power) in the quotation above supplies the 
canonical answer:  philosophers pursue their distinctive methods by thinking.  Here is 
Williamson again, in an “Afterword” to his book The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007), 
describing in general terms what philosophers are about when they do philosophy: 
To reach philosophical conclusions one must reason, usually in areas where it is 
very hard to distinguish valid from invalid reasoning. To make that distinction 
reliably, one must often attend carefully to the semantic form of the premises, 
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the conclusion, and the intermediate steps. That requires implicit semantic 
beliefs about the crucial words and constructions.  (Williamson (2007) p. 284) 
 
But, Williamson bemoans the fact that philosophers tend to be lazy:   
Much contemporary analytic philosophy seems to be written in the tacit hope of 
discursively muddling through, uncontrolled by any clear methodological 
constraints. That may be enough for easy questions, if there are any in 
philosophy; it is manifestly inadequate for resolving the hard questions with 
which most philosophers like to engage. All too often it produces only eddies in 
academic fashion, without any advance in our understanding of the subject 
matter.  (Williamson (2007) p. 286) 
 
In these two passages the key features of the dominant picture are brought into focus:  the 
questions philosophers work on are hard because they are abstract and fundamental.  The 
reasoning is so subtle that formal methods of analysis are the only tool sharp enough for 
the job.  The only thing philosophers have to rely on is reason, and given the human 
nature of most philosophers, the tendency towards laziness and sloppiness is always 
lurking.  The antidote to this – the way to preserve the self-image of philosophy as akin to 
science and not to the soft humanities – is for philosophers to discipline themselves: 
Discipline from semantics is only one kind of philosophical discipline. It is 
insufficient by itself for the conduct of a philosophical inquiry, and may 
sometimes fail to be useful, when the semantic forms of the relevant linguistic 
constructions are simple and obvious. But when philosophy is not disciplined 
by semantics, it must be disciplined by something else: syntax, logic, common 
sense, imaginary examples, the findings of other disciplines (mathematics, 
physics, biology, psychology, history, . . .) or the aesthetic evaluation of 
theories (elegance, simplicity, . . .). Indeed, philosophy subject to only one of 
those disciplines is liable to become severely distorted: several are needed 
simultaneously. To be “disciplined” by X here is not simply to pay lip-service 
to X; it is to make a systematic conscious effort to conform to the deliverances 
of X, where such conformity is at least somewhat easier to recognize than is the 
answer to the original philosophical question. Of course, each form of 
philosophical discipline is itself contested by some philosophers. But that is no 
reason to produce work that is not properly disciplined by anything.  
(Williamson (2007) p. 285) 
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 The popular way of advancing the philosophical project that conforms to this 
demand for discipline is the testing of intuitions by posing “thought experiments.”  
Williamson says, “Of all the armchair methods of philosophy, one of the most 
conspicuous is the thought experiment” (Williamson (2007) p. 179).  When a question is 
as fundamental and context-independent as, “what is the good?”, it is hard to know what 
resources one could have for developing an answer other than the “intuitions” one has, 
the things we feel compelled to say about the question just in virtue of being reflective, 
reason-using creatures.  Cohen provides an example of this kind of what else is there 
defense of the use of intuitions: 
Those readers who find themselves unwilling to accept something like the 
following account of intuition and its function in analytical philosophy need 
to ask themselves what alternative source of philosophical premises they 
would propose.  Or would they wish to confine analytical philosophy to the 
hypothetical mode of procedure?  (Cohen (1986) p. 73) 
 
Of course Cohen expects the reader to respond negatively to his rhetorical question; 
apparently there are no other genuine alternatives to intuitions in philosophical 
argument.31 
These intuitions are nurtured by often elaborate, fantastical examples that require 
the thinker to tease out the nature of the concept under investigation.  Machery describes 
some familiar thought experiments:   
                                                
31 Machery (2011) is critical of the use of thought experiments and their intuitions as sources for 
premises in philosophical argument, but he doesn’t offer any alternative (he does, though, appeal 
to cognitive research).  Cappelen (2012) thinks philosophers do not use intuitions, and that the 
appearance of talk about intuitions in philosophical texts is misleading.  Cappelen's argument 
uses a highly selective definition of intuitions, though, and, as he says, he is denying what seems 
to be a widespread and widely accepted practice. 
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Thought experiments are a distinctive feature of contemporary analytic 
philosophy, and many influential arguments rest on premises supported by 
judgments elicited by thought experiments.  Just think of the Godel cases 
and Twin Earth in the philosophy of language, Mary the neuroscientist and 
zombies in the philosophy of mind, Gettier cases in epistemology, and 
trolley cases or the Society of Music Lovers in ethics.  Philosophers seem to 
assume that the judgments elicited by such thought experiments have an 
important role to play in the growth of philosophical knowledge. (Machery 
(2011) p. 191) 
 
The often-fantastical nature of these thought experiments allows Williamson and other 
defenders to claim that philosophy requires above all a creative imagination.32  It is 
instructive to see that even philosophers critical of “arm-chair” methods often rely on the 
very same kind of thought experiments to perform “empirical” studies.  Recently there 
has been interest in so-called “experimental philosophy” or “x-phi,” in which 
philosophers typically use surveys to elicit intuitions from ordinary people about the 
standard philosophical thought experiments (zombies, trolleys, etc.…) (see Knobe and 
Nichols (2008), Weinberg, Nichols and Stich (2001).33 
                                                
32 The dominant picture allows philosophers to see even cognitive capacities in a particular light.  
Thus they have little understanding of what imagination means in, for example, the Romantic 
literature that so influenced Emerson and Thoreau.   
33 Consider how the debate about experimental philosophy is carried out.  Williamson, a critic of 
the movement, does not deny that what philosophers rely on in making progress is philosophical 
knowledge; rather he criticizes experimental philosophers for looking to “folk” intuitions rather 
than the intuitions of philosophical experts – those trained to do philosophy (Williamson (2011)).  
Machery argues that the claim that thought experiments do elicit judgments that can be used as 
premises in philosophical arguments is subject to grave skeptical objections, and he denies that 
there is evidence that philosophers have an expertise that would make them immune from these 
skeptical considerations (Machery (2011)).  Machery’s argument appeals to evidence from the 
literature on cognitive capacities.  Machery is in an History and Philosophy of Science 
department, so it isn’t entirely surprising that he is somewhat dubious about the dominant picture 
of philosophy.   Nevertheless his discussion of philosophical knowledge and philosophical 
arguments does seem to indicate that he sees philosophy largely as the activity that goes on under 
the dominant picture. 
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 It is true that historical figures have used imaginative examples in canonical 
philosophical texts: the Ring of Gyges in the Republic, the mad demon in Descartes’s 
Meditations, Locke’s little finger that comes to possess someone’s consciousness, and so 
on.  These examples make plausible the claim that this is simply how philosophers 
reason.  But consider, first, that the dominant picture allows philosophers to identify the 
philosophical content of writings of historical figures.  This makes the claim about the 
distinctive methodology of philosophy circular.  Second, Plato, Descartes and Locke do 
not rely on thought experiments and appeals to intuitions exclusively.  Finally, in none of 
these paradigmatic historical cases is the thought experiment or example used to supply a 
premise for a philosophical argument,34 which is typically the use made of thought 
experiments in philosophy today.  And many historical philosophers, including Dewey, 
simply never engage in thought experiments. 
 
IV.  Conclusion  
We have seen that the picture of philosophy that currently dominates – the 
professional image – provides a conception of the subject matter of philosophy as 
general, fundamental and timeless questions.  It privileges the investigation of these 
questions through formal analysis.  And it encourages thought experiments and appeals to 
                                                
34 At least, it isn’t obvious that this is how the examples are used.  Philosophers working under 
the dominant picture, of course, will offer reconstructions of the works that interpret the examples 
as doing some work to motivate an argument.  But there is certainly nothing in the texts that 
determines this sort of interpretation.  The examples mentioned above are used for persuasive 
purposes, but there are many forms of persuasion. 
  57 
intuition.  In the next chapter an explanation for the development of the professional 
image is offered. The explanation is in terms of features of academic institutions. 
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Chapter 3 A Model of Change in Philosophy 
One could say that the sociological understanding of “reality” and 
“knowledge” falls somewhere in the middle between that of the man in the 
street and that of the philosopher.  The man in the street does not ordinarily 
trouble himself about what is “real” to him and about what he “knows” 
unless he is stopped short by some sort of problem.  … The philosopher, on 
the other hand, is professionally obligated to take nothing for granted, and to 
obtain maximal clarity as to the ultimate status of what the man in the street 
believes to be “reality” and “knowledge.”   
 -Berger & Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 A number of recent publications have addressed the question of contemporary 
philosophical methodology (Cappelen (2012), Chase & Reynolds (2010), Daly (2010), 
Gutting (2009), Williamson (2007)).  The concern to understand and defend philosophic 
methodology arises in an attempt to rationalize the history of philosophy, a history that 
can seem to lack any real unity.  
 Missing from these works, and indeed missing from the literature about 
philosophy generally, is an attempt to comprehend philosophy as an ongoing material 
practice, one that has a particular kind of institutional setting which gives it shape and 
that includes a set of typical social actions:  teaching, lecturing, attending conferences 
and meetings, grading, reviewing, reading.  Works of “meta-philosophy” (as those listed 
above are called) tend to simply ignore these aspects of philosophy, and the sociological 
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work about philosophy is scant; what does exist tends simply to accept the self-image 
presented by authorities in philosophy. In other words it looks past the practice of 
philosophy to high-status texts.  There is a tendency among both philosophers and non-
philosophers to think that philosophy is, by its nature, immune from determining 
conditions that constrain all other practices. 
 For example, one of the key texts in the field of the sociology of knowledge, 
Berger and Luckman’s The Social Construction of Reality (1967), presents a kind of 
tension when it comes to its understanding of philosophy.  The epigraph to this chapter 
shows that they are aware of disciplinary constraints on what philosophers do, but that is 
mostly ignored in their other remarks about philosophy.  In a book devoted to explaining 
the way in which social structures determine knowledge, they are strangely, even naively, 
willing to depict philosophy as a mode of knowledge that is aloof, universal and formal.  
In fact they seem to think that the understanding of philosophy is exempt from the social 
pressures they identify.  They view philosophy as a kind of purchase or perspective from 
which to understand and analyze social structures.  They say, for example, that  
[t]he man in the street inhabits a world that is “real” to him, albeit in 
different degrees, and he “knows,” with different degrees of confidence, that 
this world possesses such and such characteristics.  The philosopher, of 
course, will raise questions about the ultimate status of both this “reality” 
and this “knowledge.”  What is real?  How is one to know?  These are 
among the most ancient questions not only of philosophical inquiry proper, 
but of human thought as such.  (p. 1) 
 
This reproduces the core of the image of philosophy described in the previous chapter:  
philosophers ask timeless questions that occur to anyone who tries to think.  The authors 
refrain from considering for philosophy the kind of social determinants they appeal to in 
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other knowledge domains.  It is this – the thought that philosophy provides a perch from 
which fundamental questions about reality can be posed and answered – that I challenge 
in this chapter.35 
 To pose the question of the origins of the currently dominant picture is to consider 
philosophy to be a practice that has a particular material structure.  Certain features of the 
work philosophers do are determined by the material structure.  This way of thinking 
about philosophy is as unusual in sociology departments as it is in philosophy 
departments.  Nevertheless we will see that the nature of the work philosophers do and 
the self-understandings philosophers have about their work have changed along with 
changes in the setting in which philosophers work.  The basic claim is that 
professionalization and the demands of disciplinarity, as these forces are configured in 
contemporary American research universities, have contributed to the development of the 
professional image.  
 The claim being made here is not that professionalization is the cause of the 
professional image; rather it is simply that the practice of philosophy is shaped in part by 
pressures attendant upon the increasing professionalization of the discipline.  But what, 
specifically, are those pressures, and how do they operate? In the next section of this 
chapter I set the parameters of my discussion. In the third through fifth sections I describe 
                                                
35 There have been a few attempts to analyze philosophy as a discipline from a sociological 
perspective.  But, as I said in the introduction, these have all understandably begun with the 
received picture of what philosophy is.  This means that they have not been able to pose the 
question about how the received picture arose to the level of dominance it currently has.  Collins 
(1988) and (1998) are good examples of this. 
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models that have been used to explain philosophical change. In the sixth I develop a 
model of professionalization, adopted from sociological literature. Then, in the seventh 
section, I give a brief survey of the history of the professionalization of philosophy in the 
twentieth century. 
 
II.  Change in philosophy 
  In an early essay, Dewey sees a common aspiration between poetry and 
philosophy:   
We must, in the cold, reflective way of critical system, justify and organize 
the truth which poetry, with its quick, naïve contacts, has already felt and 
reported.  The same movement of the spirit, bringing man and man, man 
and nature, into wider and closer unity, which has found expression by 
anticipation in poetry, must find expression by retrospection in philosophy.  
Thus will be hastened the day in which our sons and our daughters shall 
prophesy, our young men shall see visions, and our old men dream dreams.  
(Dewey, Poetry and Philosophy, EW v. 3, pp. 123-124) 
 
This was a not uncommon way of understanding the nature of philosophy:  it aimed, like 
poetry, to be “… the vehicle of serious thought and ennobling emotion, that it shall … 
more and more convey genuine and helpful interpretation of life” (Dewey, Poetry and 
Philosophy, EW v. 3, p, 111).  Compare that understanding of philosophy to the one that 
dominates the teaching of philosophy today, one that sees the task of philosophy as 
primarily a matter of formal analysis.  For example, in an introductory text on 
philosophical methods, Daly says that one of the claims made by the prevailing model of 
philosophical analysis is this: 
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(1) An analysis has the logical form of a universally quantified 
biconditional:   
∀x(Fx ⇔ Gx).  (Daly (2010) p. 45) 
 
It is hard to imagine an understanding of philosophy, austere and formal as it is, more at 
odds with the one Dewey held a century earlier.  How did this change happen? 
From a certain distance the history of philosophy can look directionless, like a 
train going nowhere in particular, as if there is no pattern or system to the ways 
philosophers have gone about their business.  Here I survey some models that explain 
these changes.  Some accept that there is no order to the thing:  philosophical views and 
methods, like other cultural practices, shift and change in ways that cannot be given a 
principled explanation.  Perhaps the most common competing model, especially these 
days, is that there is a principled explanation of the shape of the history of philosophy, 
though it takes some work to discern it: the principle is progress on the timeless questions 
of philosophy.  Understood correctly, the history of philosophy is a slow history of 
progress being made on some fundamental questions.   
 Another approach is to grant that from a distance there isn’t a principled order, 
but that for any particular shift there are cultural or social mechanisms that explain it.  
Here again there are competing models.  After surveying the most prominent that have 
been used to interpret the changes in 20th century American philosophy, I develop my 
model: professionalization and the attendant pressures of disciplinarity help to explain 
why philosophy looks the way it does.  I use this model in the following chapters to 
explain the trajectory of the reception of Dewey’s thought about logic and epistemology; 
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to develop a perspective on Dewey’s work in education; and to explain how Thoreau’s 
Walden can be used to challenge conventional thinking about moral philosophy. 
 At this point my general thesis bears repeating:  the way philosophers have come 
to think about philosophy – that it is a discipline with its own problems and methods – is 
a relatively recent development; there are explanations for this that are not philosophical 
in the sense that they follow from purely rational argument; and this recent way of 
thinking about philosophy unnecessarily blinds philosophers to sources of novel and 
potentially fruitful insights.   
 
III.  Models of change  
 Some philosophers have a particular kind of nagging worry, a kind of existential 
trouble that calls into question the things they say in public (to students, or in the 
newspaper) about what philosophy is.  This worry most often comes out in asides in 
memoirs or in the behind-the-scenes shoptalk that goes on in hallways or at conferences.   
The worry is:  can we really justify our way of doing what we do?  Is there an argument 
that justifies this way of doing philosophy, of having just these interests and tools?  Have 
we really and truly refuted idealism (or pragmatism, or Platonism, or ordinary language 
approaches…)?  Is there any reason at all for relying on intuitions in epistemology, 
ethics, philosophy of science, etc.…?  Do we have methods of our own? 
 This phenomenon is not unique to philosophy; Gerald Graff in his Professing 
Literature says that the self-doubt is in some ways the most important institutional 
  64 
feature of the discipline of English in the 20th century.  Current controversies in 
Anthropology36 (Is it science?  Should it be?) are evidence of similar uncertainty in that 
discipline.  As will become clear below, I take this to be a consequence of the 
professionalization of academic disciplines. 
 Here I survey some models that try to offer an understanding of the phenomenon 
of philosophical change.  The first group (sometimes happily, sometimes despairingly) 
admits that there is no final explanation or justification for our way of doing philosophy.  
The second agrees that there is an explanation but disagrees about the nature of the 
justification that the explanation provides.   
 
IV.  (Hap)hazards of philosophy 
The fashion model:  According to some the history of philosophy is directionless.  Instead 
like the whims of tastes in clothing some approaches become fashionable for a while and 
then just as suddenly become outré.  Here the most common thought is that, while we 
                                                
36 Anthropology makes for an interesting comparison.  In America both philosophy and 
anthropology professionalized at the beginning of the 20th century (The American 
Anthropological Association was founded in 1902; The American Philosophical Association in 
1900); both disciplines have had internal debates about the extent to which they are like or a part 
of science and about their place in the humanities.  These debates were central to the well-known 
disputes about Margaret Mead’s work in Samoa.  Like Dewey, Mead was a public intellectual as 
well as an academic.  Derek Freeman’s criticisms of her in his The Fateful Hoaxing of Margaret 
Mead (1999) were largely centered around her lack of professionalism, though he was also 
critical of what he took to be her anti-biological and anti-scientific approach.  With Dewey, the 
familiar charge is that he is not rigorous enough.  These internal disputes continue to be a part of 
anthropology’s professional discourse, as they are in philosophy.  See Shankman (2009), The 
Trashing of Margaret Mead: Anatomy of an Anthropological Controversy. 
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may be able to reconstruct historical arguments in a way that makes their conclusions 
reasonable in light of their premises, often the premises just embody a way of thinking or 
feeling that is simply no longer attractive.   
 This model is seldom made explicit but it shows up frequently in the ways 
philosophers more or less casually dismiss rival views.  For example in an article 
celebrating J. L. Austin, Stuart Hampshire says that Austin 
… refused to adopt any special or elevated tone for the discussion of 
philosophy, and he refused to accept from others any peculiar inherited 
canons of argument.  Particularly during the 1930’s, when technical 
pretensions were rife, these refusals had the effect of fair, and devastating, 
comment on the Emperor’s New Clothes.  He continued in this vein of 
patient literalness, through changing fashions, until the end.  (Hampshire 
(1992) p. 240, emphasis added) 
 
The temperament model:  Like the fashion model, the temperament model assigns a 
causal role to features that are not subject to rational manipulation.  William James 
explicitly adopted this model in his Pragmatism: 
The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain clash of 
human temperaments.  Undignified as such a treatment may seem to some 
of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this clash and explain a 
good many of the divergencies of philosophers by it.  Of whatever 
temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to 
sink the fact of his temperament.  Temperament is no conventionally 
recognized reason, so he urges impersonal reasons only for his conclusions.  
Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more 
strictly objective premises…. He trusts his temperament.  (James (1955 
(1907)) p. 19)   
 
James here notes that what he is saying is likely to be unpopular with his colleagues, and 
this is important.  It reveals the fact that there is some discomfort involved in these public 
discussions of philosophy’s supposed shortcomings.   
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 A corollary of this model is that, unlike fashion, there is something that can be 
said for some temperaments at some times.  And temperaments can change.  Rorty’s 
championing of the work of his favorite philosophers (the later Heidegger, Wittgenstein, 
Dewey, Sellars and (sometimes) Davidson) often aims at a change not in rational 
understanding but in temperament.  Perhaps, he says, if we start reading and talking to 
different people, we will come to embody a different way of thinking about philosophy.  
In a very general way, he urges philosophers to stop being argumentative so that they can 
be better conversationalists. 
 Both of these models get at something that no doubt plays a role in philosophical 
change. However, there are more comprehensive models that, while not denying the role 
of fashion and temperament, seek to place these factors within a more complicated 
framework of causal mechanisms that can (however weakly) explain some of these shifts. 
 
V.  Explaining philosophical change 
Progress model:  According to this model, the fact that philosophers continue to 
argue about whether Descartes knows that he isn’t dreaming and whether Socrates knows 
anything shouldn’t be taken as evidence that philosophy doesn’t progress.  Instead from a 
finely-enough grained perspective, we can see that these discussions are (very gradually) 
gaining in conceptual clarity.  These advances in conceptual clarity are gained through 
the development of more sophisticated tools of analysis, tools that weren’t available to 
earlier philosophers.  The fact that people continue to die shouldn’t be taken to show that 
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there has been no progress in medicine, and the fact that we are still arguing about 
skepticism doesn’t show that there has been no progress in epistemology.  Timothy 
Williamson says: 
In many areas of philosophy, we know much more in 2007 than was known 
in 1957; much more was known in 1957 than in 1907; much more was 
known in 1907 than was known in 1857.  As in natural science, something 
can be collectively known in a community even if it is occasionally denied 
by eccentric members of that community.  Although fundamental 
disagreement is conspicuous in most areas of philosophy, the best theories 
in a given area are in most cases far better developed in 2007 than the best 
theories in that area were in 1957, and so on.  (Williamson (2007) p. 280) 
 
 This model has the advantage of providing some traction in contemporary debates 
about the role of philosophy in the University.  If philosophy is a well-behaved discipline 
that is in some way aligned with the sciences (as many today claim), then it should 
progress.  And it should progress in a way that is genuinely helpful to people as they try 
to understand themselves and the world.  Gary Gutting claims that it has: 
I maintain … that there is a body of disciplinary philosophical knowledge 
achieved by (at least) analytic philosophers of the last fifty years.  … I do 
claim that it is a substantive body of knowledge and one of great cultural 
significance.  Those without access to this knowledge will be severely 
limited in the essential reflective dimension of human existence.  (Gutting 
(2009) p. 2) 
 
Scott Soames clearly embraces this model in his two-volume history of analysis in the 
20th century37: 
Looking back, we are now in a position to separate success from failure, to 
discern substantial insights, and to identify what turned out to be confusions 
or dead ends.  The aim of this work is to do just that.  This will involve not 
only explaining what the most important analytic philosophers of the period 
                                                
37 For a critical review of Soames (2003) from the perspective of a philosopher working primarily 
in the continental tradition, see Livingston (2006). 
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thought, and why they thought it, but also arguing with them, evaluating 
what they achieved, and indicating how they fell short.  If the history of 
philosophy is to help us extend the hard-won gains of our predecessors, we 
must be as prepared to profit from their mistakes as to learn from their 
achievements. (Soames (2003) volume I, p. xi) 
 
These are recent examples, but many histories of philosophy have the same arc: the 
period is described as one in which, through many turns and some undeniable dead ends, 
progress was made (see for example Russell (1945), Passmore (1968), Scruton (2002 
(1981)), and Kenny (2007)). 
 The progress model sometimes includes the notion that professionalization 
lubricates the mechanism of progress.  Soames, for example, says that it will be difficult 
to write general histories of philosophy in the future because 
Philosophy has become a highly organized discipline, done by specialists 
primarily for other specialists. The number of philosophers has exploded, 
the volume of publication has swelled, and the subfields of serious 
philosophical investigation have multiplied.  Not only is the broad field of 
philosophy today far too vast to be embraced by one mind, something 
similar is true even of many highly specialized subfields. (Soames (2003) 
volume II p. 463) 
 
In other words it is evidence of philosophy being a well-behaved discipline, one that 
makes progress, that it is no longer possible for one person to understand everything 
about it.  It has subfields (like, for example, biology), specialized journals and specialized 
jargon – all evidence of a certain kind of progress. 
 Given this close association between professionalization and progress, it isn’t 
surprising that at one of the early meetings (in 1916) of the American Philosophical 
Association (APA), the main professional organization of philosophers in the United 
States, Arthur Lovejoy devoted his presidential address to the question of philosophical 
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progress.  As James Campbell says in his (quasi) official history of the APA, Lovejoy 
“wanted to discuss with his professional colleagues the disappointments that result from 
the lack of philosophical progress” (Campbell (2006) p. 165).  Lovejoy promoted a 
conception of the business of philosophy that both emphasizes its credentials as a 
profession (and as a science) and clarifies the notion of philosophical progress.  Looking 
back Campbell’s assessment is largely positive:  “…the APA and more broadly 
philosophy in America has made great progress in recent years” (Campbell (2006) p. 
290). 
It will be my aim in much of what follows to try to prise apart the effects of 
professionalization from the rhetoric of progress.  What is important here is that there is a 
model that (sometimes) recognizes the undeniable role that professionalization plays in 
philosophical change, even if there is no attempt to understand the way this institution 
affects philosophical progress in a systematic way.  The progress model is the favored 
model today among philosophers who identify themselves as doing analytical 
philosophy.   
 
Reactionary model:  In direct contrast to the progress model is what I will call the 
reactionary model.  Unlike the progress model, which explains developments in 
philosophy largely by appealing to internal factors, the reactionary model views 
philosophical change largely as the attempt to respond to a variety of forces acting on 
philosophy from the outside.  In its most common form, these responses are thought of as 
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conservative and invidious.  That is, this model often explains particular changes as in 
some way deviating from an ideal possible trajectory.  The ideal possible trajectory 
typically is implicit but it is usually aligned with broader social programs aimed at 
increasing openness, tolerance and empowerment.  John McCumber’s book Time in the 
Ditch: American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era (2001) is the most explicit 
development of this model.  American philosophy, he says,  
[i]n the 1940s and 1950s confronted a political movement that threatened its 
future in important ways.  The record suggests that philosophers did not 
exactly win their battle against that movement, which is usually called 
McCarthyism.  And there is also evidence suggesting that American 
philosophy largely remains, even today, what Joe McCarthy’s academic 
henchmen would have wanted it to be.  (McCumber (2001) p.xvii) 
 
A less extreme and more limited form of this model is developed in George Reisch’s 
How the Cold War Transformed Philosophy of Science (2005).  Reisch argues that the 
“social ambitions” associated with logical empiricism got lost in the transformation of 
philosophy of science generally that was brought about  
…during the 1950s at least partly, if not mainly, by political pressures that 
were common throughout civic as well as intellectual life during the Cold 
War following World War II.  In large part, these pressures led logical 
empiricism to shed its cultural and social engagments by shedding 
Neurath’s Unity of Science movement.  The movement was not merely a 
public, scientific front for an otherwise independent philosophical program.  
It helped to determine which kinds of questions and research topics were 
pursued, and how they were pursued, at the heart of philosophy of science.  
(Reisch (2005) p. 6) 
 
From the perspective of this dissertation, while these works do point to possible social 
and political determinants of philosophical change, the explanation lacks a model to 
explain with precision how large-scale social movements determine or constrain 
philosophical practice.  That they do is of course something that I accept, but in the 
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absence of immediate mechanisms that describe forces acting on philosophical practice, 
these explanations finally remain only interpretive hypotheses. 
 
VI.  Professionalization  
 The point of the preceding survey is to show the range of models that have been 
appealed to in the attempt to explain the history of philosophy and more specifically the 
recent history of philosophy in America.  I turn now to the model that I will defend in this 
dissertation.  I develop this model in part by drawing on features of the other models that 
I think are worth preserving and by explicitly distinguishing the model from weaknesses 
in the others.  The model both explains many otherwise apparently accidental features of 
contemporary philosophical practice and offers a perspective from which insights can be 
seen more clearly.  
 There is a vast literature on the professions and professionalization (Parsons 
(1939) is a classic; see more recently Freidson (1986), Macdonald (1995)).  This work is 
primarily concerned with accounting for the role that the professions play in the 
knowledge economy.  Much of it consists of arguments over what a profession is – there 
is widespread agreement about the paradigm cases of medicine and law, but quibbles 
erupt over just which features of these make them professions and so which features need 
to be present for there to be a profession.  Abbott summarizes the basic concept of a 
profession: 
Expert, white-collar occupations evolve toward a particular structure and 
cultural form of occupational control.  The structural form is called 
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profession and consists of a series of organizations for association, for 
control, and for work.  (In its strong form, the professionalization concept 
argues that these organizations develop in a certain order.)  Culturally, 
professions legitimate their control by attaching their expertise to values 
with general cultural legitimacy, increasingly the values of rationality, 
efficiency, and science.  (Abbott (1988) p. 16) 
 
Key for our purposes is the idea that there is a characteristic form to the professions, a 
structure that exerts some kind of control over the day-to-day behavior of its members.38  
In turn, the members exert an influence over other social actors in virtue of their 
affiliation with the values cited above.  Sciulli offers what he calls “today’s premier 
definition” of a profession: 
It is a full-time, liberal (non-manual) occupation; 
It establishes a monopoly in the labor market for expert services; 
It attains self-governance or autonomy, that is, freedom from control by any 
outsiders, whether the state, clients, laymen or others; 
Training is specialized and yet also systematic and scholarly; 
Examinations, diplomas and titles control entry to the occupation and also 
sanction the monopoly; 
Member rewards, both material and symbolic, are tied not only to 
occupational competence and workplace ethics but also to contemporaries’ 
beliefs that their expert services are ‘of special importance for society and 
the common weal.’ (Sciulli (2009) p. 45) 
 
The literature on professions isolates the pressure this unique form of social organization 
exerts on members, clients and, in virtue of the status professions enjoy, on the wider 
social world.  For example, professionals sacrifice some freedom of action by submitting 
to codes of conduct; but these codes provide the professionals with an aura of neutrality 
                                                
38 There is a developing consensus that the professions are losing their influence (See Dingwall 
(2008) chapter 10, Freidson (1994) chapter 2, Prechel and Gupman (1995) and Schuster (2011)).  
Managed care of medicine, for example, removes power from doctors.  This development will be 
discussed in the conclusion of this dissertation, where it is argued that control of the universities 
too is increasingly being removed from academic professionals and placed instead in managing 
committees with ties to the corporate world.  Insouciance about these matters, especially when 
supported by claims to philosophy’s existing above the fray, betrays a pernicious naiveté. 
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and incorruptibility that carries much social, indeed political, weight.  The doctor’s 
advice isn’t followed because of any personal characteristics she has, even any particular 
features of her education or training; instead it is the professional authority she holds in 
virtue of adhering to professional standards that puts her advice beyond any conventional 
reproach.  The price paid by society for ceding control over key areas of knowledge (as 
Freidson says, professionals enjoy “… a degree of discretion or autonomy at work that 
marks them off from other workers”39 (Freidson (1986), p. 209)) is compensated by the 
uses to which the knowledge gets put, often enough, but also by the recognition that 
individualist and selfish mores are disciplined by professional training. 
 Here it is important to develop briefly the part of the definition that refers to the 
role played by knowledge.  Our definition notes that “training” is “systematic and 
scholarly”, and that “examinations, diplomas and titles” are used to certify membership.  
These factors indicate the central role knowledge plays in the professions.  But it is 
knowledge of a particular kind – typically highly specialized knowledge encrypted in 
formal, technical language.  It is proficiency with this formal language as much as facility 
with specific content that is developed during the systematic training and then tested for 
in professional examinations (the law and medical board tests, for example, and the 
                                                
39 Freidson goes on to say of professionals that  
…their expertise can gain them special privilege in the courts that marks 
them off from ordinary people.  The activities of their associations in 
legislatures and of individual members in committees created to formulate 
policy recommendations for various agencies of government and in 
committees that in effect establish national standards for the manufacture of 
products and in the staffing of critical services testify to a position that can 
have considerable influence on national affairs.  (Freidson (1986), p. 209) 
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dissertation exams in the academic professions).  Medical professionals, lawyers and 
other professionals communicate with each other in highly specialized codes that signal 
to the uninitiated their relative position.   
 The literature on professions includes an increasing literature on the academic 
professions.  Parsons (1939) and Parsons & Platt (1968) are important instances, but of 
late there is an increasing interest in this form of profession (see Abbot (2001), Bender & 
Schorske (1997), Bourdieu (1988), Camic, Gross & Lamont (2011), Clark (1987), 
Graubard (2001), Hermanowicz (2011), and Lamont (2009)). The historical shift (and its 
effects) from academic and scholarly knowledge being the domain of either religious 
orders or independent scholars to the domain of professional academics is the subject of 
this growing literature.  That the shift accounts for at least some features of the current 
academic world is obvious from this research even if academics themselves are typically 
content to ignore this field of influence. 
 For our purposes the central feature of academic professionalization is the 
important role disciplines play:  indeed, Light goes so far as to say that “…the ‘academic 
profession’ does not exist. … [W]e have the academic professions, one for each 
discipline.  Each discipline has its own history, its own intellectual style, a distinct sense 
of timing, different preferences for articles and books, and different career lines” (Light 
(1974) p. 12).  Becher provides a more balanced view, suggesting that the question of 
whether there is one or many academic professions is appropriately answered differently 
depending on the interests of the investigator:  both general academic pressures and 
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disciplinary pressures exert influence on the work academics do and on their self-
understandings (Becher (1987) p. 277).  Much of what follows assumes a central role 
played by the disciplines, though this is consistent with the existence of higher level 
professional pressures.  The self-regulation, training and certification that are essential 
features of all the professions are conducted for academic professionals by some form of 
disciplinary institution.  The work of academics is policed not by laymen, government or 
even university bureaucrats but by disciplinary representatives in one form or another.  
Becher (1987) analyzes the ways in which different disciplines negotiate the tasks of 
initiation, social interaction, specialization, and change and mobility.  These structures, 
the structures of authority exerted by the disciplines, have real felt consequences for 
practitioners – the world of the academic is largely a world defined by the discipline.   
But how do disciplines exert this influence?  What is the mechanism?  The answer 
is already apparent in what has been said:  disciplines a) monitor the entrance, accepting 
only those whose prior history gives evidence of capacities that are thought to be 
necessary; b) train the aspiring professionals, giving both content knowledge and 
proficiency in the formal language in which the knowledge is presented; c) certify by 
granting degrees; and d) oversee advancement, promotion and general success through 
the mechanism of peer review of publications and presentations and then of these for the 
key moments of career advancement:  tenure review, promotion, and lateral and other 
hiring.  That all of this exerts strong pressure on the self-understanding of academics, as 
well as on their work, is surely beyond question.  Yet, as we have seen, the role of 
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disciplinarity in the changes noticed in philosophical practice have not received attention 
from philosophers or from sociologists.  
 Abbott (2001) develops a model of how disciplines work.  It will be useful here to 
give a brief description of his model as a way of specifying the pressures exerted by a 
discipline.  We will concentrate on the functions of the disciplines and on their dynamic 
operations.  We assume as background condition the following features of the university:  
limited funding, constraints on size of disciplines in both material terms (buildings, 
numbers of students, etc.…) and immaterial terms (preexisting divisions in subject 
matter, for example), and demands for novelty.  It is worth pointing out here, too, that 
disciplines are disproportionately more powerful in the United States as compared to 
higher education in other countries (Abbott (2001) p. 128) – I address philosophy 
primarily as it is currently practiced in the United States at the major research universities 
and to a lesser extent at elite colleges.  The discipline functions differently at community 
colleges as well as at lower status institutions. 
 According to Abbott, academic disciplines (in the United States) provide the 
single most important structural feature of the universities.  All undergraduates choose a 
major from among the disciplines (Abbott (2001) p. 127); this provides for a built-in 
reproduction of disciplinary traditions.  Very often each discipline assigns someone to the 
role of undergraduate advisor, someone who mediates between the student and what the 
student experiences as the larger often unfathomable world of the university with its 
regulations, traditions and larger social connections.  
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 In addition, Abbott points out that the labor markets for academics are largely the 
concern of the disciplines.  In philosophy (until very recently, at least) virtually all junior 
hiring has been done at the annual professional meetings.  Departments, of which each 
university typically has one per discipline, vet prospective hires and nominate candidates.   
 Disciplines also “…provide the core of identity for the vast majority of 
intellectuals in modern America” (Abbott (2001) p. 130).  The self-understanding of 
academics is filtered through their discipline – it gives form to the often abstract work 
they do, even if this form is often inaccessible to those outside the discipline.   
 Finally, disciplines make academic work manageable.  As Abbott says,  
Disciplines legitimate our necessarily partial knowledge.  They define what 
it is permissible not to know and thereby limit the body of books one must 
have read.  They provide a specific tradition and lineage.  They provide 
common sets of research practices that unify groups with diverse 
substantive interests.  Often, as I have argued throughout this book, these 
various limits are quite arbitrary.  Sociology could substitute Ihering for 
Weber in its canon without experiencing much intellectual change.  What 
matters is not the particular canonical writer but rather the legitimation of 
knowing only the one or the other.  (Abbott (2001) pp. 130-131) 
 
All philosophers have read Plato, Descartes, Kant and at least some Wittgenstein; more 
importantly, today philosophers need not have read Whewell, or Dewey, Derrida40 or, for 
that matter, Shakespeare.   
 There is though a tension between the constancy needed to perform these 
functions and the ongoing demands for novelty within the realistically finite intellectual 
space of academic knowledge.  The negotiation of this tension – what I am calling 
                                                
40 Recall that I am writing about philosophers working within the professional image.  Derrida is 
important to philosophers working in the continental tradition. 
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(following some of Abbott’s language) the dynamical operation of the disciplines – is the 
work of what Abbott calls "settlement."  Abbot defines settlement as “the ensemble of 
forces that define the relation of a given amoeba41 to the intellectual turf that it has 
invented and/ or invested” (Abbott (2001) pp. 139-140).  In other words the settlement of 
a discipline refers to the mechanisms that it uses to maintain its institutional standing in 
the face of encroachment from other disciplines as well as, especially for humanities in 
the current economic downturn, threats to its existence in the form of defunding.  More 
broadly, settlement comprises everything that members of a discipline do that marks 
them as members of a particular discipline and not some other and also implies the 
importance of the disciplinary work that is done.  This includes, for Abbott, cultural 
structures (“an ensemble of research practices, evidentiary conventions, rhetorical 
strategies, canonical works…” (Abbott (2001) pp. 139-140) as well as social structures, 
like the credential system, associations and journals, and typical audiences (Abbott 
(2001) pp. 140-141). 
 Settlement, then, describes the mechanism that maintains disciplinary identity.  It 
is diffuse and varied so that it can be flexible and innovative.  The settlement of 
philosophy as it is currently arrayed in the United States can be characterized by the 
features identified in the previous chapter – philosophy occupies the space of intellectual 
turf concerned with fundamental questions of universal scope that can be addressed most 
                                                
41 Earlier Abbott uses the metaphor of disciplines as amoebas to i) emphasize the sense in which 
the shape of a discipline changes and ii) to allow himself the further metaphor of "pseudopods" 
for the attempts by disciplines to capture external intellectual turf (Abbott (2001) p. 138). 
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conspicuously in logical notation.  Philosophical journals do their part by publishing 
works that carry out this agenda.  And graduate programs perform the important work of 
reproducing scholars committed to this particular settlement, this way of being a 
philosopher.  Finally, the institution of peer review means that the popular connotation 
associated with philosophy – that it aims to provide people with a sense of meaning – is  
impotent with respect to the academic discipline:  philosophy’s settlement depends on 
keeping such popular notions at bay, lest philosophy lose its distinct academic status. 
 
VII. Philosophy 
 In the period after the Civil War there was a tremendous change in the nature of 
post-secondary education institutions42 (Rudolph (1990 (1962))).  Prior to the war the 
typical American college was a “… small unpretentious institution at which inspired 
teaching molded young men of good character rather than of accomplished scholarship” 
(Rudolph (1990 (1962)), p. 243).  The typical college president functioned essentially in 
loco parentis.  Here is how the president of the University of Rochester understood his 
duties in 1868: 
No class passes through my hands which does not contain more or less 
young men who are on the eve of ruin from wayward natures, bad habits, or 
hereditary tendencies to evil.  These men must be watched, borne with, and 
if possible saved to the world and to their families … This work must 
                                                
42 What follows is a necessarily extremely abbreviated overview of the history of higher 
education in the United States.  For more detailed accounts, in addition to Rudolph (1990 (1962)), 
see Thelin (2004).  For a critical perspective on the more recent history of public higher education 
in the United States, see Newfield (2008).   
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mainly be done by the president.  (Quoted in Rudolph (1990 (1962)), p. 
169) 
 
The major shift that occurred was from the college as a kind of paternalistic training 
ground for young men of good character to a diverse system of colleges and universities 
whose main mission was the promotion of scholarship, heavily geared to scholarship in 
the sciences and emerging technologies.  What the nation needed were fewer gentlemen 
and more scientists and innovators. 
 But there was no central agency overseeing the reforms in higher education; new 
institutions adopted their own agendas, and older institutions changed in diverse ways.  
According to Rudolph, 
By the dawn of the twentieth century, under the aegis of necessity and, later, 
of the richly endowed educational foundations, there would be an almost 
frantic effort to put some order into the collegiate and university scene.  For 
the old unity, the old sameness, were by then utterly destroyed, and the 
paramount problem was to determine what had taken their place.  (Rudolph 
(1990 (1962)), p. 245) 
 
And one key way of establishing order was the disciplinary professional organization.  If 
universities and colleges adopted diverse missions, disciplines tried to maintain some 
unity by organizing themselves.  The significance of this is readily apparent today in the 
way that professional organizations are often the center of scholarly production and 
provide the structure for academic careers. 
In the nineteenth century in the United States philosophy wasn’t just one subject 
among many, one that you might study alongside the others.  Instead it was typically a 
course taken in the last year of study, often taught by the president of the college or 
university, often by a minister, and it was intended to provide a kind of moral perspective 
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to the young adults about to make their way into the higher strata of American society.  
G. Stanley Hall, in an article from 1879 called “Philosophy in the United States," was 
severely critical: 
There are nearly 300 non-Catholic colleges in the United States, most of 
them chartered by the legislatures of their respective states, and conferring 
the degree of A.B. upon their students at the end of a four years’ course, and 
A.M. three years after graduation.  In nearly all these institutions certain 
studies, aesthetical, logical, historical, most commonly ethical, most rarely 
psychological, are roughly classed as philosophy and taught during the last 
year almost invariably by the president.  The methods of instruction and 
examination are so varied that it is impossible in the space at our disposal to 
report in detail upon the nature and value of the work done in these 
institutions.  More than 200 of them are strictly denominational, and the 
instruction given in philosophy is rudimentary and mediaeval. … Many 
teachers of philosophy have no training in their department save such as has 
been obtained in theological seminaries, and their pupils are made far more 
familiar with the points of difference in the theology of Parks, Fairchilds, 
Hodges and the like, than with Plato, Leibniz or Kant.  (Hall (1879), pp. 89-
90) 
 
Here Hall deplores the lack of professional competence in philosophy, something the 
American Philosophical Association was created to establish.  Hall’s comments are 
particularly interesting because they issue from a period just prior to the establishment of 
the professional image of philosophy.  Hall here pays attention to the material practices 
of philosophers:  he notes the institutional context in which philosophy is taught, 
identifies courses of study and culminating degrees, and even characterizes, if briefly, the 
nature of instruction.  In pointing to the significance of canonical figures like Plato and 
Kant towards the end of his remarks, Hall is anticipating the way philosophy is 
understood from the professional image:  rarely do philosophers today discuss 
institutional structures in their discussion of philosophy.  Even in the massive two-
volume A History of Philosophy in America (Flower & Murphey (1977)) there is no 
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attention paid to what actually went on in philosophy courses in the United States.  It is a 
history of ideas, not material practices, giving the impression that the ideas floated above 
the fray of the convulsing changes going on in the country generally and in higher 
education specifically. 
Dewey received his Ph.D. from Johns Hopkins in 1884 (after two years of 
graduate study!).  The president of Johns Hopkins tried to dissuade Dewey from studying 
philosophy because it had no real disciplinary or professional identity: 
[President Daniel C. Gilman] felt that graduates in philosophy had little 
chance of getting positions teaching philosophy in American colleges and 
universities, which continued to employ as instructors only those trained in 
Christian theology.  As a gesture of friendship, he tried at first to dissuade 
Dewey from majoring in philosophy.  (Dykhuizen (1973), p. 29) 
 
Becher summarizes the change that occurred during Dewey’s lifetime in this way:  
Such subjects as philosophy, which once comprised ‘a rung in the ladder of 
an individual’s intellectual and professional training,’ subsequently claimed 
for themselves ‘a special place in an impersonal map of learning.’  This shift 
in emphasis gave rise to a significant increase in intellectual productivity, at 
least in terms of research publications; it also succeeded in deepening the 
contrasts between those with specialized training and those without it.  
(Becher43 (1987) pp. 277-278)  
 
There have been a number of “internal” accounts of the changes in philosophy during this 
period, that is, there have been a number of histories of the philosophy of the twentieth 
century, and there is a well-known arc to most of these histories – the idealism that had 
prevailed in England was rejected due to a renewed commitment to scientific empiricism 
on the one hand and to the promise of formal techniques for representing and analyzing 
reasoning and inference on the other.  This is told as a story of progress – from hoary 
                                                
43 Becher is quoting and, he says, relying on the unpublished notes of Jonathan Rée.  
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unconstrained speculative thought to hard-nosed empiricism and disciplined (by logic) 
reasoning.  Hilary Putnam offers a biographical history of philosophy in the United States 
between roughly 1930-1990 in a volume entitled American Academic Culture in 
Transformation (Bender and Schorske (1997)).  His account aims to correct some “subtle 
falsifications” in the standard story about the importance of logical positivism (Putnam 
(1997) p. 194), and, given both his prominence in the discipline and the high status 
institutions (Harvard, Oxford) and scholars (Quine, for example) that he associated with, 
his biographical account is authoritative concerning the internal philosophical 
understanding of the development of the discipline.  But while Putnam makes passing 
mention of the key institutional fact that retirement of older professors often leads to new 
innovations, his account is otherwise silent about how academic and other institutional 
features shaped philosophical development.  His account is entirely in terms of the way 
philosophers responded to other philosophers.  This is surprising in a piece in a volume 
intended to address these institutional and structural forces: 
Questions have been raised about the nature and definition of American 
academic disciplines, the role of ideology and political commitment in 
scholarship, the possibility of objectivity, the status of theory, and the place 
of knowledge in the larger culture and polity. … There is a deeper historical 
background to these debates that bears examination and deserves attention 
in its own right.  … The achievement of new levels of disciplinary 
professionalism over the course of a half century has generated its own 
needs and produced its own internal tensions as well as changed relations to 
the larger public realm… neither the scholar nor the academy as a whole is 
inclined to pause from its normal pursuits to take itself as its subject and 
examine its own transformations and condition.  This study, launched by the 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, presents the yield of a collective 
attempt at such an examination.  (Bender & Schorske (1997) pp. 3-4) 
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It is telling that, given these aims, the philosopher assigned to write about philosophy 
gives an account that ignores all nonphilosophical conditions. 
 The internal history of philosophy given by Putnam, like the ones mentioned 
above by Soames, Passmore, and Russell, treats philosophy as something independent of 
particular contexts.  It rings true to philosophers because philosophers have come to 
inhabit the professional image, according to which philosophy is the study of timeless 
questions:  the study of timeless questions is philosophy's disciplinary niche, and the 
professional image's presumption influences the way philosophers think of their work.  I 
have been arguing that there are external pressures that help to explain the emergence of 
the professional image of philosophy. 
The importance of structural changes is evident in Campbell’s laudatory history 
of the American Philosophical Association.  Campbell combines an appeal to the well-
known internal history of philosophy in the twentieth century with a high-level 
assessment of progress in philosophy, and he attributes a leading role to the youthful 
APA: 
What had begun in obscure gatherings in unlikely locales had by the mid-
1920’s blossomed into a national organization of over four hundred 
members that could bring to the United States an international gathering of 
the world’s philosophers, and make a profit doing it.  This is a story of great 
advance that should be better known, as least by contemporary American 
philosophers.  During this quarter-century, there had been a major shift in 
the direction of America’s philosophical thinking.  Idealism’s primacy had 
been challenged by the human urgencies championed by the pragmatists, 
and undermined by the analytical epistemology of the realists.  There had 
also been many changes in the institutional situation of philosophy in 
America.  Philosophy had completed its move from the old-time college to 
the new university, where it had secured its own place – in terms of distinct 
departments, graduate study, and specialized journals – among the many 
other professionalizing disciplines.  (Campbell (2006) pp. 278-279) 
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Note here the implicit recognition, in the form of an admonition to learn it, that most 
philosophers are ignorant of the structural history of the discipline in the United States.  
This ignorance is consistent with the self-understanding engendered by the professional 
image: such institutional, structural, contingent, and external – in a word, such 
unphilosophical – material is irrelevant to the concerns of the properly disciplined 
philosopher.  Rational reconstruction, the aim of much contemporary work in philosophy 
that treats of historical material, requires precisely the setting aside of all such 
considerations.   
 Campbell describes the very developments that would be expected given our 
working definition of a profession:  specialized knowledge, formal training, and 
disciplinary identity.  From the very beginning Campbell notes that the APA was focused 
on, among other things, “…the teaching of philosophy, leadership issues, membership 
matters…” (Campbell (2006), p. 80).  Campbell describes Alexander Thomas Ormond’s 
presidential address of 1902 as calling on philosophers to “…vindicate their efforts by 
adopting a distinct point-of-view, method, and criterion of validity.  To do so would 
enable philosophy to clarify its uncertain relation to science” (Campbell (2006), p. 78).  
In other words, from the very beginning members of the APA understood the need for a 
professional image of philosophy that would define for it boundaries in intellectual space.  
As I have argued, these efforts were largely successful:  philosophy invented a “criterion 
of validity” for itself and has used it to construct an understanding of its own history. 
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VIII.  Conclusion 
The developments I have described in the preceding section and throughout this 
chapter constitute the professionalization of philosophy, and they encourage certain 
practices within philosophy.  Journals devoted to the reporting of research encourage 
uniformity of style among writers.  The availability of textbooks and the need to fill slots 
in the curriculum lead to uniformity of the content of teaching.  And as has been stressed 
the pressures over control of academic intellectual space encourage the formation of a 
more rigorous shared identity among philosophers.  The professional image of 
philosophy provides an ideal solution to these various demands.   
 We will see in the next chapter that this picture, responsive as it is to the demands 
faced by the academic discipline of philosophy and open as it is to continuing and 
ongoing successful research programs that promise some form of progress, also 
beautifully fulfills the function, described above, of cutting the subject down to a 
manageable size.  The fundamental, formal nature of philosophy according to this picture 
yields a conceptual space of possible "views."  A philosopher like John Dewey is read as 
holding views on the philosophical questions, and he is read this way by critics as well as 
admirers.  What is distinctive about his conception of philosophy is lost sight of when he 
is read by philosophers working within the professional image. 
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Chapter 4  Dewey and the Professional Image 
Readers not particularly conversant with contemporary logical discussions 
may find portions of the text too technical, especially Part III.  I suggest that 
such readers interpret what is said by calling to mind what they themselves 
do, and the way they proceed in doing it, when they are confronted with 
some question or difficulty which they attempt to cope with in an 
intellectual way.  If they pursue this course, I think the general principles 
will be sufficiently intelligible so that they will not be unduly troubled by 
technical details.  It is possible that the same advice is applicable in the case 
of those whose very familiarity with current logical literature constitutes an 
obstruction to understanding a position that is at odds with most current 
theory. 
 -Dewey, preface to Logic 
 
I.  Introduction 
 Philosophers project the professional image onto the historical texts they read, 
making it seem as if there is a common philosophical project that has been pursued since 
Plato wrote about Socrates.  One reason the projection of the image goes unnoticed is that 
it provides for the possibility of a way of talking, writing, reading and teaching that is just 
a part of our ordinary experience as philosophers.  It seems that nothing can be more 
obvious than that Plato, Descartes and John Searle, a prominent contemporary 
philosopher, are all wondering about the relation between bodies and minds.  There 
seems no reason to ask about the conditions that make what is obvious seem obvious.  
But there are such conditions, and they are, here as elsewhere, conditions of social 
practices.   
 The approach taken here to uncovering the work that the dominant picture is 
doing is to consider the history of Dewey’s thought and its reception in the 20th century.  
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Dewey gained prominence in the burgeoning professional discipline, teaching at some of 
the most highly regarded institutions (The University of Chicago, The University of 
Michigan and Columbia University) and serving as president of the American 
Philosophical Association in 1905 (Campbell (2006) p. 299).  But Dewey’s reputation 
waned as the older pre-professionalized picture – the one Dewey held, described below in 
section two – was eclipsed by the now dominant one.  Dewey is still read today, but both 
his admirers and his critics interpret him in the light of the professional image.  Dewey 
can seem a little like a character in a novel who keeps quarreling with how he is depicted 
– in a way, the dominant picture makes Dewey a pragmatist advancing a view of truth 
and morality, his protests notwithstanding. 
 In the next section of this chapter I explain Dewey's picture of philosophy. Then, 
in the third section, I describe how some of Dewey's earliest critics misread him in light 
of the professional image of philosophy.  In the fourth section I show that this misreading 
continues, among both his critics and his admirers.  But first it will be helpful here to 
discuss the label 'pragmatist’, because many professional philosophers will know of 
Dewey as an example of a pragmatist.  Philosophers deploying the professional image of 
philosophy try to identify the views historical philosophers have on the timeless 
questions:  it is assumed that all philosophers hold identifiable views on the big 
questions.44  A pragmatist, as the term is understood today amongst professional 
philosophers, is one who holds particular views about knowledge (for example that it is 
                                                
44 See Chalmers and Bourget (forthcoming). 
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"warranted assertability") and about truth45 (for example that it is "what works" or that it 
is what will emerge at the end of inquiry).   
 It is true that Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey (the so-called 
“classical pragmatists”) did at various times write about knowledge as warranted 
assertability or about truth as what works.  But they were not defending views on the 
timeless questions.  Dewey often bemoaned the fact that philosophers who read his work 
were focused on identifying the unique pragmatist position on the big questions:  that 
wasn't what Dewey was up to, as we will see in the next section.  'Pragmatism' was 
originally adopted as descriptive name by Charles Peirce, who intended to capture a 
distinction Kant had made.46  Here is how Dewey tells the story: 
The term 'pragmatic,' contrary to the opinion of those who regard 
pragmatism as an exclusively American conception, was suggested to 
[Peirce] by the study of Kant.  In the Metaphysic of Morals Kant established 
a distinction between pragmatic and practical.  The latter term applies to 
moral laws which Kant regards as a priori, whereas the former term applies 
to the rules of art and technique which are based on experience and are 
applicable to experience.  (Dewey LW 2 p. 3) 
 
Originally, then, the term was meant to capture a distinctive orientation that privileged 
the "arts and techniques" of experience.  Dewey in the same article argues that 
pragmatism is different from classical empiricism: 
Pragmatism, thus, presents itself as an extension of historical empiricism, 
but with this fundamental difference, that it does not insist upon antecedent 
phenomena but upon consequent phenomena; not upon the precedents but 
                                                
45 See Haack (1976) for a sympathetic interpretation of the pragmatist "theory of truth."  Her 
article is partly historical, though she ends up arguing that the pragmatist theory of truth is a 
genuine contender, an unconventional view. 
46 See Bacon (2012), especially the introduction, for another version of the history of the name 
"pragmatism."   
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upon the possibilities of action… when we take the point of view of 
pragmatism we see that general ideas have a very different role to play than 
that of reporting and registering past experiences.  They are the bases for 
organizing future observations and experiences. (Dewey LW 2 p. 12) 
 
In other words the pragmatist isn't trying to find general ideas that will report general 
views as responses to timeless questions.  Rather he uses them as tentative hypothesis to 
be measured against future experience.  It is ironic that the term 'pragmatist' itself gets 
used to label a set of responses to timeless questions!  In a reply to his critics in the 
volume The Philosophy of John Dewey (Schilpp and Hahn (1989 (1939))), Dewey makes 
just this point in a response to criticisms from Bertrand Russell:  Russell, Dewey says, 
used a particular passage from Dewey's Logic "…only as a means of identifying me as a 
pragmatist, but not as a means of understanding what I mean by any pragmatic theory of 
'consequences' which I accept" (Schilpp & Hahn (1989 (1939)) p. 571).  He then quotes 
himself in Logic saying that, given the tendency philosophers have to try to affix labels to 
views, it is better to avoid using labels like pragmatism.47  
 
                                                
47 The word 'pragmatic' outside of philosophy has a connotation that is closely aligned with 
Dewey's overall orientation: to be pragmatic is to be concerned with the actual problems and 
difficulties one faces (this is the sense of 'pragmatism' that Burt is relying on in his new book 
about Lincoln: Lincoln's Tragic Pragmatism (2013)).  But 'pragmatic' also has a negative 
connotation, as when it is used to criticize someone for being overly concerned with what is 
practical and losing sight of principle, and though his critics sometimes accuse Dewey of being 
pragmatic in this sense, there is little warrant for this, other than the connotation of the word. 
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II.   Dewey’s picture of philosophy 
 In this light it is interesting to see that, at the very end of his career, Dewey 
focused on the professional nature of academic philosophy.  He still is one of the few 
philosophers to have acknowledged the role of social organization in determining the 
meaning of what an individual says and writes.48   In an introduction to a reissue (written 
in 1948, 25 years after the work was originally published and just four years before he 
died) of his Reconstruction in Philosophy, Dewey constantly tied the notion of 
reconstruction in philosophy to the idea that philosophy is conditioned by social and 
historical events.   
A plea for reconstruction cannot, as far as I can see, be made without giving 
considerable critical attention to the background within which and in regard 
to which reconstruction is to take place.  Far from being a sign of disesteem, 
this critical attention is an indispensible part of interest in the development 
of a philosophy that will do for our time and place what the great doctrines 
of the past did in and for the cultural media out of which they arose. (Dewey 
MW 12 (1948), p. 258) 
 
Here Dewey describes philosophy as tied to a particular time and place.  He goes on to 
say that an important philosophical task is to show why historical systems of philosophy 
are “obstructive in intellectual dealings with the present scene” (Dewey MW 12, p. 274) 
by relating them to the conditions from which they arose.  
                                                
48 Interestingly this insight animates a variety of work in the history and philosophy of science.  
That social organization is one of the material conditions of epistemic practice in science is now a 
commonplace, though Dewey noted its absence in his day:  “The institutional conditions into 
which it [i.e. scientific inquiry] enters and which determine its human consequences have not as 
yet been subjected to any serious, systematic inquiry worthy of being designated scientific” 
(Dewey MW 12, p. 268).  But little attention has been paid to such material conditions of 
epistemic practice in philosophy.   
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The epigraph to this chapter gives a sense – touching to those in sympathy with 
the idea that philosophy is for everyone, foolishly naïve to those under the spell of the 
professional image – of  Dewey’s commitment to the idea that philosophy is not simply 
an academic discipline whose intended audience is composed of professional 
philosophers.  Dewey thought logic should concern itself with the way people think, the 
way actual people actually think, and so he expresses the hope that people will compare 
their own experience of thinking to the theoretical analysis he provides.  Dewey is not 
trying to reduce logic to psychology.  He is rather trying to present in a systematic way a 
theory of inquiry that will bring to light certain of its features so that future inquiry can be 
more self-aware. 
  But perhaps the passage most revealing of Dewey's picture of philosophy is to be 
found in his 1916 Democracy and Education, the work that appeared at the pinnacle of 
his professional reputation and the work of his that is most likely to be studied today (in 
departments of education, not philosophy).  In the chapter called “Philosophy of 
Education", Dewey says this: 
If we are willing to conceive of education as the process of forming 
fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and 
fellow-men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of 
education.  Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic – or verbal – or a 
sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary dogma, its auditing 
of past experience and its program of values must take effect in conduct.  
(Dewey MW 9, p. 338, emphasis in original) 
 
The focus here is clearly on the particular factors that together determine the lived-in 
world of experience, and the claim is that philosophy is the project of understanding how 
people come to experience the world they do.  The second sentence posits that this (the 
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forming of dispositions, the generation of a world of experience) doesn’t happen in the 
abstract but to particular individuals in particular circumstances.  Philosophy, for Dewey, 
is not the study of timeless questions. 
 In these wider statements of his conception of philosophy, Dewey, especially in 
the introduction to Reconstruction in Philosophy, addresses a plausible criticism of his 
picture of philosophy.  Dewey imagines a philosopher saying, "But clearly there is 
continuity between Plato and Descartes: they are both concerned with skepticism!  And 
many philosophers do try to develop a theory of Truth or Being or The Good."  Such a 
philosopher might point to John Stuart Mill, in Utilitarianism, who makes an explicit 
claim to be pursuing a "timeless question": 
From the dawn of philosophy, the question concerning the summum bonum, 
or, what is the same thing, concerning the foundation of morality, has been 
accounted the main problem of speculative thought, has occupied the most 
gifted intellects and divided them into sects and schools carrying on a 
vigorous warfare against one another.  And after more than two thousand 
years the same discussions continue … (Mill (2001 (1861)) p. 1) 
 
That sounds a lot like the professional image, and it might seem problematic for the view 
that I am attributing to Dewey.  So it will be worthwhile to discuss the point in some 
detail. 
 First, Dewey’s picture – that philosophy is always addressing particular problems 
that arise in particular contexts – assumes that these problems are faced after all by 
people, and so there will be some more or less stable clusterings of problems.  That does 
not make the problems timeless.  Moreover the social institutions that frame many of the 
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problems people face endure for long periods of time.  So again there is no reason to 
think that Dewey needs to deny that there are some persistent problems. 
 Second, while it is true that philosophers across wide historical distances use 
similar forms of expression in defining and responding to their problems, this by itself 
doesn’t establish that they are pursuing the same questions.  This is a question that cannot 
be dealt with exhaustively here, but proponents of the “timeless question” view at least 
have to explain why the fact of similar superficial features of language is evidence for 
identity of concepts.  On the face of it one would think that dramatic changes in the world 
of experience (e.g. new political settings, technological changes, increased knowledge, 
etc.…) would significantly alter the concepts with which one speaks.  As MacIntyre says, 
“…in some large degree the sense of continuity that so many standard histories of 
philosophy provide is illusory and depends upon the adroit, although doubtless 
unconscious, use of a series of devices designed to mask difference, to bridge 
discontinuity and to conceal unintelligibility” (MacIntyre (1984) p. 33).49  But it is 
actually even more difficult for the "timeless question" view:  very often philosophers are 
using texts translated into English, where the translations themselves often make 
                                                
49 The devices MacIntyre describes are unconscious because they are part of the picture that 
dominates the profession.  That they are unconscious does not imply that they aren’t at times 
made explicit in methodological discussions.  MacIntyre’s essay appears in Philosophy in 
History: Essays in the Historiography of Philosophy (Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner (1984)).  
See also the essays in the volume by Rorty, Hacking and Skinner for further arguments along 
these lines.  Skinner (2002) replies to Taylor’s essay in that volume; whereas Taylor had argued 
that historians should bracket the question of the truth of historical claims, Skinner rejects that 
model.  For Skinner, the goal is “…that of trying so far as possible to think as our ancestors 
thought and to see things their way” (Skinner (1984) p. 47).  This is incompatible with the 
dominant picture of philosophy. 
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substantive attempts to provide the kind of superficial similarities that are then used as 
evidence for there being timeless questions.  If the translators are under the sway of the 
dominant picture, then again this begins to look viciously circular. 
 Third, Mill claiming to be continuing a two thousand year old discussion doesn’t 
make it so.  There are rhetorical reasons for claiming to be dealing with problems that are 
timeless, and for claiming for oneself interlocutors of the status of Plato and Aristotle.  
Every attempt to identify what one is doing in philosophy is also an attempt to identify 
the importance of what one is doing (this holds, of course, no less for Dewey).   
 Dewey is clear about the way in which nascent professionalization, in 1916, has 
made it difficult to see the history of philosophy clearly: 
The fact that philosophic problems arise because of widespread and widely 
felt difficulties in social practice is disguised because philosophers become 
a specialized class which uses a technical language, unlike the vocabulary in 
which the direct difficulties are stated. (Dewey MW 9, p. 338) 
 
It is interesting to see that Dewey recognized already in 1916 that his picture of 
philosophy was likely to be in tension with another picture developing among the 
“specialized class” of professional philosophers. 
 The picture of philosophy operative in Dewey’s texts is one that ties philosophical 
reflection to specific features of the social and historical context.  And it was not just 
Dewey’s idiosyncratic view that philosophy focuses on particular contexts.  In an article 
called “The Aims of an Introductory Course in Philosophy,” Edgar Hinman, in 1910, 
could say that 
…philosophy is the criticism of life, and to be effective it should engage 
with life as the modern American knows it, rather than with the theorizing 
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of German metaphysicians.  And certainly in our modern intellectual world 
there are sufficient jars and bickerings, contrasts and antagonisms, to give 
point and interest and cultural significance to such a study; certainly also the 
distress of our day in the consciousness of its distracting and conflicting 
cultural tendencies will yield the dialectic necessary to evoke and sustain 
sounder and more philosophical views. (Hinman (1910) p. 562) 
 
This picture, coming as it does in a discussion of teaching and curriculum in the key 
professional journal for philosophers (The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and 
Scientific Methods, which is now called simply The Journal of Philosophy), is strikingly 
at odds with the professional image.  The Journal of Philosophy no longer publishes 
articles about teaching philosophy.  Campbell accurately captures the professional mood: 
Philosophers who are particularly dedicated to the teaching aspects of their 
careers often see themselves as being in the minority within the 
contemporary profession.  The profession, it seems to them, is interested in 
the ongoing flow of philosophical ideas, in the historical development of 
this topic or the current literature on that; but this interest in matters of 
philosophical content is seldom matched, they believe, by an equal devotion 
to matters pedagogical. (Campbell (2002) p. 53)50 
 
Philosophical questions for Dewey originate in the activities and practices people 
engage in, and they get their meaning and significance from the particular conditions that 
people experience.  For Dewey, whatever prevents experience from going on in an 
uninterrupted way poses a problem for reflection; philosophy aims to give a general 
picture of experience and its problems, and then to frame methods that are in accord with 
the best available practices for resolving problems.  This is the picture presented in 
Logic:  The Theory of Inquiry.   
                                                
50 Campbell argues that teaching was never a central concern of the members of the American 
Philosophical Association. 
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 For example, in the early 20th century the United States was undergoing massive 
disruptions of social order.  Among the causes were industrialization and shifts in 
population, urbanization, influx of immigrants, economic changes caused by participation 
in the war, and developments in scientific understanding, all of which broaden the 
horizon of experience and so create disruptions in traditional sources of meaning and 
value.  For Dewey, these challenges constituted the primary obstacle to continuous 
meaningful experience: 
The hypothesis here offered is that the upsets which, taken together, 
constitute the crisis in which man is now involved all over the world, in all 
aspects of his life, are due to the entrance into the conduct of the everyday 
affairs of life of processes, materials and interests whose origin lies in the 
work done by physical inquirers in the relatively aloof and remote technical 
workshops known as laboratories.  It is no longer a matter of disturbance of 
religious beliefs and practices, but of every institution established before the 
rise of modern science a few short centuries ago.  (Dewey MW 12, p. 265) 
 
These "upsets" then become, for Dewey, the focus of philosophical reflection.  Dewey’s 
abiding commitment was to the thought that developments of scientific technique were 
the best available means for solving problems, but they had yet to be brought to bear on 
problems of value:   
Here, then, lies the reconstructive work to be done by philosophy.  It must 
undertake to do for the development of inquiry into human affairs and hence 
into morals what the philosophers of the last few centuries did for 
promotion of scientific inquiry in physical and physiological conditions and 
aspects of human life.  (Dewey MW 12, p. 266) 
 
This provides a perspective on works like Democracy and Education, Logic, Art as 
Experience, Theory of Valuation and Experience and Nature:  these works try to apply 
elements of scientific inquiry to areas of ordinary life that had, so far, been considered 
inappropriate objects of scientific study.  This also suggests a limitation:  Dewey’s 
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studies are grounded in his (sometimes naïve) understanding of scientific practice, and 
the problems he is concerned with are tied to conditions that have undergone further 
changes.  Nevertheless our understanding of Dewey’s thought has to begin with this 
recognition of the picture he had of his undertaking. 
 
III.   Dewey meets the professional image 
 Chapters 5 and 6 will fill out the picture described above.  Here I describe the 
origins of the misreading of Dewey that characterizes his reception still today.   Bertrand 
Russell’s contribution to The Philosophy of John Dewey, which appeared in 1939, was a 
consideration of Dewey’s Logic.  For Russell, logic constituted the more or less 
continuous study of inference from Aristotle to the present.  Insofar as Dewey tried in his 
Logic to examine historical and contemporary cases of discovery, primarily in science, he 
was, Russell thought, getting off topic:   
This book is very rich and varied in its contents; it contains highly 
interesting criticisms of past philosophers, very able analyses of prejudices 
inspiring traditional formal logic, and an intimate awareness of the realities 
of scientific investigation.  All this makes the book far more concrete than 
most books called ‘Logic.’  Since, however, a review should be shorter than 
the work reviewed, I shall ignore everything that occurs by way of 
illustration or history, and consider only those positive doctrines which 
seem to me most characteristic.  (Russell (1989 (1939)) p. 137) 
 
We see here the results of a clash of pictures.  What Dewey thought of as central to his 
project, Russell considers merely "illustration or history."  The last sentence quoted 
above makes explicit that what Russell means by the "positive doctrines" is the 
philosophical material of the book.  It is unsurprising then that Russell takes the book to 
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be, centrally, a defense of a set of answers to the timeless philosophical questions about 
truth, knowledge and being.  
 For example, Russell is critical of Dewey for emphasizing inquiry as the focus of 
investigation rather than the more traditional “truth or knowledge” (Russell (1989 (1939)) 
p. 143).  Russell quotes Dewey’s provisional statement concerning the nature of inquiry: 
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate 
situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and 
relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified 
whole.  (quoted in Russell (1989 (1939)) p. 143) 
 
Russell of course takes this, not as a characterization for a definite purpose, but as a 
definition, providing necessary and sufficient conditions, and he clearly enjoys 
lampooning it: 
I cannot but think that this definition does not adequately express Dr. 
Dewey’s meaning, since it would apply, for instance, to the operations of a 
drill sergeant in transforming a collection of raw recruits into a regiment, or 
of a bricklayer transforming a heap of bricks into a house, and yet it would 
be impossible to say that the drill sergeant is ‘inquiring’ into the recruits, or 
the bricklayer into the bricks. (Russell (1989 (1939)) p. 143) 
 
Note that Russell doesn’t explain why it would be "impossible to say" that the sergeant is 
inquiring into the recruits:  he is relying on his readers sharing his intuitions that this is 
simply an improper use of a fundamental concept.  
Russell says that “ ‘Truth’ is not an important concept in Dr. Dewey’s logic” 
(Russell (1989 (1939)) p. 144), and he is critical of this:  if Dewey understood the nature 
of the questions that a logic ought to answer, Dewey would see that truth is the central 
concept.  Russell goes on to quote a footnote in which Dewey cites Peirce’s definition of 
truth as the end of ideal inquiry, and then Russell shows that that definition fails to be a 
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convincing answer (in the sense of identifying necessary and sufficient conditions) to the 
question, What is truth?.  For example, Russell criticizes Peirce’s idea (quoted by Dewey 
in the footnote referred to above) that “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed 
to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth…” (quoted in Russell (1989 
(1939)) p. 144).  Russell retorts: 
During breakfast, I may have a well-grounded conviction that I am eating 
eggs and bacon.  I doubt whether scientists 2000 years hence will 
investigate whether this was the case, and if they did their opinions would 
be worth less than mine. (Russell (1989 (1939)) p. 146) 
 
This manner of criticizing Dewey by taking what he says as an answer to a 
timeless question was relatively common in the mid-twentieth century.  May Brodbeck 
says that Dewey talks about "warranted assertability" instead of truth, and that 
“Warranted assertability is, so to speak, truth by Gallup Poll” (Brodbeck (1952) p. 43).  
That is, Dewey has a conception of truth that, in reducing it to the results of an opinion 
poll, is clearly wrong.  In criticizing Dewey’s alleged view that moral judgment is always 
about means and never about ends, Brodbeck criticizes Dewey for not providing a 
fundamental ethic that would answer once and for all questions about what we ought to 
do: 
One difficulty with this view is that which was pointed out bitterly by 
Randolph Bourne in his ‘Twilight of the Idols,’ namely, that, preoccupied as 
he is with means and anxious as he is to deny all final ends, Dewey failed to 
supply the generations of World War I that looked to him for guidance with 
a set of standards by which it could consistently behave.  (Brodbeck (1952) 
p. 50) 
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Such a set of standards is what Dewey thinks philosophy in isolation from historical 
context cannot provide.  But Brodbeck is convinced that that is what philosophy must 
aspire to: 
The perennial problems of philosophy have always required hard thinking 
as well as technical skill. To take philosophy seriously is to recognize these 
problems as important in their own right and, therefore, to recognize those 
special skills as worth acquiring. (Brodbeck (1952) p. 94) 
 
It is clear in the context of the essay that Brodbeck thinks "hard thinking" and "technical 
skill" exhaust the set of skills philosophers need, a view (as noted in chapter 2) that 
Timothy Williamson shares.  In what seems to be an early, shortened version of the 1952 
essay, Brodbeck essentially defines philosophy as the study of the "classical" problems of  
…the ultimate nature of knowledge and reality; how and what do we know; 
the meaning of truth, goodness, and beauty; the nature of justification in 
matters of morality, our ethical standards, as well as in matters of fact. 
(Brodbeck (1950) p. 51) 
 
Since, she claims, Dewey thinks all such questions should be answered by science, for all 
intents and purposes Dewey is not really properly identified as a philosopher, and his 
view if followed would lead to the “liquidation of the philosophical enterprise” 
(Brodbeck (1950) p. 48).  As we have seen, excising Dewey from the canon of 
philosophers is the natural outcome of the reification of the professional image.  From the 
perspective of the present, we can see that Dewey, and not the philosophical enterprise 
(as the professional image conceives of it), has been all but liquidated.  For similar 
dismissive discussions of Dewey see Brodbeck (1949). 
 Dewey was frequently criticized during this period for his apparent unwillingness 
to do philosophy in the increasingly technical and formal way professional philosophy 
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was being done.  Churchman and Cowan (1946), in a brief response to a series of articles 
Dewey co-wrote with Arthur Bentley trying to establish some uniformity in terminology 
used by logicians and epistemologists, seem most dissatisfied by Dewey and Bentley’s 
commitment to the idea that the names “…are to be based on observations such as are 
accessible to and attainable by everybody” (Dewey LW 16, p. 47).  In response, 
Churchman and Cowan offer a technical definition of  “the scientific ideal," using 
variables and set names.  They end with this criticism:  “Is it amiss to suggest that 
philosophical thinking on scientific matters become as technical as the thing it 
discusses?” (Churchman and Cowan (1946) p. 219).  The point of the rhetorical question, 
of course, is to reaffirm commitment to the professionalized picture of philosophy as a 
discipline primarily committed to formal work carried out in technical language.  
 In an article criticizing Dewey’s "philosophy of nature," Morris Cohen makes his 
uneasiness with Dewey’s conception of philosophy explicit: 
Some of my difficulties are doubtless due to the limitations of my interests 
and temperament.  To me the central problems of philosophy are the 
perennial or, if you like, traditional ones of ontology, of the nature of the 
world into which we are born and which we sooner or later leave.  And I am 
bewildered when I find fundamental cosmic issues ignored or treated only 
in the interstices of the much more complicated, and to me always illusive, 
problems of the psychology of human thought or behavior.  (Cohen (1940) 
p.197) 
 
Cohen establishes one of the terms under which philosophy should operate (though he is 
here coy in saying that these may be limitations of his "temperament").  Philosophy 
should pursue perennial problems and fundamental cosmic issues; in eschewing these 
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questions, Dewey, according to Cohen, ceases to be a philosopher (later in the article 
Cohen calls Dewey a “psychologist” (Cohen (1940) p. 205)).   
What these examples show is that the professional image is deployed in two ways.  
First, it is used to demarcate philosophy: Brodbeck thinks Dewey risks undermining 
philosophy by turning its central questions over to "science."  Second, Churchman and 
Cowan use the image to evaluate Dewey's work; they find it comes up short because it is 
not sufficiently formal.  We will see in the next section, and then also in chapters 5 and 6, 
that Dewey's admirers deploy the image in the first way:  they accept that the professional 
image demarcates philosophy and argue that what makes Dewey an important 
philosopher is that he provides answers to the timeless questions.  What is missed when 
the image is deployed in this way is an understanding of Dewey’s work from within the 
picture of philosophy that he developed – philosophy as a historically grounded attempt 
to solve particular problems. 
 
IV.  Dewey’s contemporary reception 
 I have been arguing that philosophy in the professional image takes its task to be 
providing answers, couched in formal terms, to timeless fundamental problems, and that 
it privileges a methodology centered on the testing of claims to have identified the 
essential content of some concept or term.  The testing is often accomplished through the 
use of thought experiments.  In the next two chapters, I describe some contemporary 
responses to Dewey’s work in logic and to Dewey’s and Thoreau’s moral philosophy.  
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Here I shall provide a brief but general analysis of how Dewey is read in contemporary 
philosophy. 
 Two approaches dominate discussions today. First, many philosophers treat 
Dewey and pragmatism in general as failed attempts to solve the traditional problems of 
philosophy.  This approach is most common in texts used in undergraduate teaching and 
in general surveys, so that most students, if they engage with Dewey at all, engage with 
him as having proposed one of the positions in the space of possible responses to the 
fundamental questions.  Typically such texts borrow from the storehouse of well-worn 
philosophical labels and views and characterize Dewey as a naturalist, as having an 
instrumental view of truth, as being in some sense a positivist, a non-cognitivist in ethical 
theory, and so on.  These labels serve to cover over, indeed eliminate, what is particular 
and specific in Dewey’s thought (as well as in the thought of other historical philosophers 
who receive the same treatment). 
 For example, in The Great Conversation (Melchert (2010, 6th ed.), a widely-used 
textbook in the history of philosophy,51 Norman Melchert describes Western philosophy 
as a conversation across the generations about the fundamental problems of philosophy.  
In his chapter on Pragmatism, he presents Peirce, James and Dewey as trying to solve the 
traditional problems of knowledge and morality by "naturalizing" them:  that is, he says 
that what is significant about Dewey’s philosophical work is that it aims to answer finally 
                                                
51 I here rely on my experience taking and being the teaching assistant for such courses.  I have 
also looked at online syllabi for such courses.  And the book has gone through several editions 
and appears to continue to sell. 
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the question about what knowledge is, or what the good is.  Since Melchert emphasizes 
Dewey’s "Darwinian" influence, he does refer to Dewey’s historically situated 
conception of nature.  But in the context of the history that Melchert is telling, this looks 
like just one more attempt to solve the timeless questions. 
 In The Philosopher’s Toolkit, the authors’ present the pragmatists’ conception of 
truth as one among many to choose from.  According to them, the pragmatists think that 
“… what we ought to adopt as true is what we can formulate as propositions that have 
warrant because they solve problems for us and help us get along better in the world” 
(Baggini and Fosl (2010 2nd ed.) p. 244).  Presenting it that way, as a ready-made view or 
system, it is vulnerable to the sorts of criticism that Russell and others have repeated:  
there is a difference between what is true and what is useful. 
 Second, there are Dewey’s admirers, scholars who think that Dewey, for the most 
part, was dealing with the fundamental timeless questions of philosophy, and who think 
that on the whole Dewey gave the right answers to them.  These scholars constitute a 
camp within the profession of philosophy:  they are often associated in some way with 
the Center for Dewey Studies at Southern Illinois University Carbondale (which 
publishes the standard edition of Dewey’s collected works); their books are often 
published by Fordham University Press, Indiana University Press or Vanderbilt 
University Press (and not with Oxford University Press or Cambridge University Press, 
the most prestigious publishers in the profession); and they meet annually at the Society 
for the Advancement of American Philosophy (SAAP) conference. The SAAP also 
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publishes a journal in which articles defending Dewey frequently appear.  Specific texts 
by such scholars relating to Dewey’s work in logic and moral philosophy will be 
discussed in the next chapter.  But generally, such scholars, even while acknowledging 
that Dewey rejected most of the traditional problems of philosophy, still defend his 
answers to them.   
 For example, Larry Hickman, the current director of The Center for Dewey 
studies, defends Dewey’s epistemological view against some of the traditional positions.  
In his essay “Tuning Up Technology” he writes, 
It was by means of [his] view of the instrumental or productive role and 
function of inquiry in human experience that Dewey avoided the problems 
that had vitiated the work of many of his predecessors.  His view avoids the 
problems of the empiricism advanced by John Locke, for example, since the 
central place that his instrumentalism gives to production allows it to 
undercut both the sensory atomism and the associationism on which such 
empiricism depends.  …His view avoids the difficulties of Cartesian 
rationalism, moreover, by treating productive inquiry as a public, observable 
enterprise that takes place within a community… It also avoids the pitfalls 
generated by the Kantian treatment of knowledge, especially the view that 
perceptual and conceptual contents have different origins… (Hickman 
(2001) pp. 28-29) 
 
Here we see Hickman deploying the labels that the profession generally uses to reduce 
Dewey’s work to one possible view ("instrumental") to point to ways in which Dewey’s 
view does a better job than his predecessors of answering epistemological questions.  
Hickman compares Dewey’s "answer" to Locke’s, Descartes’s and Kant’s because he 
thinks that they are all aspiring to answer the same question. 
 In the introduction to his book Dewey’s Metaphysics, Boisvert identifies his aim: 
Locating Dewey as one in a long line of thinkers who recognized the 
importance of ontological considerations, it examines in particular the way 
Dewey dealt with the perennial issue of permanence and change.  Since the 
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time of Plato, this topic has been discussed within the context of ‘forms.’  
As we shall see, Dewey’s own  reflections bring him to a revised 
understanding of this venerable philosophical term.  While rejecting much 
that was in the tradition, Dewey nonetheless continued to ask questions and 
to suggest answers that place him at the level of classical metaphysicians.  
The aim of this book is to examine, explain, and interpret his questions and 
answers pertaining to the issue of change and permanence.  (Boisvert (1988) 
p. 1) 
 
Boisvert thinks that Dewey was working on the old question of metaphysics, the nature 
of change and permanence, and he thinks (as becomes clear in the book) that Dewey’s 
answer is preferable to others in the tradition.  This is the tactic Dewey’s admirers 
increasingly use, no doubt under the pressures of the professional image:  in order to 
defend Dewey it is first necessary to show that he is genuinely a philosopher, and this is 
most effectively accomplished by identifying the fundamental problem that he worked 
on.52  But this has the unfortunate consequence of projecting onto Dewey a conception of 
philosophy that, as shown above, he rejected.53  
 I omit discussion here of prominent philosophers like Robert Brandom and Hilary 
Putnam who, at least in some of their work, see themselves as working broadly in the 
                                                
52 Not all scholars among the group of Dewey’s admirers pursue this tactic.  Michael Eldridge, for 
example, in his Transforming Experience, explicitly disavows trying to fit Dewey into the history 
of “the problems of philosophers” (Eldridge (1998) p. 14); his reading of Dewey is sensitive to 
Dewey’s own conception of what his work was about.  This, unfortunately, means that while he 
avoids the Scylla of projecting the professional image onto Dewey, he crashes against the 
Charybdis of immersing himself in Dewey’s conceptual itinerary in such a way that the book 
looks unphilosophical to most professional philosophers: they cannot find their way in it. 
Evidence for this is that while the book has been influential amongst Dewey's admirers, and it 
was reviewed favorably in sympathetic journals (see Mendell (1999) and Morse (1997)), it seems 
not to have been reviewed in journals appealing to the broader profession. 
53 For similar treatments of Dewey by his avowed admirers, see also Hickman (1990), Koopman 
(2009), Pappas (2008), and Shook (2000).  
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pragmatic tradition (see for example Brandom (2011) and Putnam (1995)) because they 
typically eschew direct engagement with Dewey’s texts.  They see themselves as working 
in the spirit of the classical pragmatists even as they continue to pursue the fundamental 
timeless questions.  I omit Richard Rorty here, too, with whose work this dissertation is 
in profound sympathy (see especially Rorty (2009 (1979))).  The dominance of the 
professional image is perhaps nowhere so obvious as in the tendency to read even Rorty 
(who, in part under the influence of his reading of Dewey, abandoned his position as 
professor of philosophy because he thought the timeless questions were better ignored 
than pursued) as articulating just one of the many possible philosophical views:  anti-
foundationalism. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 In this chapter I have described how Dewey's influence within the profession 
waned as the philosophers became more committed to embracing the professional image.  
The professional image continues to influence the reception of Dewey's work.  Earlier, in 
chapter 2, I provided an analysis of the professional image; and I argued, in chapter 3, 
that it came to prominence in part as a result of the professionalization of the discipline of 
philosophy.  In chapter 4, I give a more detailed analysis of Dewey's work in logic and its 
contemporary reception; and, in chapter 5, I discuss Dewey's work in education and 
Thoreau's moral philosophy in light of the way in which these works are read by 
philosophers deploying the professional image.  In the conclusion to this dissertation I 
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return to the question of the connection between the professional image and the 
contemporary problems facing the discipline. 
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Chapter 5 Dewey, Logic and Epistemology 
The systematic study of validity is the concern of logic.  Logicians are 
concerned to devise perfectly reliable procedures for detecting validity… 
Since the validity of an argument is independent of the truth-values of its 
premises, logic has a unique status amongst the sciences; for other sciences 
are concerned to find out the truth-values of particular propositions about its 
[sic] characteristic subject matter.  Ichthyology, for example, seeks to know 
which propositions about fish are true, and which false.  The logician has no 
particular concern with fish, nor with the truth as regards anything else in 
particular.  Logic has no concern with particular truths.  In a sense, the 
logician does not have to know anything. 
 -Tracey Bowell & Gary Kemp, Critical Thinking: A Concise Guide 
 
The logician is not concerned with the process of inference, but with the 
propositions that are the initial and end points of the process… 
 -Irving Copi, Symbolic Logic 
 
 
I.  Introduction – the contemporary conception of logic 
 In philosophy departments today, logic is narrowly focused on the study of 
consequence or validity.  According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article 
on logical consequence, "Contemporary analyses of the concept of consequence – of the 
follows from relation – take it to be both necessary and formal…" (Beall & Restall 
(2005)).  The epigraphs to this chapter convey the conventional view of logic as a purely 
formal discipline that requires no substantive or material knowledge or expertise.  
Undergraduate courses in logic teach formal methods for assessing arguments largely 
through the use of the predicate calculus.  These courses are pitched as appropriate for all 
students because it is claimed that, although not all reasoning aims at deductive validity, 
deductive reasoning constitutes the ideal form of reasoning (because it can guarantee the 
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truth of conclusions given the truth of premises).  Logic is thought to be the preeminent 
fundamental discipline in virtue of its formality.   
For example, in a popular textbook for undergraduate logic courses, Howard 
Pospesel's Introduction to Logic: Propositional Logic, the preface for students notes that 
one of the goals of the book is "… to sharpen your native ability to evaluate arguments. 
This is a goal of utmost consequence; one of the marks of a well-educated person is the 
ability to assess correctly the worth of arguments" (Pospesel (2000) p. ix).54  This claim 
that logic is fundamental to reasoning is made as well in a common text used in upper-
level/ graduate courses, Bergmann, Moor & Nelson's The Logic Book: 
Historically two overlapping concerns have driven research in deductive 
logic and the development of specific formal systems of deductive logic:  
the desire to formulate canons or principles of good reasoning in everyday 
life, as well as in science and mathematics, and the desire to formalize and 
systemize existing and emerging work in mathematics and science.  
Common to these concerns is the view that what distinguishes good 
reasoning from bad reasoning, and what makes good deductive reasoning 
'logical' as opposed to 'illogical', is truth preservation.  (Bergmann, Moor & 
Nelson (2009) p. 1) 
 
The easy and unremarked conflation of deductive logic with “good reasoning” is a part of 
the dogma of logic in philosophy.  Obviously this casts inductive reasoning, along with 
analogical or genealogical reasoning, or reasoning that makes substantive use of 
rhetorical or literary tropes, in a subordinate light.  These forms of reasoning are 
subordinate because, while the ideal form (that is, reasoning that achieves deductive 
validity) shows perfect truth preservation, they do not.  The study of deductive validity 
                                                
54 The examples in the book are often drawn from newspaper articles and comics.  This is meant 
to both interest students and to show that logic, understood as the formal analysis and evaluation 
of arguments, applies to everything. 
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shows what is given up when we engage in other forms of reasoning.  Figures like 
Dewey, who thought of logic as encompassing not just deduction but induction and the 
variety of patterns of reasoning actual people engage in, are excluded from the 
contemporary study of logic. 
This picture of logic is dogma in philosophy today:  reasoning is to be evaluated 
according to the ideal which provides formal principles that mechanically ensure truth 
preservation.  And this scheme influences the way philosophers read historical work: as 
we have seen in previous chapters, a conventional way of treating historical works is to 
extract arguments from them that can be assessed for validity and soundness, whether or 
not the writer of the work aspired to this kind of argument.  And this means that works 
for which this kind of reconstructive analysis is very difficult are seen as not 
philosophical.          
Though many philosophers would agree that philosophy can only be defined as 
"unbridled criticism" (Priest (2006) p. 207), the methodological tool that philosophers 
rely on is treated as sacrosanct.  One cannot begin to successfully philosophize until one 
has accepted the dogma of logic: ideal reasoning is formal and necessary.  Priest says  
This is why philosophy is so absolutely essential to any university worth the 
name, and any society worth having.   We all need to be challenged out of 
our mistakes, stupidities, complacencies – especially when it is our own 
intellectual blinkers that prevent us from seeing them as such.  This is the 
preeminent role of philosophy.  (Priest (2006) p. 2007) 
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It is ironic that the tool philosophers rely on to remove "intellectual blinkers" is itself 
rarely questioned. 55  One intellectual blinker philosophers suffer from is an ahistoricism 
when it comes to logic, for only in the 20th century did logic become exclusively the 
formal study of deductive reasoning. It is the aim of this chapter to recover a small part of 
the history of logic that has largely been forgotten.  In the 19th and in the early part of the 
20th centuries, many philosophers thought of logic as the study of actual reasoning, of 
substantive, material inference, deduction and induction.  Influential philosophers like 
Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) were unwilling to "…separate logic from epistemology" 
(Allard (2007) p. 81) because they were interested in how reasoning developed 
knowledge.  Although Bosanquet and other idealist logicians like Lotze, all broadly 
influenced by Hegel, were the main targets of Dewey's critical work in logic, Dewey 
agreed with them that there is no real distinction between logic and the attempt to 
understand how actual reasoning produces knowledge.   
This conception of logic is now mostly absent in philosophy.  It is common in 
community colleges to have a course in critical thinking taught by a philosopher, but 
within the profession these are low status jobs, often referred to slightingly as courses in 
“baby logic.”  The shift in thinking of logic as the study of reasoning to thinking of logic 
as the study of valid inference was gradual.  The great achievements of formal logic in 
                                                
55 I owe this insight to Paul Hoyningen-Huene, who in discussion condemned what he called the 
“wholly unphilosophical” way logic is taught in university departments:  there simply is no 
questioning of the assumptions built into the picture logic presents of reasoning as formal and 
necessary.  His introductory text, Formal Logic: A Philosophical Approach, isn't dogmatic about 
formalism or about the way to understand inference. 
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the early 20th century – for example the proof that any logical system powerful enough to 
generate arithmetic is formally undecidable56 – did not immediately alter the way the 
profession taught logic.  Stephen Toulmin’s book The Uses of Argument, for example, 
was published in 1958 and was used in philosophy courses, and it is a study of “…the 
practical assessment of arguments” (Toulmin (2003 (1958) p. 2).  But Toulmin was 
already reacting to the view, a view that is virtually unchallenged in the profession today, 
of logic as a formal science having little to do with actual reasoning:57   
Certainly the man-in-the-street (or the man-out-of-the-study) expects the 
conclusion of logicians to have some application to his practice; … By the 
twentieth century A.D. it may have become possible to question the 
connection, and some would perhaps want to say that ‘logical 
demonstration’ was one thing, and the establishment of conclusions in the 
normal run of life something different. (Toulmin (2003 (1958)) p. 2)  
 
Many factors played a role in the shift in the understanding of the nature of logic.  
Philosophical histories point to progress in understanding inference and in moving away 
from thinking of logic as a branch of psychology, giving a purely philosophical 
explanation.  For example, in their canonical history of logic (the first sentence of which 
states: "Logic is concerned with the principles of valid inference…" (Kneale and Kneale 
(1962) p. 1)) the Kneales trace the history of logic from Aristotle to the mid-twentieth 
                                                
56 For a somewhat accessible and mostly non-technical account of Godel's proof of this, see Nagel 
and Newman (2001). 
57 In the preface to the "updated" edition of his book, published in 2003, Toulmin says that he 
wrote his book in 1958 to challenge what I have been calling the professional image of 
philosophy: 
When I wrote it, my aim was strictly philosophical: to criticize the 
assumption, made by most Anglo-American academic philosophers, that 
any significant argument can be put in formal terms… (Toulmin (2003 
(1958)) p. vii) 
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century.  They describe the history as one of progress of ideas that culminates with the 
formal proofs of undecidability.58   
 But there were other factors, particularly disciplinary pressures brought on by 
changes in the way colleges and universities functioned in the United States.  After 
World War II and the passage of the GI Bill, college attendance boomed.  Philosophy 
departments might have had a hard time convincing these students that it was necessary 
to read Plato, but they could convince students and university administrators that a solid 
foundation in reasoning is essential to success in college.  There was at this time a 
proliferation of logic textbooks, each intent on explaining to beginners how to use formal 
analysis to evaluate arguments, a skill that would be useful no matter a student's major.  
So logic became a way for philosophy departments to get students into their classrooms, 
and this played a role in shaping the professional image of philosophy.59  It helped that 
logicians had played an important role in decoding war secrets during World War II, and 
that logicians were making advances in computing.60  Philosophers working on logic 
benefitted from increasing government funding of basic research in science and 
technology.  Here was philosophy making a contribution that was tangible, and it was 
                                                
58 Their history ignores Dewey; while they do discuss Mill, it is only to point out that, while most 
of his System of Logic concerns …"induction and the methodology of the natural and social 
sciences", and so isn't properly logic, he does in the first two books give "… a systematic account 
of formal logic instead of dismissing it with contempt…" (Kneale and Kneale (1962) p. 372).  I 
discuss Mill below. 
59 This was suggested to me in conversation by Doug Lewis.  Frankfurt (2011, p. 90) discusses 
the increased demand for higher education, and the resulting increased demand for college and 
university teachers (including philosophers), as a result of the GI Bill. 
60 See Dyson (2012) for a popular history of the role logicians played in the development of 
computing. 
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made possible by formal analysis.  Older conceptions of logic, like the one Dewey held, 
seemed musty to philosophers, and they were happy to allow departments of 
communications and rhetoric to take over the teaching of informal logic and critical 
thinking:  philosophy attached its disciplinary identity to formal reasoning. 
In what follows I argue for the relevance of Dewey’s logic, and his theory of 
induction in particular, by defending an approach to the history of philosophy.  My thesis 
is that Dewey’s logic is understood correctly when it is read as engaged with discussions 
among 19th century philosophers interested in logic and science and not as an answer to 
timeless philosophical questions concerning truth and knowledge.  Scholars have recently 
tried to explain the influence of 19th century German philosophy on Dewey’s mature 
metaphysics,61 but the role of 19th century logic and philosophy of science in the 
development of Dewey’s mature epistemology has not been explored in the literature.  In 
the next section I explain my approach to Dewey and say why the 19th century debate 
between Mill and Whewell is important for understanding Dewey.  The third and fourth 
provide a brief account of the Mill-Whewell debate.  In the fifth I consider Dewey’s only 
published discussion of the Mill-Whewell debate, and in the sixth and seventh sections I 
present an account of Dewey’s theory of induction from his relatively late Logic, of 1937, 
an account which has some interesting similarities with Whewell’s view.  Finally, I 
conclude with some remarks intended to bring out the importance of this episode in the 
history of philosophy. 
                                                
61 See, for example, Good (2006(a) and 2006(b)) and Shook (2000). 
  117 
 
II.  Resituating Dewey, or with friends like these … 
 Dewey’s critics have had a fairly easy time of it.  His Logic is easily criticized in 
part because nobody reads it anymore.  But Dewey has not always been helped by his 
admirers.  Few of them read the Logic, either.  Instead they rely on standard formulations 
of Deweyian ideas, for example, “Thought is a natural activity,” “Truth is what works,” 
hoping that others will agree that Dewey had better answers to a standard set of 
philosophical questions like “Is dualism true?” “What is truth?” than his contemporaries 
had.  Few are persuaded by this.  Tom Burke is one of the few of Dewey’s admirers who 
is interested in his logic, yet even he continues to read Dewey as responding to the same 
set of problems that people like Russell and Carnap worked on (the subtitle of his book 
is: A Reply to Russell).   
 Burke, in his Dewey’s New Logic, shows that Russell misunderstood Dewey.  
Russell thought Dewey was trying to answer the same questions that he was interested in, 
and he thought Dewey’s answers were silly.  Burke’s mistake is to accept Russell’s way 
of framing the dispute:  he denies just that Dewey’s answers were silly.  Burke contends 
that  
…there is more involved here than rectifying a misreading of Dewey.  
Russell, whether or not he was reading him correctly, had good reason to 
attack Dewey’s logical theory, for Dewey was proposing a conception of 
logic which does undermine much which is central to logic as Russell 
conceived of it.  What is at issue here is not just how to think about some 
key notions of interest to logicians but more generally how to conceive of 
the very subject matter of logic.  Russell’s and Dewey’s debate over the 
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proper conception of particular logical concepts is ultimately a debate about 
what logic is.  (Burke (1994), p. 14) 
 
This is the wrong way to think about Dewey’s project.  Calling the exchange between 
Russell and Dewey a debate misrepresents it.  Russell and Dewey did not debate, Dewey 
does not "undermine" Russell’s project, and Dewey was not interested in defining what 
logic is.  Dewey is largely neglected in contemporary discussions of logic because, when 
the “debate” is read in this way, Russell clearly wins:  the remarkable innovations in 
formal logic of the twentieth century have their origins in Russell’s work, not Dewey’s.  
Indeed, Burke is aware of the difficulties confronting his project: 
In the long run, a solid vindication of Dewey’s conception of logic will 
require that it assimilate what has been accomplished in mathematical logic 
over the last several decades. (Burke (1994), p. 17) 
 
But only Dewey’s keenest admirers think that such a vindication is likely, and few even 
of them think it is worth the trouble. 
 Burke’s mistake is his approach to reading Dewey.  We might distinguish two 
methodological approaches to the history of philosophy.  Call Burke’s the timeless 
questions method, which is philosophy in the professional image described in earlier 
chapters.  The timeless questions method sees all philosophers as participating in a 
conversation about some core problems:  What is truth? What is knowledge?  This 
method assumes that one can set aside the philosopher’s historical context, set aside 
questions about what a philosopher has been reading, and instead concentrate on the 
philosopher’s answer to the core question.   
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This method creates significant blind spots:  philosophers whose work cannot 
easily be read as contributing to the timeless questions are often either ignored, because 
they seem not to have had the right interests, or their writings are reconstructed to make 
them relevant to contemporary concerns.  Either way the potential is that their originality 
is sacrificed.   
 I think we can recover important philosophical insights by adopting the historical  
context method in reading Dewey. The historical context method assumes that, since a 
philosopher is engaged with contemporaries and with social and cultural forces, 
understanding the philosopher’s ideas requires an awareness of the nature of the 
philosophical conversation at the time and some knowledge of the historical situation.  
Note a difference in emphasis here:  in my description of the historical context method I 
stress "understanding the philosopher’s ideas."  The timeless questions method is less 
interested in recovering a particular philosopher’s ideas, that is, in getting an accurate 
understanding of the ideas that a particular philosopher had, than in seeing some view as 
a possible response to some philosophical question.  There are occasions when knowing 
that some position belonged to some figure is irrelevant.  But there are times when a 
careful attention to the development of a particular philosopher’s thought, through a 
consideration of his/her broadly construed historical context, can open up new 
philosophical terrain and contribute to the contemporary discussion.62  Such is the case, I 
                                                
62 Snyder argues that Whewell presents an alternative to the currently dominant theories of 
discovery, that it has been ignored because Whewell has been misunderstood, and that he has 
been misunderstood because he has been read without sufficient attention to the context in which 
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think, with Dewey.  Dewey did not take himself to be answering timeless questions, and 
when his work is approached as if that is what he were doing, it can seem unsophisticated 
and unpersuasive.  But the historical context method shows that Dewey had insights 
which, if they can be recovered, might contribute to some important contemporary 
discussions.  One such important contemporary discussion concerns the nature of 
induction. 
 John Norton, in a recent paper entitled “A Material Theory of Induction,” argues 
that “… our failure to agree on a single systemization of inductive inference is not merely 
a temporary lacuna.  It is here to stay” (Norton (2003) p. 648).  Norton goes on: 
We have been mislead, I believe, by the model of deductive logic into 
seeking an account of induction based on universal schemas.  In its place I 
will develop an account of induction with no universal schemas.  Instead 
inductive inferences will be seen as deriving their license from facts.  These 
facts are the material of the inductions; hence it is a “material theory of 
induction.”  (Norton (2003) p. 648) 
 
There are differences between the theory of induction Norton develops and the ones 
described by Dewey and Whewell, but they are all material theories of induction in the 
sense that they hold that inductive inferences in some sense "derive their license from 
facts."63  It follows that, for material theories, reasoning cannot be understood or 
evaluated independently of the substantive claims made throughout the reasoning 
process.  Dewey calls his theory a material theory of induction to distinguish it from 
formal accounts.  Recognizing that Dewey and Whewell were approaching induction in 
                                                                                                                                            
he was writing.  See Snyder (2006), pp. 331-332.  See also her remarkably rich reconstruction of 
Whewell's intellectual culture in Snyder (2011). 
63 On material theories of induction, see also Love (2012(b)) and Brigandt (2010).  
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this way, and that it represents an alternative to formal and Millian accounts of induction, 
has the potential to move the discussion of induction in a fruitful direction.   
 But to see that Dewey was approaching induction in this way one needs to know 
with whom he was arguing.  He was not arguing with Russell and the logicists64 of the 
twentieth century but with the logicians of the nineteenth century, primarily those who 
were trying to present a theoretical account of scientific reasoning.  Dewey’s interest was 
historical and philosophical:  he wanted to show that historically significant philosophical 
developments followed periods of great conflicts between tradition and intellectual 
discovery.  Developments in the nineteenth century, prominent among them the 
publication of Origin of Species, marked a new period of conflict calling for 
philosophical reflection.  This is Dewey’s large project:  to develop a philosophically 
sound response to the rupture presented by modernity.  The epistemological project is to 
provide an account of reasoning that is consistent with contemporary science.  The 
importance of providing an account of induction was part and parcel of a 19th century 
understanding of philosophy as playing an important role in the progressive 
transformation of society.  Dewey, in many ways a man of the 19th century, shared this 
understanding of philosophy.  This explains his lack of interest in the developments of 
formal logic that were occurring precisely when he was writing, teaching and thinking 
most about logic:  he did not see developments in formal logic as having a bearing on 
                                                
64 The logicists thought mathematics could be derived from or shown to be equivalent to more 
fundamental logical principles: this was the principle aim of Russell and Whitehead's Principia 
Mathematica.  See Musgrave (1977) for a brief history of logicism. 
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social and cultural problems.65  In other words, the problems motivating work on formal 
logic were not Dewey’s problems. 
 Here I will show that the Mill- Whewell debate about induction is an important 
part of the context of Dewey’s logical theory.  My argument, in brief, is that, though 
Dewey thought about induction in terms set by the debate, because he dismissed the 
philosophical work of Whewell for what he took to be its Kantian idealism, he did not 
give serious attention to Whewell’s account of scientific epistemology; nevertheless, 
Dewey’s considered view of induction bears some striking similarities to Whewell’s 
theory of induction.  In contrast, Dewey was sympathetic to Mill’s metaphysics, and this 
influenced his less critical reading of Mill’s account of induction.  Induction for Whewell 
and Dewey is material; Mill’s induction is formal.  Understanding induction as formal 
gives rise to the problem of justifying inductive inference, and this has been the focus of 
philosophical treatments of induction.  The problem, so understood, is not a concern for 
material induction.  In contrast to the formal interpretation of induction, according to 
which it is simply a kind of inference that can be represented independently of content, 
the material view is that inductive inference is essentially tied to features of the particular 
object of investigation and so no purely formal account can capture its distinctive 
movement.   
 This history is interesting and important because Dewey was the last major 
American philosopher to hold a conception of philosophy firmly rooted in the 19th 
                                                
65 This was one of Dewey’s blind spots, because of course developments in formal logic led to the 
explosion of computing which had far reaching effects on social and cultural phenomena. 
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century according to which the role of philosophy is to make life better.  Dewey, like Mill 
and Whewell, thought that providing a theoretical account of successful reasoning, 
looking primarily to episodes of significant scientific discoveries, would result in the 
creation and proliferation of a method that could be applied to other significant areas of 
inquiry.  For Dewey, this meant primarily application to the essential problem of 
resolving tensions and ruptures of meaning created by modernity.  These tensions present 
themselves in questions about education, democracy, and social justice. 
 
III.  Whewell, induction, and the epistemology of science 
  Whewell has been misread and misunderstood by subsequent philosophers 
because he does not fit easily into familiar categories.  Mill was the first, and he set the 
terms for the subsequent reception of Whewell.66  Roughly, it has looked like the choice 
is between Mill’s empirical metaphysics and Whewell’s strange amalgam of Kantian and 
Platonic idealism.  Since the rise of positivism and naturalism Mill wins that contest 
easily.   For my purposes, it will be useful to provide a brief account of Whewell’s 
approach, and then describe Mill’s criticism.  Much that is interesting about the debate 
will be ignored here (but see Snyder 2006). 
 Whewell published a massive, three volume history of science, The History of the 
Inductive Sciences, from the Earliest to the Present Time in 1837; this was the study on 
                                                
66 Snyder’s Reforming Philosophy (Snyder (2006)) is an excellent account of the debate.  She sets 
the debate in its 19th century context.    
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which he based his philosophy of science, published in the equally ambitious The 
Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences Founded Upon Their History which went through 
three editions from 1840, when it first appeared, to 1857.  In the second edition of the 
Philosophy, published in 1847, Whewell added a chapter to the first volume called “On 
The Fundamental Antithesis of Philosophy.”67   He says in the preface that the essay of 
the same name, published earlier, had attracted much attention, and also that the view 
expressed there is fundamental to his overall view.  It is also fundamental to 
understanding why his position has been misread. 
 The fundamental antithesis of philosophy (FAP) that Whewell identifies is, he 
tells us, seen in several related conceptual pairings: thoughts/things, theories/ facts, 
subjective/ objective, necessary truths/ experiential truths, deduction/induction.   
Whewell says that the “…antithesis is constant and essential, but yet that there is no fixed 
and permanent line dividing its members” (Whewell (1847, v. 1) p. 17).  This is an 
antithesis of philosophy, not of reality or metaphysics.  Mill and subsequent 
commentators have read what is said here as implying that there is an irresolvable but 
fluid dichotomy in the structure of reality.  This is not Whewell's view.  Rather it is that, 
in constructing a theory of scientific knowledge, the conceptual distinction between idea 
and fact is natural, recurring and explanatory. 
 Whewell tells us that his purpose is to determine “the nature and conditions of 
human knowledge” (Whewell (1847, v. 1) p.16).  For Whewell this means providing a 
                                                
67 In the Studies in Logical Theory Dewey appears to refer to this chapter, though his citation is to 
the 1840 edition. 
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theoretical analysis of scientific knowledge, science being the pinnacle of human 
knowledge.  Beginning with an attempt to analyze ordinary or common sense knowledge 
would, for Whewell, be like trying to understand the art of painting by watching children 
play with finger paint.  By Whewell’s time remarkable advances had been made in 
physics and chemistry as well as in practical sciences like meteorology and the study of 
tides; he points to great discoveries in various sciences as evidence that a) science is the 
pinnacle of human knowledge and b) philosophical understanding of knowledge might be 
gained from looking closely at these advances to discover unifying principles: 
The advances which have, during the last three centuries, been made in the 
physical sciences; -in Astronomy, in Physics, in Chemistry, in Natural 
History, in Physiology;- these are allowed by all to be real, to be great, to be 
striking:  may it not be, then, that these steps of progress have in them 
something alike? – that in each advancing movement there is some common 
process, some common principle?  (Whewell (1847, v. 1) p. vi) 
 
Anyone interested in understanding what knowledge is would be foolish, Whewell 
thinks, to look to ordinary modes of thought; science is the only reliable source of 
genuine knowledge.68  This is why he says that the philosophy of science “…would 
                                                
68 Whewell says  
We may best hope to understand the nature and conditions of real 
knowledge, by studying the nature and conditions of the most certain and 
stable portions of knowledge which we already possess…Now there do 
exist among us doctrines of solid and acknowledged certainty, and truths of 
which the discovery has been received with universal applause.  These 
constitute what we commonly term Sciences. (Whewell (1847, v. 1) , pp. 1-
2) 
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imply nothing less than a complete insight into the essence and conditions of all real 
knowledge” (Whewell (1847, v.1) p. 1).69 
 Whewell’s claim that knowledge requires the correct apprehension of the 
appropriate fundamental ideas has been taken as evidence that there is a tendency 
towards Platonism in his thought.   His view that the manifold of sensation is a chaotic, 
confusing swarm of disorder until, in perception, it is filtered through concepts provided 
by the mind has been taken as evidence of his unreconstructed Kantianism.  The 
supposed incompatibility between his Platonism and his Kantianism, and his obvious 
competence as a scientist, suffices to explain why he is neglected in treatments of the 
history of philosophy.  But both readings commit the same error:  they interpret 
Whewell’s epistemology in metaphysical terms.  Whewell does think knowledge requires 
apprehension of fundamental ideas, but this need not commit him to metaphysical 
Platonism.  And he does think that concepts make possible the perception of facts, but 
this need not commit him to an irresolvable tension between reality-as-perceived and 
reality-in-itself.  In his work on the philosophy of science, Whewell makes no 
metaphysical claims; he is, with respect to what is taken to be the important and timeless 
philosophical question of the ultimate nature of reality, a quietist.  His philosophical 
                                                
69 Not just any science can serve as a model, either, but only those that have stood the test of time, 
that have “been fixed by means of distinct and permanent phraseology, and sanctioned by 
universal reception, and formed into a connected system, and traced through the steps of their 
gradual discovery and establishment, so as to make them instructive examples of the nature and 
progress of truth in general” (Whewell (1847, v. 1), p. 7).  Whewell takes the physical sciences, 
primarily physics, astronomy and chemistry, to have stood such a test. 
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interests are limited to the epistemology of science.  His insights in this area have been 
neglected because of a persistent metaphysical misreading of his work. 
 The misreading begins with the interpretation of Whewell’s fundamental 
antithesis.  It is, as he says, “the basis of” his conception of the philosophy of science, but 
the relationship between the two sides of the antithesis is complicated and has led to 
confusion.  Dewey, as we shall see, misread Whewell.  Ironically, what Whewell was 
doing was arguing for a view much like the one that Dewey spent years developing, the 
view that metaphysical dualism is the mistake of reifying successful epistemological or 
methodological strategies or distinctions.70  This is not to say that Whewell was a monist; 
in his philosophical works about science Whewell was noncommittal on metaphysical 
issues, except that he seemed to have taken for granted a simple realism about the objects 
of study; his interests were not metaphysical.  He was primarily interested in the 
epistemology of science.  Whewell did have theological beliefs that, worked out into a 
systematic metaphysics, are quite antithetical to Dewey’s naturalism.  Nevertheless, his 
epistemology can be understood independently of his theology.  To put it simply, as a 
philosopher working on science Whewell was uninterested in metaphysics.  The action 
was in epistemology.  And his epistemology ends up bearing striking similarities to 
Dewey’s.    
 For Whewell, scientific knowledge consists of the application of the correct 
fundamental ideas to materials made available to the mind from sensation:  neither 
                                                
70 I owe this way of expressing the point to Alan Love. 
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rational analysis of concepts nor careful attention to sensations alone can provide 
knowledge.  The history of scientific discovery consists of the conversion of theories and 
hypotheses into incontrovertible facts.  What begin as contingent discoveries become, 
over time and through meticulous and rigorous testing and analysis, necessary truths.  A 
truth is necessary, for Whewell, when its denial is inconceivable.  Whereas, at an early 
stage in the development of astronomy, it was possible to conceive of a universe made up 
of perfectly spherical planets inhabiting perfectly spherical orbits around the earth, it is 
no longer possible for those who know what the universe is really like to conceive of the 
cosmos as anything other  than planets orbiting sun in elliptical orbits.  Of course I can 
conceive otherwise, but then I have not achieved a familiarity with the fundamental ideas 
by which knowledge of the planets is organized.  Whewell says that experience, by which 
he means observations made in the conduct of science, provides true facts but cannot 
provide necessity or universality.  But since we do have necessary knowledge of matters 
of fact, according to Whewell, this proves that such knowledge includes application of 
ideas.  
 Whewell thinks, then, that “…knowledge involves an active as well as a passive 
element” (Whewell (1847, v. 1) p. 67), and he thinks that the active element, the 
conceptualization that the mind imposes, is the source of that necessity which attaches to 
knowledge which is universal and necessary.  Indeed he seems to go further, providing 
some evidence for those71 who would read Whewell as a rationalist or deductivist, when 
                                                
71 See Wettersten (1992) for an example. 
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he says that the fundamental ideas govern the activity of the mind according to rules 
which  
…may be made the basis of demonstrations by which the 
necessary relations imparted to our knowledge by our Ideas may 
be traced to their consequences in the most remote ramifications 
of scientific truth. (Whewell (1847, v. 1) p. 66) 
Though Dewey does not cite this passage, it, and some few others like it, might have 
convinced him that Whewell does think that the analysis and clarification of concepts and 
pure objects of thought is sufficient for knowledge.   
 But this is not Whewell’s view.  To see why, I turn to a discussion of his theory of 
induction.  The first thing to note is that, even if particular facts that are known present a 
mixture of idea and sensation, and even if no cognizing about the sensation independently 
of ideas is possible, still we can gain a complete understanding of the ideas we use so 
that, by implication, we can have some apprehension of what is supplied by sensation.  
The ideas, as it were, can be subtracted out, analyzed, and the remainder is, we can be 
assured, not idea or concept but objective material.  This process Whewell calls the 
“Decomposition of Facts.” It involves removing from our perceptions all thoughts not 
supplied directly by the fundamental idea.  For example, Whewell says that progress in 
astronomical science required abstracting from observation of comets resemblance to 
familiar forms, such as “the form of a sword, of a spear, of a cross, and so on” (Whewell, 
(1847, v. 2)  p. 32).  These ideas do not follow from the fundamental ideas which regulate 
space and form and so must be, in the decomposition of facts relating to comets, set 
aside.  Whewell says  
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Thus the Facts which we assume as the basis of Science are to be freed from 
all the mists which imagination and passion throw round them; and to be 
separated into those elementary Facts which exhibit simple and evident 
relations of Time, or Space, or Cause, or some other Ideas equally clear. 
(Whewell, (1847, v. 2) p. 33)  
 
 These elemental facts, though they are the basis of science, do not yet constitute science: 
science consists of general statements or propositions formed on the basis of these 
elemental facts through the process of what Whewell calls the colligation of facts.  “The 
whole of our physical knowledge consists in the establishment of such propositions” 
(Whewell (1847, v. 2) p. 36).  This, together with the processes through which ordinary 
facts are decomposed, is, for Whewell, induction, the creation of new knowledge: 
induction “…is usually and justly spoken of as the genuine source of all our real general 
knowledge respecting the external world” (Whewell, (1847, v. 2) p. 47). 
 For example, prior to Kepler’s discovery of the elliptical orbit of planets, the 
decomposition of facts produced a series of observed positions.  These were the 
elemental facts.  The hypothesis of the elliptical orbit colligates these facts; that is, it 
organizes them, renders their relationship comprehensible and stable such that further 
predictions can be made on this basis.  For Whewell this is a prime example of induction.  
In the end there can be no accounting for the precise process through which the 
hypothesis was arrived at; but the induction includes all of the work that went into 
making the initial observations, decomposing the facts, and then the barely conscious 
guessing at and testing of possible forms of organization.  When finally the correct 
hypothesis is formulated, the facts are seen in a new light that stands up to testing and 
more careful observation, and knowledge is achieved.  This knowledge, to be explicit, 
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requires both the clarification and analysis of fundamental ideas into conceptions and the 
decomposition and colligation of facts, of material provided by the world.  The rationalist 
reading is a misreading because Whewell is adamant that  
The neglect of Facts gives rise to empty speculations, idle subtleties, 
visionary inventions, false opinions concerning the laws of phenomena, 
disregard of the true aspect of nature. (Whewell (1847, v. 1) p. 47) 
 
Ideas and conceptions alone provide merely the form or ‘mould’ of knowledge; reality 
supplies the material.72 
 
IV. Whewell’s reply to Mill 
 The exchanges between Mill and Whewell are full of interest and are often 
entertaining.  I wish to highlight two themes that run through the “debate.”  The first is 
that Whewell and Mill fundamentally disagree over the extension of the word 
‘induction.’  Mill is happy to call any behavior of any organism ‘induction’ just so long 
as it appears to have as its motivation an inference from some experience.  So, for 
example, if my dog refrains from biting a porcupine after having once suffered from 
having done so, Mill would call this an induction.  Whewell demurs.  Perhaps, he says, 
something is to be gained from seeing my dog’s pattern of behavior as in some respect 
similar to the discover of the elliptical orbit of a planet.  But what is not gained is an 
                                                
72 To be clear, a fact for Whewell does combine idea and material present through sensation.  But 
the sense material is a real constituent of any fact, even if it cannot be thought or cognized 
independently of concepts.  A fact for Whewell, even as it contains idea, is given, not 
constructed. 
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understanding of what human induction is, because human induction is the difficult and 
rational process described above, a process requiring such steps as no one suspects dogs 
or other brutes of having the capacity to undertake.  Whewell goes further.  It is a sign, 
perhaps, of intelligence if I am successful at selecting ripe fruit by applying some kind of 
rule that I generate through trial and test.  But Whewell would not call this an induction.  
We have, Whewell thinks, many examples of hard won truths of general application and 
near universal acceptance, and we have accounts of how these truths were achieved.  
These should be taken as exemplars of the creation of knowledge.  Whewell is adamant: 
We are speaking of Induction, and we mean that kind of Induction by which 
the sciences now existing among men have been constructed.  On this 
account it is, that we cannot include, in the meaning of the term, mere 
practical tendencies or practical habits; for science is not constructed of 
these.  No accumulation of these would make up any of the acknowledged 
sciences.  (Whewell (1849), pp. 12-13) 
 
 The second point concerns the large question of the origin of our ideas.  Mill and 
Whewell disagree over where, for example, the conception of the ellipse in Kepler’s 
discovery of the elliptical orbit originates.  Mill thinks that Kepler observed the ellipse; 
Whewell thinks that Kepler supplied the concept.73 I point out this disagreement simply 
to show that the debate between Mill and Whewell, and Whewell’s position in particular, 
is terribly distorted if it is seen merely as a philosophical disagreement that fits nicely 
into the opposing categories of rationalism and empiricism.  Mill presented the 
disagreement in this way and, unfortunately, Dewey followed him in this. 
                                                
73 Snyder (2006), especially pp. 143-144,  provides a very useful discussion of this aspect of the 
debate. 
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V.  Dewey and the context of Studies in Logical Theory 
 In 1903 Dewey and some of his students and colleagues at the University of 
Chicago published Studies in Logical Theory.   Dewey wrote the first three chapters, 
edited the volume and contributed a short passage to the chapter “The Nature of 
Hypothesis,” written by Myron Ashley.  This latter contribution will be my focus here, 
because it was the first time that Dewey wrote about Mill and Whewell.74  The volume as 
a whole is an attempt to defend a view of logic quite at odds with the then prevalent 
treatment of logic. The essays in the volume try to refute the notion that logic is primarily 
a formal science, in the sense that it studies relationships of implication independently of 
the material content of actual investigations.  The reigning theory at the time was that 
logic dealt with ideal forms that could be approached in an a priori manner, though 
empirical theories of logic were on the rise.   Dewey thought both committed the 
fundamental error of treating the subject matter of logical investigation as independent of 
particular investigations.  More broadly, Dewey’s essays constitute a vigorous challenge 
to what are taken to be persistent dualisms in philosophical theories.  Dewey’s aim is to 
show that philosophical theories of logic that do not explicitly challenge the metaphysical 
dualism of thought and world, or idea and fact, merely repeat old mistakes about the sort 
of thing rational thought is.  The mistake is to think that rational thought deals with ideal, 
                                                
74 He had written about Mill earlier, for example in “The Present Position of Logical Theory” in 
1891 (EW 3, pp. 125-141). 
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persisting, knowable forms.  When experience fails to reveal such consistency, the 
problem of the relationship between rational thought and experience is generated (and, 
Dewey thinks, unsolvable).   
 Dewey had two principle aims in publishing the volume: 1) to offer an alternative 
to the dominant philosophical treatments of logic, all of which, according to Dewey, 
accept a fundamental metaphysical dualism of thought/idea and world/ fact; and 2) to 
bring about a reconstruction of the discipline of philosophy, primarily in its approach to 
epistemology.  Narrowly this would mean replacing the commonly used logic texts with 
texts advocating an instrumental approach.  But more generally it would mean 
philosophy casting aside metaphysical assumptions it had acquired as a result of its long 
period of service in universities and colleges as a fundamental part of the study and 
dissemination of a particular theological view of the world.75  As discussed in earlier 
chapters, Dewey thought philosophy had an important, constructive role to play in the 
development of a free, democratic society, and he thought it neglected this role so long as 
it was attached to antiquated metaphysical ideas.  This is not to say that Dewey rejected 
philosophy’s past, or that he thought metaphysics should be abandoned.  On the contrary, 
he thought that the historical moment in which he wrote demanded a critique of 
                                                
75 Both Coughlan (1975) and Dykhuizen (1973) note that the men who taught philosophy to 
Dewey, though they were university professors of philosophy, had responsibilities quite different 
from what contemporary philosophers have.  For example, Coughlan ((1975) p. 15) says of Henry 
Torrey, who was one of Dewey’s undergraduate professors, that “…his principal responsibility 
was to the New England church culture. … his duties were to demonstrate how philosophy and 
human reason tended to support the teachings of Scripture (certainly not to ask whether they 
did).”  One of Dewey’s goals was to challenge this status of the discipline of philosophy in the 
university. 
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traditional, and development of a new, metaphysics.  It also required logical 
reconstruction.   
 A sense of the argument of the book can be had from the following long passage 
from the preface, written by Dewey, in which he tries to state the shared commitments of 
the authors and to describe the tendency of the argument: 
All agree, the editor takes the liberty of saying, that judgment is the central 
function of knowing, and hence affords the central problem of logic; that 
since the act of knowing is intimately and indissolubly connected with the 
like yet diverse functions of affection, appreciation, and practice, it only 
distorts results reached to treat knowing as a self-enclosed and self-
explanatory whole – hence the intimate connections of logical theory with 
functional psychology; that since knowledge appears as a function within 
experience, and yet passes judgment upon both the processes and contents 
of other functions, its work and aim must be distinctively reconstructive or 
transformatory; that since Reality must be defined in terms of experience, 
judgment appears accordingly as the medium through which the consciously 
effected evolution of Reality goes on; that there is no reasonable standard of 
truth (or of success of the knowing function) in general, except upon the 
postulate that Reality is thus dynamic and self-evolving, and, in particular, 
except through reference to the specific offices which knowledge is called 
upon to perform in readjusting and expanding the means and ends of life.  
And all agree that this conception gives the only promising basis upon 
which the working methods of science, and the proper demands of the  
moral life, may cooperate. (Dewey, MW 2, p. 296) 
 
There is much in this passage that is obscure, but the main themes treated in the volume 
are here stated succinctly.  Thinking is an activity that is continuous with other ways of 
responding to the world.  Interaction with the environment calls forth various sorts of 
response; what is called thinking is one among many others.  The reference to 
psychology here must be treated carefully.  Dewey does not reduce logic to psychology, 
that is, he does not think that a complete account of the way people think will exhaust the 
study of logic.  Logic is a normative science, as is evident from his claim that judgment is 
  136 
reconstructive.  This points to what would become one of the most controversial of 
Dewey’s claims regarding logic, his view that objects of knowledge are created in the 
situation, so that judgment is the construction of a new object.  What comes to be known, 
then, is not the same object that initially entered into experience.    
 Dewey’s discussion of Whewell and Mill appears, without attribution, in the 
middle of a chapter called “On The Nature of Hypothesis," written by Myron Ashley.76  
The chapter criticizes what it takes to be the commonly accepted view that hypotheses are 
the fundamentally mysterious products of persons of a particular kind of genius; that true 
hypotheses unify data that are there for anyone to see, so that there can be no way of 
accounting for the creation of a hypothesis save by appeal to a unique insight on the part 
of the creator.  In contrast to this received view, but consistently with the views presented 
in other chapters of the Studies, Ashley says that data are not present prior to hypothesis 
but that “…the hypothesis exercises a directive function in determining what are the 
data” (Ashley (1903) p. 145).  This is taken to follow from the general view of inquiry as 
an organic process in which form (hypothesis) and matter (data) are in some sense 
continuous and never fully separate.  Data are not given but created, selected and 
organized.  The principles by which data are generated play a role in determining the 
nature of the data.   Ashley’s argument, consistently with the approach of the book as a 
whole, is genitive: he tries to show how hypotheses arise and function in real inquiry.  It 
is interesting to note that Ashley’s examples include episodes of scientific discovery (he 
                                                
76 Ashley is identified in this way:  “Myron Lucius Ashley, Ph. D., Instructor, American 
Correspondance School.” 
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discusses Darwin and Kepler) but also more pedestrian cases (such as coming to 
recognize a figure one approaches from a distance). 
 To support his argument, Ashley gives a brief historical description of theories of 
hypothesis, and Dewey’s addition to the chapter occurs here.  He presents Whewell as an 
example of someone holding the common view that hypotheses are essentially lucky 
guesses.  Now, Whewell does say that a hypothesis is often a “happy guess,” so there is 
some warrant to including him in the list of philosophers holding the received view.  But 
it is a very small warrant, and, as I have tried to show above, his view is much more 
complicated.  Briefly, a “happy guess” is only possible for one who has a clear 
understanding of the simple, fundamental ideas and who has decomposed the relevant 
facts. There is nothing lucky about having done this; it takes much work.  So Whewell 
does not think the data are available to all.  To make a guess for Whewell was in part to 
make an inference.  Whewell thinks only the sagacious generate successful hypotheses.  
Nevertheless, in Dewey’s contribution to the chapter, Whewell is associated with the 
commonly held but, in Dewey’s view, false theory that hypotheses spring from the mind 
of the investigator in a mysterious way and are wholly disconnected from the data they 
organize.  The data are facts, the hypothesis idea. 
 Though noting the fundamental differences in their views, for the purposes of the 
argument pursued in the chapter Dewey thinks Mill and Whewell make a similar basic 
mistake: 
[Mill] and Whewell have one point in common: they both agree in the 
existence of a certain subject-matter which is given for logical purposes 
quite outside of the logical process itself. (Dewey, MW 2, p. 373) 
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Dewey regards Mill as having achieved a significant advance over idealist logics because 
he does not think that ideas, or the content of concepts, occupy a distinct and separate 
ontological realm of stability.  But, according to Dewey, Mill does think that the subject 
matter for logical investigation is simply given in empirical intuition: 
Mill was equally attached to the belief that ultimate reality, as it is for the 
human mind, is given in sensations, independent of ideas; and that all valid 
ideas are combinations and convenient ways of using such given material. 
(Dewey, MW 2, p. 368)77 
 
 The discussion of Whewell in the chapter on hypothesis was Dewey’s only 
published comments on Whewell (though Whewell is mentioned in some of the syllabi 
Dewey wrote for his logic courses, it does not appear that Whewell’s books were used in 
his courses).  He begins by taking note of some passages in Whewell that are in line with 
the treatment of logic and the relation between thought and fact that is developed in the 
volume.   
[Whewell] began by stating a distinction which easily might 
have been developed into a theory of the relation of fact and idea 
which is  in line with that advanced in this chapter, and indeed in 
this volume as a whole.  He questions (Ch. 2) the fixity of the 
distinction between theory and practice.  He points out that what 
we term facts are in effect simply accepted inferences; and that 
                                                
77 There is insufficient space here to treat Dewey’s view of Mill’s logic, a subject that Dewey 
returned to again and again.  It is interesting to note, though, that in the only other published work 
that mentions Whewell (though without discussing his work), a contribution to the Cyclopedia of 
Education, “Deduction and Induction” (MW 7, pp. 239-245), Dewey ends up attributing to Mill a 
view that is formally much closer to Whewell’s!  The piece is meant for a wide audience so there 
is no attempt to cite passages; in the event this would have been impossible for the view Dewey 
attributes to Mill is not to be found in Mill.  That Dewey does not see that the view he does 
attribute to Mill is actually a near relative of Whewell’s is understandable if my speculation is 
correct: Dewey, once he had decided that Whewell was at bottom an epistemological idealist, did 
not read his works carefully or consider his work seriously. 
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what we call theories are describable as facts, in proportion as 
they become thoroughly established.  A true theory is a fact. 
(Dewey, MW 2, p. 370) 
Dewey agrees that the distinction between theory and fact is fluid, and he here indicates 
that he thinks Whewell should have developed this insight in a different direction.   But 
whereas Dewey gives to this account an instrumentalist justification (a fact is, for some 
particular purpose, accepted as given, and may be subjected to examination as a theory 
when some other purpose motivates investigation), for Whewell it is purely historical: a 
theory comes to be regarded as fact when those who have the right sort of expertise 
cannot conceive otherwise.   
 Dewey thinks that Whewell has the right insight but errs in its development.  
Dewey says instead of developing the insight into an instrumentalist account of logic, 
Whewell “…[choose] rather to fall back on the Kantian antithesis of sense and thought” 
(Dewey MW 2, p. 372).  This makes a metaphysician of Whewell, and from here Dewey 
seems almost bored with having to explain his reasons for rejecting this view: 
We do not need to present again the objections already offered to this view: 
the impossibility of any orderly stimulation of ideas and facts, and the 
impossibility of any check in the imposition of idea upon fact.  “Facts” and 
conception are so thoroughly separate and independent that any sensory 
datum is indifferently and equally related to any conceivable idea.  (Dewey 
MW 2, p. 373) 
 
Dewey, for all of his interest in the history of philosophy, and in spite of his interest in 
reconstructing the discipline, misread Whewell.  While unfortunate, this is perhaps 
unsurprising given the high regard Dewey had for Mill’s ethical progressivism and given 
the fact that Mill’s logic text was widely used.  Though Dewey recognizes some affinity 
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between the views he was developing and a strand of Whewell’s thought, he passes over 
this quickly and condemns Whewell for his rationalism and idealism. 
 Dewey continued to write and teach about logic; in notes for a course given in 
1922, for example, he is clearly in the early stages of developing the theory of induction 
that he presents in his Logic, published in 1938.  Here is how he presents the distinction 
between induction and deduction: “There is a technique for discovering and describing 
data (socalled [sic] induction) and for defining and developing meanings – deductive.”78  
This prefigures his view that induction consists of the various strategies taken to generate 
facts or data, and it shows that he was committed to a view of induction that was quite at 
odds with a formal account.   
 
VI. Dewey on induction in Logic 
 Dewey takes logic to be the study of inquiry.  This is the core of Dewey’s 
position, and it remains constant from his early work in the Studies in Logical Theory to 
the late Logic.  The early Studies was a defense, in general, of treating logic as the study 
of successful inquiry.  The Logic aims to provide a more detailed account.  At the heart of 
Dewey’s epistemological reconstruction of inquiry is something like Whewell’s 
fundamental antithesis of philosophy.  He says that  
Inquiry is the directed or controlled transformation of an indeterminate 
situation into a determinately unified one.  The transition is achieved by 
                                                
78 Unpublished notes from the Dewey Collection, collection 102/04/1, Special Collections 
Research Center, Southern Illinois University. 
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means of operations of two kinds which are in functional correspondence 
with each other.  One kind of operations deals with ideational or conceptual 
subject-matter.  It anticipates a solution, and is marked off from fancy 
because, or in so far as, it becomes operative in instigation and direction of 
new observations yielding new factual material.  The other kind of 
operations is made up of activities involving the techniques and organs of 
observation.  …The ground and criterion of the execution of this work of 
emphasis, selection and arrangement is to delimit the problem in such a way 
that existential material may be provided with which to test the ideas that 
represent possible modes of solution.  (Dewey LW 12, p. 121) 
 
I stress again that, like Whewell’s fundamental antithesis of philosophy, this is an 
epistemological distinction, not a metaphysical one.  It is an artifact of the attempt to 
provide a theoretical account of reasoning. The operations dealing with conceptual 
subject matter encompass the analysis of concepts, and here formal techniques for the 
analysis of implication are appropriate.  Dewey thinks that the advances made in formal 
logic contribute to the understanding of inquiry; the apparatus of formal logic simplifies 
and solidifies the analysis of conceptual subject matter.  It is, therefore, wrong to suggest 
that Dewey’s logic ‘undermines’ the approach taken by Russell and others.  In fact they 
are complementary.  Both Dewey and Whewell see the process of acquiring knowledge 
as containing two epistemologically distinguishable modes:  the clarification and analysis 
of concepts and the acquisition and organization of empirical data.  That the modes are 
distinguishable carries no implications for the being of thought or its objects.  
  For Dewey, induction, then, is the movement in thought wherein conceptual 
innovations are brought to bear explicitly on empirical subject matter.  Induction does not 
proceed merely by accumulating several instances of something but by organizing 
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material such that it is taken to be a particular instance of some kind.79  According to the 
Millian formal account, as understood by Dewey, the general claim that malaria is 
transmitted by mosquito bites is justified by some number of particular instances of 
malarial transmission.  But Dewey thinks this obscures the fact that seeing something as 
an instance of malarial transmission requires a complex combination of conceptual and 
empirical analysis and organization (of which the method of comparing instances is just 
one among many others).  Once these processes have allowed some occurrence to be seen 
as a case of malarial transmission, that is as a paradigm case of a kind or class or event, 
the induction to the general claim is a trivial matter (or, as Dewey puts it with some 
exaggeration, “a matter of pure tautology” (Dewey, LW 12, p. 432)): 
…"induction" is a name for the complex of methods by which a given case 
is determined to be representative, a function that is expressed in its being a 
specimen or sample case.  The problem of inductive inquiry, and the 
precautions that have to be observed in conducting it, all have to do with 
ascertaining that the given case is representative, or is a sample or specimen. 
(Dewey, LW 12, 432) 
 
 Dewey has two arguments against the view that induction succeeds via 
enumeration of instances.80  First, the only way to make such arguments valid, that is, the 
only way in which the instances could be taken as justification for the general claim, is if 
a premise is added stating the uniformity of nature.  Mill takes this to be a premise of all 
valid inductive arguments.  But such a premise cannot be justified deductively (without 
                                                
79 Kinds for Dewey are not metaphysical realities but groupings that are useful for some purpose. 
80 The first argument appears in Dewey (LW 12, pp. 323-328); both arguments appear in more 
concise form in a draft manuscript page for a chapter of the Logic (Dewey Collection, collection 
102/52/18, Special Collections Research Center, Southern Illinois University). 
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relying on antiquated metaphysical assumptions) so, if it is justified it is justified 
inductively.  But then the argument is circular.  Second, Dewey denies that nature is 
uniform and he denies that bare experience ever presents us with instances of a kind.  For 
Dewey here, everything in experience is particular:  the red that we see on the tip of a 
bird’s wing changes in brightness and hue from moment to moment, and is not 
“identical” to the red seen on the tip of a different bird of the same kind.  Seeing all of 
these as instances of red is an inference, a complicated movement of reasoning that 
involves conceptual work as well as refinements in observations.81   
 
VII. Common sense and science 
 Finally, the relationship between common sense or everyday reasoning and 
scientific reasoning is, for Dewey, neither one of formal identity, as it is for Mill, nor of 
radical discontinuity, as it is for Whewell.  Instead Dewey sees the methods of science as 
representing the most successful ways of transforming problematic situations into 
relatively ordered and settled conditions allowing for the continuation and growth of 
experience.  That is to say that, when projects or plans or goals are frustrated by an 
intransigent reality, the method of careful analysis of ideational subject matter, rigorous 
                                                
81 When I presented this material to an audience at an SAAP conference (as noted earlier, an 
organization composed primarily of Dewey's admirers), someone objected to this by saying that 
“Dewey was not a nominalist."  This is symptomatic of the unfortunate tendency of philosophers 
under the professional image to think that the ideas philosophers have can always be reduced to 
well-known views or positions.  There is a crucial difference between noting what Dewey wrote 
in his private papers and identifying him as a nominalist, as that position is defined in 
contemporary philosophy.   
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empirical observation and testing, and careful consideration and comparison of outcomes 
is more likely to produce conditions of successful completion than alternative methods, 
such as the reliance on traditional coping methods, appeal to authority or custom or 
relegating outcomes to fate.  The success, in general, of scientific methods is a solution to 
the problem of intelligent inquiry but it also poses several problems:  1) How can the 
methods of science be applied to social and cultural problems? 2) How can the methods 
and discoveries of science be made to fit with traditions and customs that provide 
meaning? And, 3) What do the successes of the various sciences imply about what the 
world is like and where humans belong?  These are, for Dewey, the properly 
philosophical questions that arise from the interest in science. 
  I think Dewey’s view of the relationship between science and common sense is 
that science provides a model for the investigation of particular kinds of difficulties that 
arise when practices and needs achieve a high level of complexity.  If the problem is how 
to scramble an egg, the scientific method is the wrong implement.  Custom or authority 
here provide the proper means.  But if the problem is what to do with children so that 
they will, at some time in the future, be prepared to participate intelligently in democratic 
institutions, then understanding how scientific advances and discoveries have been made 
is relevant.  Relevant, but not determinant, because, again, recognizing that there is a 
method for resolving problematic situations that has been successful in some inquiries 
does not just solve some problems but it presents a new one:  how to apply to people and 
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institutions methods that have been shown to deal successfully with physical subject 
matter. 
 In contrast to Mill, Dewey doesn’t think that common sense constantly performs 
inferences that are formally like scientific inferences.  Most of the time habit and custom 
operate without intervention of thought.  When problems do arise, such as when an egg 
needs to be scrambled, depending on custom or authority provides for the continuation of 
experience.  The problem with common sense is that, when the problems become 
complicated, habits and custom interfere with the recognition that some new procedure is 
required.  For Dewey providing a theoretical account of scientific inference and 
reforming scientific education are the only ways to make common sense more intelligent.    
In contrast to Whewell, Dewey sees inquiry as a common response to difficult or 
problematic situations.  Science is a response to a particular kind and complexity of 
problem, not a unique kind of response.  Dewey thinks there is intelligence in some 
inherited or customary responses, and the study of inquiry can illuminate these.   Unlike 
Whewell, Dewey thinks logic includes an analysis of common sense. 
 
VIII.  Conclusion 
 I have argued that Dewey’s work, especially his work on logic, has been 
neglected primarily because, when it has been read, it has been read in the light of 
contemporary developments in formal logic.  In this light it looks antiquated.  The work 
is correctly understood when it is read as responding to the conversations surrounding 
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logic, science and epistemology which were occurring toward the end of the 19th century, 
conversations that had their origins in the debates between Mill and Whewell.  Further, 
understanding Dewey’s work can contribute to some contemporary philosophical 
discussions – Dewey’s theory of induction offers an alternative to formal theories which 
have been bogged down for some time in the problem of justification.  Moreover, Charles 
Peirce, whose work in semiotics and logic has been of interest to contemporary 
philosophers, also wrote about the Mill-Whewell debate.  He too took the debate to be 
important for understanding induction, though this feature of his work has not been 
explored.  The historical context approach has the potential to uncover philosophical 
ground that has been neglected and that can contribute to philosophical progress.  In 
addition, the historical approach can identify places where a historical figure got things 
wrong.  In contemporary philosophy under the professional image, Dewey's admirers 
mostly refrain from attributing errors and mistakes, of the kind identified above, to 
Dewey because this would have the practical effect of supplying Dewey's critics with 
more ammunition.  Philosophy under the professional image becomes this kind of 
reductionist battle over territory.  We will see in the next chapter that a similar pattern 
occurs in the way philosophers read the moral philosophy of Dewey and Thoreau. 
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Chapter 6   Dewey, Thoreau and Moral Philosophy 
What avail is it to win prescribed amounts of information about geography 
and history, to win ability to read and write, if in the process the individual 
loses his own soul: loses his appreciation of things worth while, of the 
values to which these things are relative; if he loses the desire to apply what 
he has learned and, above all, loses the ability to extract meaning from his 
future experiences as they occur? 
 -Dewey, Experience and Education 
 
Our whole life is startlingly moral. 
 -Thoreau, Walden 
 
I.  Introduction - contemporary moral philosophy 
When contemporary philosophers write about morality and ethics they rarely 
avoid discussing hypothetical cases that force one to confront, immediately, a decision 
that will lead to the intense suffering or death of some if not many people.  In a book 
often used in introductory ethics courses, Gilbert Harman, for example, begins the first 
chapter in this way: 
Can moral principles be tested and confirmed in the way scientific 
principles can?  Consider the principle that, if you are given a choice 
between five people alive and one dead or five people dead and one alive, 
you should always choose to have five people alive and one dead rather than 
the other way round.  (Harman (1977) p. 3) 
 
Another commonly used book in introductory ethics courses, Peter Singer's Practical 
Ethics, has twelve chapters, the titles of three of which begin with the phrase “Taking 
Life.”  Chapter 4 is entitled “What's Wrong with Killing?”, and chapter 11 is about “Civil 
Disobedience, Violence and Terrorism” (Singer (2011, 3rd ed.)).  In the general 
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introductory textbook Thinking Through Philosophy: An Introduction, the first example 
discussed in the chapter on ethics seems, in comparison, almost benign: 
Consider how we respond to concrete moral dilemmas where we are faced 
with a choice of two evils – for example, we must decide whether to tell the 
truth to someone and cause them pain or instead to lie and spare them this 
suffering. (Horner & Westacott (2000) p. 127) 
 
Still, the emphasis here is on the high stakes of the decision: to lie or cause suffering and 
pain. 
 And it is not that these exciting and extreme examples from undergraduate texts 
are simply there to attract the attention of students to philosophy.  In a recent edition of 
the professional journal Ethics, one of the four articles is called "Vague Projects and the 
Puzzle of the Self-Torturer."  It begins like this: 
In Warren Quinn’s notorious puzzle of the self-torturer, a person has agreed 
to wear a device that delivers a constant but imperceptible electric shock. 
She is then offered the following trade-off: she will receive a large sum of 
money—say, $100,000—if she agrees to raise the voltage on the device by a 
marginal, that is, imperceptible or just barely perceptible, amount. She 
knows that she will be offered this same trade-off again each time she 
agrees to raise the voltage. It seems that, at each step of the way, the agent 
should and would raise the voltage; after all, each rise in voltage makes at 
most a marginal difference in pain, well worth a gain of $100,000, so it 
would be irrational to do otherwise. But of course in so doing, she would 
eventually find herself in unbearable pain and would gladly return all of the 
money, even pay some in addition, to be restored to the initial setting, at 
which she was poor but pain free. Thus the self-torturer appears to face a 
dilemma: no matter which choice she makes—continue indefinitely or stop 
at some point—her action seems irrational or leads quickly to a state of 
affairs that no rational agent would accept.  (Tenenbaum & Raffman (2012) 
p. 9) 
 
This focus on questions in which the stakes are high, which force one to choose life or 
death (or at least pain and suffering) immediately, is evidence of the professional image 
of philosophy doing its work.  Philosophers who write about ethics see themselves as 
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doing something fundamental:  they are asking questions about the most significant and 
challenging problems facing people.  They also take themselves to be working on 
questions of complete generality, since, of course, everyone dies and everyone feels pain, 
and thinking about examples of the sorts described above is thought to be the way to 
achieve the appropriate level of abstraction.  Most introductory works make this explicit 
by, early on, arguing against versions of relativism that, they say, are common among the 
philosophically uninitiated (cf. Horner & Westacott (2000) pp. 126-129).  
 It should be clear from the examples above that many philosophers writing about 
ethics favor the methodology of thought experiment and intuition-testing.  Even in the 
field of applied ethics, where the focus is on practical problems instead of theoretical 
questions, the discussion very often is pursued through the use of implausible and 
fictional examples rather than ordinary or factual examples.  In her famous paper about 
abortion called "A Defense of Abortion," for example, Judith Jarvis Thompson asks her 
readers to consider:  a) waking up to find themselves in a hospital with their circulatory 
system connected to that of "a famous unconscious violinist;" b) finding themselves 
trapped in a very tiny house with a "rapidly growing baby," a baby growing so fast that 
they will be soon crushed to death; c) being sick with a disease for which the only cure is 
"the touch of Henry Fonda's cool hand on [their] fevered brow;" and d) a world in which 
"people-seeds" float around and sprout into babies when they lodge in carpeting 
(Thompson (1971)).  This article, and others very much like it, constitute the core 
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curriculum in classes with titles like "Contemporary Moral Problems" at many colleges 
and universities.  
 Finally, the questions moral philosophers pursue are considered to be formal – 
that is why they can be broached using devices like the growing child or the self-torturer.  
It is thought that abstracting away from particular real cases and carefully constructing 
thought-experiments allows the philosopher to focus with laser-like precision on the real 
questions that can then be treated formally, using the system of formal logic with perhaps 
some additions like operators for 'should' and 'must.'  
 Much conventional moral philosophy these days tries to explain, justify or, failing 
that, explain away what it takes to be our intuitions about what we, as moral agents, may 
and may not do.  That is, it uses a method of intuition testing to clarify our use of 
normative language.  Allan Gibbard, for example, says “What to do can be a serious 
question, the question I ask myself in thinking my way to a decision.  Ethics concerns 
what to do.  In morality figure injunctions 'Thou shalt' and 'Thou shalt not'" (Gibbard 
(2003) p. 13).  In other words, moral philosophy is concerned with the normative 
question.   
 Korsgaard identifies what she calls "the normative question":  
a first-person question that arises for the moral agent who must actually do what 
morality says.  When you want to know what a philosopher’s theory of 
normativity is, you must place yourself in the position of an agent on whom 
morality is making a difficult claim.  You then ask the philosopher:  must I really 
do this?  Why must I do it?  And his answer is his answer to the normative 
question. (Korsgaard (1996) p. 160) 
 
On the standard account of moral philosophy, this is the timeless question that moral 
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philosophy tries to answer:  it is perfectly general, apparently of fundamental importance, 
and is best approached through inventive thought experiments that abstract away from 
any distracting particulars, allowing the application of formal methods of analysis. 
 If we take this to be the central problem of moral philosophy, we have a way of 
identifying works that belong to the tradition of moral philosophy.  Such works typically 
fit, more or less, into a model that lends an aura of rigor to the enterprise in virtue of 
exhibiting the virtues of formality and systematicity.  This model suggests that the moral 
philosopher: 
1. Thinks of moral philosophy as (he thinks of) science, an organized body of 
knowledge, whose form is ideally a demonstration (i.e. one that utilizes 
the proof procedures of formal logic); 
2. Thinks such a science requires a first or fundamental or at least very general 
principle; 
3. Thinks such a principle can be discovered by the correct kind of investigation 
of the world; 
4. Thinks the object of the science is to give us rules for deciding what to do; 
5. And finally, can be read as trying to answer a timeless version of the question 
about what to do. 
 
When moral philosophy is thought of as primarily addressing the normative problem, and 
when Mill and Kant are read selectively so that they appear to be using this model and 
become the significant figures in the tradition, a canon emerges as well as a way of 
reading past philosophers.  Philosophers who aren’t primarily concerned with the very 
general normative question or with proposing abstract and formal solutions are either 
neglected or “rationally reconstructed” as having a view about the normative question. 
 In this chapter I intend to show how the professional image distorts the way some 
contemporary philosophers think of the project of moral philosophy and, in particular, 
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how it distorts the way they read historical philosophers.  It is true of course that some 
historical philosophers used examples and that they wrote about cases where the stakes 
were high.  This thin resemblance, though, is used as evidence that contemporary 
philosophers are engaged in essentially the same project as all historical philosophers.  
But, this is merely the professional image at work, being projected back onto historical 
works. 
 I discuss, in addition to Dewey's "normative" philosophy, the work of Henry 
Thoreau, for two reasons.  First, I want to show that what I have been saying about 
philosophy is not limited to its treatment of Dewey:  a similar story could be told of many 
historical writers who have been excluded from the canon.  Thoreau is another example.   
(The limitations of space prevent me from writing about how the professional image 
distorts the reading of works that constitute the canon.)  Second, a number of recent 
publications have argued for looking to Thoreau as a philosopher (see for example Cafaro 
(2004), Furtak, Ellsworth & Reid (2012) and Robinson (2004)).  A consideration of the 
ways in which these works, through projecting onto Thoreau the professional image of 
philosophy, distort his work is, therefore, timely. 
 
II.  The recent reception of Dewey's work in moral philosophy 
Dewey's admirers continue to see the relevance of his work to moral philosophy, 
of course, but it is striking that the increasing interest in his work, and pragmatism 
generally, among some prominent philosophers has focused almost exclusively on his 
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"naturalism" in metaphysics and epistemology.  Robert Brandom's Perspectives on 
Pragmatism: Classical, Recent & Contemporary, for example, takes up questions in 
metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of language; Philip Kitcher's Preludes to 
Pragmatism: Toward a Reconstruction of Philosophy is mostly devoted to questions in 
the general philosophy of science (its one chapter on ethics, chapter 13 "Naturalistic 
Ethics without Fallacies" is really concerned with advancing a metaphysical naturalism 
that Kitcher associates with Dewey).  There is no comparable work by a prominent moral 
philosopher trying to assimilate Dewey's work.   
 Harman in the introductory text discussed above provides a clear description of 
the essential task of the moral philosopher as seen through the professional image.  He 
bemoans the fact that so much teaching in ethics is concerned with "social issues," so 
much so that "[t]he unhappy effect has been a decline in the philosophical content of 
courses in ethics and the books designed for use in such courses" (Harman (1977) p. ix).  
Here is how he describes that philosophical content that he thinks is in decline:  
"Philosophy aims at understanding.  In ethics, for example, you must try to develop an 
overall account of the nature of morality" (Harman (1977) p. ix).  Work that does not 
undertake this fundamental, general task is something other than philosophy.   Now, 
while it is true that Dewey occasionally raised the question of the nature of morality, he 
thought that question could be pursued only through a consideration of social issues.  His 
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Ethics82 consists of two parts, the first of which, called "The Beginnings and Growth of 
Morality," would today be called anthropological and historical.  In the second part, 
called "The Theory of the Moral Life," Dewey explicitly denies that there can be a pure 
theoretical investigation into the question of the nature of morality.  Instead he says that 
No fundamental difference exists between systematic moral theory – the 
general theme of this Second Part of our study – and the reflection an 
individual engages in when he attempts to find general principles which 
shall direct and justify his conduct…. Children make at least a start upon the 
road of theory when they assert that the injunctions of elders are arbitrary, 
being simply a matter of superior position.  Any adult enters the road when, 
in the presence of moral perplexity, of doubt as to what it is right or best to 
do, he attempts to find his way out through reflection which will lead him to 
some principle he regards as dependable. (Dewey (LW 7) pp. 163-164) 
 
This picture of what moral theory is, particularly in seeing it as in some sense including 
the way in which children first start to speculate about the source of moral authority, is so 
far removed from the professional image of moral theory that it is not surprising that 
contemporary philosophers have found little in Dewey's writings to use in their projects 
trying to define the nature of morality. 
 Dewey's admirers, on the other hand, have tried to defend his work in moral 
philosophy as work that merits the attention of other philosophers.  In doing so, they have 
frequently projected the professional image of philosophy onto these works.  As I have 
argued in previous chapters, this can be seen as a tactical decision given the constraints 
                                                
82 Dewey co-wrote this book, originally published in 1908, with James Hayden Tufts, his 
colleague at the University of Chicago.  It was intended to be a textbook for use in college 
courses in ethics.  A new edition, significantly revised, was issued in 1932; it is from this edition 
that my quotations are taken.  See the introduction to the collected works edition (Dewey (LW 7), 
written by Abraham Edel and Elizabeth Flower, for details about the interesting history of this 
work. 
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generated by the forces of professionalization:  philosophy today is dominated by the 
professional image, so that if you want to present some historical thinker as worthy of 
philosophical attention, a good way to start is with the assumptions built into the 
professional image about what philosophy is and what its distinctive questions are.  As a 
tactic, then, this way of reading Dewey has some credibility.  But it carries the serious 
risk of distorting Dewey's thought in a way that erases its insights.  
 Gregory Pappas's recent book, John Dewey's Ethics (2008) is a good example of 
how Dewey's admirers have taken the tactical approach.  Pappas is an influential member 
of the group of Dewey's admirers, frequently appearing on panels at The Society for the 
Advancement of American Philosophy meetings and other events sponsored by the 
Dewey Center.  His book is published by Indiana University Press, one of the main 
publishers of work by Dewey's admirers.   
 Pappas is aware of this danger, and he tries to pursue a middle course:   
There needs to be a more detailed consideration of the arguments and views 
in current moral theory from a Deweyan perspective.  My present project, 
however, issues a warning: we must not become so eager to become part of 
the mainstream philosophical dialogue that we compromise Dewey's unique 
and most worthwhile contributions.  The Dewey who is worth 
reconstructing is often the one who calls into question the basic assumptions 
that ground present debates.  A selective reconsideration of Dewey's ethics 
fails to represent the more radical Dewey and may amount to a failure to use 
his approach in the most productive way. (Pappas (2008) p. 3) 
 
This sounds promising, but it quickly becomes apparent that what Pappas has not called 
into question is the conception of philosophy at the heart of the professional image.  
Pappas opens his book with the claim that "Dewey had a cohesive and coherent ethics 
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developed in many writings that spanned his long career" (Pappas (2008) p. 1).  He goes 
on: 
It is a moral philosophy that provides answers to questions raised by moral 
agents in the midst of living, such as:  How should we live?  How should we 
approach moral problems and reach moral judgments?  And:  How should 
we settle moral disagreements?  Dewey wanted to provide better answers to 
these moral questions than had traditional ethical theory.  (Pappas (2008) p. 
1) 
 
So Pappas does take Dewey to be answering the timeless question pursued by moral 
philosophy.  Gone here is the emphatic way in which Dewey always (tried to83) ground 
his discussion of moral questions in concrete historical and cultural detail.  Of course, 
Pappas is aware of Dewey's commitment to the particular in his moral philosophy – it 
would be impossible to be a careful reader of Dewey and miss it.  But the constraints 
imposed by the profession of philosophy are real and influence the way Dewey's admirers 
are forced to present his work if they hope it to have a wider appeal. 
 Since this is the way Dewey's moral philosophy is treated by his admirers in 
books published by sympathetic presses, it should come as no surprise to see him given 
the full professional treatment when he is discussed in more mainstream and so dominant 
venues.  The recent Cambridge Companion to Dewey is such a venue.  In it Dewey's 
work is measured against the standards set by the professional image.  In her article, 
"Dewey's Moral Philosophy," Jennifer Welchman situates Dewey's work amongst the 
                                                
83 It cannot be denied that Dewey's historical narratives often combine sweeping historical 
narrative with potted accounts of individual thinkers, thereby undermining a genuine 
understanding of narrower contexts.   But that doesn't affect the larger point, which is just that 
Dewey thought moral philosophy had to begin with an understanding of the time in which 
particular questions are asked. 
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various views on offer in contemporary moral philosopy.  He is, she says, a naturalist like 
Hume but, unlike Hume, a cognitivist, which means that he is forced to confront the 
puzzles that contemporary philosophers have identified as problems for those views.  
Dewey, like all cognitivists, Welchman says, "holds that value judgments, moral and 
non-moral, make assertions about things, acts, and persons that can be true or false in a 
pragmatic sense" (Welchman (2010) p. 166).  But since these are judgments about the 
world, such a view, she says, has a problem explaining how they can be motivating: 
For cognitivists, however, conclusions of moral reasoning are propositions 
about what is or is not the case.  But this can seem to leave our motivation 
to act upon them unexplained.  (Welchman (2010) p. 167) 
 
This is a familiar (alleged) problem in contemporary moral philosophy, but it is certainly 
not one that Dewey would have recognized:  the worry that a judgment about the value of 
something, because it is a judgment about the world, is thereby not motivating is one that 
can seem, well, unmotivated unless one is familiar with the kinds of examples and 
intuitions contemporary moral philosophers write about.84  
 
III.  Dewey and the philosophy of education 
Another reason why Dewey's "normative" writings are rarely cited or discussed 
by contemporary philosophers is that he devoted the majority of them to discussions of 
specific questions of particular social problems without abstracting from the historical 
                                                
84 For similar professionalized treatments of Dewey, see Fesmire (2003) and Welchman (1995). 
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and cultural origins of those problems.  Many of these writings are on education, but they 
concern the practical problems of teaching and learning.  We have seen that this tends to 
make his work look, to contemporary philosophers, unphilosophical. 
But it is also the case that education is not a prominent subject in contemporary 
philosophy.  It is only relatively recently that philosophers began to neglect education in 
their scholarly writings.  There is a striking list of philosophers who have thought that an 
understanding of political authority, of justice and morality, and of knowledge and 
science required understanding education:  the list would include at least Plato, Aristotle, 
Aquinas, Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Mill, Russell, Whitehead, James, 
Dewey, and Adorno.  Given this list, the fact that the philosophy of education has for the 
most part disappeared from American philosophy departments is surprising. For example, 
of the 36 contributors to the recent (2003) A Companion to the Philosophy of Education 
edited by Randall Curren, only two have primary appointments in philosophy 
departments.  What explains this?  
The professionalization of philosophy and changes in the institutional way teacher 
training is handled have led to the current division of labor.  This has been fueled by the 
huge increase in the numbers and percentages of students who attend school over the last 
150 years, and the corresponding huge increase in the number of teachers.  According to 
The National Center for Education Statistics, in the academic year 1889-1890 there were 
about 14.5 million students enrolled in education institutions in the United States; in 2009  
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there were 75 million.85  Another study showed that in 1850 only about 47% of 5-19 year 
olds in the United States were enrolled in school; in 1991 93% were (Snyder (1993) p. 
14).  Between 1870 and 1980 the average number of days students attended school 
doubled (from about 80 to about 160) (Snyder (1993) p. 28).   This vast increase in the 
number of students and in school days was combined with an even greater increase in the 
number of teachers:  in the academic year 1869-1870, there were about 200,000 adults 
working in schools as educators; by 1989-1990 there were over 2.5 million (Snyder 
(1993) p. 34). 
 This huge increase in the number of people pursuing teaching licensure has 
created incentives for colleges and universities to build schools of education around 
licensing programs.  Since most programs require a course in the philosophy of 
education, and since philosophy departments cannot compete with the vast numbers of 
students in schools of education, these schools have cornered the market on this work. 
 This is a bad thing.  The way education curriculums are designed, these 
philosophy of education courses are always institutionally distinguished from what are 
called “methods courses” that deal with the practical question of what to teach.  So 
teachers come to see philosophy of education as separate from their worries about what to 
do Monday morning.  For example, in my experience, students seeking state licensure see 
the philosophy of education courses that they are required to take as impractical, 
unhelpful and idealistic.  This shows the influence of the professional image of 
                                                
85 http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_003.asp, accessed 1/17/2013 
  160 
philosophy even on those working in other departments:  philosophical questions about 
education are not seen as bound up with practical questions about teaching as they had 
been for Plato and as they were by Dewey.   
 I take it for granted that improving the system of public education is a moral 
concern.  And I think philosophers can play a central, constructive role in dealing with 
these problems.  But they aren't.  First, as I have just said, philosophy of education has 
disappeared from most philosophy departments.  But I also want to criticize some work 
that does seem to involve philosophical treatment of questions concerning education.  I 
will use two examples that I think are representative, one from scholars sympathetic to 
Dewey and one from a philosopher writing from within the professional image.  In 
general, my claim is that these are examples of philosophical work that fail to address the 
contemporary problems, and that Dewey's work gives a model for work in philosophy of 
education. 
In a recent book, Dewey's Dream, three scholars (none of them professional 
philosophers, but each of whom nevertheless has absorbed the professional image) take 
up what they call the "Dewey problem."  They say that they try to do three things.  The 
first is to give a brief history of the development of Dewey's thought.  Then  
2.  We critically analyze Dewey's failure to specify and demonstrate 
empirically the practical means needed to realize his utopian vision. 
3.  We propose a possible solution in order to stimulate the development of 
a massive worldwide academic movement dedicated to solving the terribly 
hard, critically important problem Dewey failed to solve.  (Benson, Harkavy 
& Puckett (2007) p. ix) 
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I agree that Dewey failed to demonstrate empirically practical means needed to realize a 
utopian vision.  But I don't think Dewey had a utopian vision, and he wasn’t trying to 
solve, once and for all, a terribly hard problem.  That is precisely the conception of the 
aim of philosophy that he rejected.  When we read Dewey like this, it is easy to come 
away thinking that he has very little to offer.  After all, whatever the “terribly hard, 
critically important problem," Dewey failed to solve it (the nature of truth, of ethical 
judgment, of logic, of consciousness, of democracy...). 
 There are some prominent philosophers whose work discusses education.  Here I 
will briefly discuss Elizabeth Anderson.  In an article published in Ethics in 2007 called 
"Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective," Anderson claims to 
be using "... Rawls's insights to different ends than Rawls himself did, because [her] 
concern lies with nonideal theory" (Anderson (2007) p. 621).  In other words she means 
to differentiate her project from those that are simply or primarily theoretical or 
conceptual.  She goes on to say that this implies "...constructing workable criteria of 
justice in educational opportunity for our currently unjust world, rather than for a well-
ordered society" (Anderson (2007) p. 621).  But the problem is that she is still theorizing 
about education from the outside.  That is, she is thinking of education as a kind of 
function in the complicated model of society she works with, not as the actual school 
buildings and the students and teachers in them.  This becomes clear with one of her 
proposals.  She says that her argument about the injustice of social segregation 
…entails much more extensive policies designed to integrate education at 
all levels.  For starters, this could include the right of any child to cross 
municipal lines to be admitted to any public school in which their group is 
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underrepresented, relative to the demographics of their state ... provided that 
their parents or guardians pay the school the same tax rate that prevails in 
the community where the school is located.   This would not deter the poor 
from attending schools in wealthy communities, since the poor typically pay 
higher school tax rates than the rich do.  (Anderson (2007) p.  619) 
 
This is a stunning example of the failure of philosophers to contribute to contemporary 
political problems.  The fact is that, first, in many states, open enrollment has been the 
norm for years.  Second, even before open enrollment, busing as an approach to solving 
the problem of school segregation met with very little enduring success.  Third, open 
enrollment is at best an experiment, and it raises many problems of its own; for example, 
many students don't like going to schools in communities where they have no 
connections.  These students have bad experiences.  Finally, school districts are currently 
experiencing serious budget problems because the old schemes for allocating funds don't 
make as much sense in the era of open enrollment and charter schools.  School districts 
have accumulated responsibility for buildings, buses, technology and staff that cannot be 
justified given the current enrollment picture.  But Anderson ignores all of this. 
Philosophers can make contributions if they take a Deweyan approach to the 
questions of the philosophy of education.   Currently, when philosophers consider 
education, they are likely to ask very general questions like:  What kind of good is 
education?  Or, how does education contribute to the good life?  For example, in a small 
volume On Education in a series called Thinking in Action, Harry Brighouse says that he 
intends to join in the debates about schools by "...elaborat[ing] and argu[ing] for a set of 
principles that schools, policymakers, and educators should adopt" (Brighouse (2006) p. 
2). As an example, he says  
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I argue that children have a right to learn about a range of ways of living 
and to the kind of education that will enable them to reflect on their own 
way of life in the light of these alternatives.  ...I argue that children should 
be educated so that they can have rich and flourishing lives independently of 
their participation in the economy.... (Brighouse (2006) p. 2) 
 
Brighouse is trying to answer the questions:  what kind of good is education?  How can it 
contribute to the good life?  These are good questions to ask, but the problem is that there 
are no prominent philosophers asking the question Dewey asked:  Is the education that 
children are getting in the public schools a good?  In what ways is it a good?  What is 
their experience in school like?  These questions are more important because they force 
us to take a closer look at what goes on in schools, at how children experience their time 
in school, and at what happens to children in school.  The point of asking the kinds of 
questions Brighouse asks should be to help us to try to answer the questions Dewey 
asked.  But philosophers no longer ask those questions.  
 In his late work, Freedom and Culture (1939), Dewey foresaw the need for the 
kinds of sociological analyses of education that were produced beginning in the 1970's.86  
These present radical critiques of the ways social institutions, like schools, are affected 
by broader economic interests, and they seek to understand the experience children have 
in school in light of these influences.  Too often Dewey is read as a kind of grandfatherly 
defender of our public schools.  But he would have been highly critical of our schools 
                                                
86 See, for example, Anyon (1997), Apple ( 1990 (1979)), Apple (1982), Bowles and Gintis 
(1976), Freire (1997 (1970)), Giroux (1983), Illich (1970), Kozol (1967), Kozol (1991), Shor 
(1996) and Willis (1981 (1977)). 
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because of what we have learned from the sociological literature on schooling.87  It might 
be hard to think of Dewey, the kindly looking old man typing away on his porch in 
Connecticut, as a radical, but he was.  That is, “radical” is the best we can do with our 
current topography of the intellectual layout to capture his position.  He did not have a 
naive optimistic faith in our institutions and public figures.   
 We can see the radical nature of Dewey's work in education by considering his 
commitment to an experimental approach to the philosophy of education.  Dewey 
oversaw the creation and running of The Laboratory School at the University of Chicago.  
This meant that a part of his daily work as a philosopher included:  interacting with and 
teaching children; observing and advising teachers; and dealing with issues concerning 
staffing, building maintenance and relations with parents and the wider community.  In 
other words, Dewey's philosophical work in education was grounded in his practical 
expertise gained through experience as an educator.88 
 Fundamentally, Dewey began with a problem:  we have a child – what  should we 
do with it?  The first step is to try to understand it.  What does it do?  What can it do?  
How does it respond to the environment?  Then, stepping back:  what is the world like 
that this child lives in?  What has happened?  What are the institutions that will shape the 
                                                
87 I came across an essay called “On Having Survived the Academic Moral Philosophy of the 
Twentieth Century” by Alasdair MacIntyre (in O’Rourke (2013)) too late to have incorporated a 
discussion of it into this chapter.  But in that essay MacIntyre explicitly criticizes the fact that 
moral philosophers typically have not looked to sociology and anthropology for insights into how 
institutions work and how moral systems develop. 
88 There is an interesting connection here with the emerging consensus in philosophy of science 
that attention to and experience with the practice of science is expected of philosophers writing 
about science. 
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child?  Finally, what are our best thoughts about what the world could be like?  These are 
the three matrices in which Dewey thought. The first – understanding the child – is  best 
approached through observation, investigation, and the study of children at home and in 
school.  The second – understanding what the child's world is like – is  approached 
through our own experience, through history and sociology.  The third – understanding 
our hopes for the world – is  traditionally a central topic of the humanities.  Philosophy 
has the potential to address all three together.  That is what Dewey took to be the 
opportunity for a philosophical contribution to democratic culture. 
Dewey's admirers err when they make the tactical decision to write about Dewey 
as if he had solved the problems of the philosophy of education.  That is a mistake, and it 
is a pernicious one.  It directs our attention to texts and their interpretation when the 
problems we face are in the world.  It is particularly ironic that people interested in 
Dewey should make this mistake.  Dewey thought that what he had done was to draw 
attention through philosophical investigation to problems in the culture, and that the 
contribution the philosophical work made was to present a new, better understanding of 
the problem.  The charter school movement is a good way to see this distinction.  To 
some, like Joe Nathan, who runs the Center for School Change in Minnesota which 
advocates for charter schools, and President Obama, charter schools represent the 
solution to a problem. But Dewey would have said that they present us with a new set of 
problems, and that the philosopher can contribute by helping us to see these new 
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questions. In Freedom and Culture, in which Dewey is clearly rethinking some of his 
more youthful optimism about American democracy, he says this:  
...after a century of belief that the Common School system was bound by the 
very nature of its work to be what its earlier apostles called a "pillar of the 
republic", we are learning that everything about the public schools, its 
official agencies of control, organization and administration, the status of 
teachers, the subjects taught and methods of teaching them, the prevailing 
modes of discipline, set problems; and that the problems have been largely 
ignored as far as the relation of schools to democratic institutions is 
concerned.  In fact the attention these things have received from various 
technical standpoints has been one reason why the central question has been 
obscured. (Dewey, LW 13, pp. 92-93) 
 
In other words, as we have identified problems and created reforms designed to address 
them, we have often failed to keep something like the philosophical perspective:  why do 
we have schools?  What do we hope children get out of school?  While charter schools 
have responded to real problems in the large public schools, we need to ask the question: 
does the experience children have in charter schools, many of which have the specific 
mission of attracting children of a particular cultural or racial or ethnic background, help 
to meet the aim of building democratic communities?  This, for Dewey, is a paradigmatic 
philosophical problem.  Education, as it is actually experienced by students, teachers, 
parents and the community, presents us with problems of knowledge, of ethics, of value, 
of development, of justice, of logic, and of meaning.  And for Dewey, when these 
problems are confronted in their historical and social context and assessed according to 
the "democratic ideal," they are philosophical problems.  Unlike the philosophers who do 
"ideal theory," Dewey thought philosophy had to play an active role in shaping 
institutions:  
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…the democratic ideal of education is a farcical yet tragic delusion except 
as the ideal more and more dominates our public system of education.  
(Dewey, MW 9, p. 104) 
 
IV.  Thoreau and contemporary moral philosophy 
 As is the case with Dewey, Thoreau's distinctive contribution to moral philosophy 
is obscured when he is read as if he were pursuing the timeless questions of moral 
philosophy.  This is the way Thoreau is often read when he is read by philosophers and 
by those who want to think of him as a philosopher.   For example, Philip Cafaro’s recent 
book, Thoreau's Living Ethics (2004), argues that Thoreau is a "real philosopher." But 
this reading puts Thoreau in the wrong company. Professional philosophers expect works 
in moral philosophy to have a distinctive kind of approach to the subject.  When Cafaro 
says that Thoreau is a "real philosopher," he means that Thoreau meets these 
expectations.  He calls Thoreau a real philosopher “...in the modern sense of someone 
who thought deeply about fundamental ethical issues and whose writings on these issues 
bear close scrutiny...” (Cafaro (2004) p. ix).  But what this means is that, according to 
Cafaro, Thoreau ends up discovering an answer to the question about why one should be 
moral or ethical, and the answer is a kind of naturalism.  In other words, in a perfectly 
general way, and ignoring particular cultural and historical determinants, we can see that 
a certain kind of life is good and worth living, and so we ought to see that we should seek 
to live this kind of life.  The source of the normativity here lies outside the self.  Cafaro 
says: 
The joylessness of Thoreau’s neighbors testifies to their failure and 
  168 
impoverishment.  Life is good, and human lives should be pleasurable and 
enjoyable, for the most part.  (Cafaro (2004) pp. 207-208) 
  
 Cafaro reads the important passage (at the end of the chapter of Walden called 
“Where I Lived, and Why") about finding a hard bottom as evidence that Thoreau thinks 
we can find a foundation for our ethical judgments in, as Cafaro puts it, "knowledge of 
the way things are."   Thoreau writes:  
Let us settle ourselves, and work and wedge our feet downward through the 
mud and slush of opinion, and prejudice, and tradition, and delusion, and 
appearance, that alluvion which covers the globe, through Paris and 
London, through New York and Boston and Concord, through Church and 
State, through poetry and philosophy and religion, till we come to a hard 
bottom and rocks in place, which we can call reality, and say, This is, and 
no mistake; and then begin, having a point d'appui, below freshet and frost 
and fire, a place where you might found a wall or a state, or set a lamp-post 
safely, or perhaps a gauge, not a Nilometer, but a Realometer, that future 
ages might know how deep a freshet of shams and appearances had gathered 
from time to time. If you stand right fronting and face to face to a fact, you 
will see the sun glimmer on both its surfaces, as if it were a cimeter, and feel 
its sweet edge dividing you through the heart and marrow, and so you will 
happily conclude your mortal career. (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) pp. 92-93) 
 
On Cafaro’s reading of the passage there is a distinction to be made between our "social 
and intellectual constructions" and reality, and that, to justify ethical judgments, we need 
to get past these constructions to reality.  It is in attributing this view of the centrality of 
knowledge about reality in ethical judgment to Thoreau that I find Cafaro projecting the 
standard model of moral philosophy onto Thoreau.  Cafaro’s conception of Thoreau’s 
naturalism commits him to seeing knowledge of the way the world is as in some sense a 
foundation for moral judgments. 
 Another recent work, Thoreau's Importance For Philosophy (2012), is explicit 
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about its advocacy: it aims to open "…up the lines of communication between Thoreau's 
project and the central areas of philosophy" (Furtak, Ellsworth & Reid (2012) p. 13).  
While the editors, in their introductory chapter, are aware of the ways in which 
contemporary expectations can distort the reading of Walden, they adopt the tactic 
identified earlier: they project the professional image onto Thoreau's work: 
The metaphysician will find suggestive remarks on the nature of reality and 
our fascination with appearances; Kantians will discover an idealist who 
praises the life of the knowing subject and her conceptual contribution to the 
perceived world; … aestheticians and philosophers of language are likely to 
find a wealth of material that is well worth pondering; and, of course, the 
moralist will come face to face with either an ally or an eloquent and 
quarrelsome foe. (Furtak, Ellsworth & Reid (2012) p. 4) 
 
Thoreau's importance to philosophy, then, is reduced to the way in which he can be 
understood as holding views on and debating the big questions in a way familiar to 
contemporary philosophers.  
  
V.  Thoreau, the imagination, and romantic philosophy  
 It is well known that John Stuart Mill suffered a serious mental collapse during his 
adolescence.  It is less often noted that the crisis convinced him that normative theory is 
not all there is to moral philosophy.  Here is how Mill describes the nadir of the "crisis" 
in his mental history: 
In this frame of mind it occurred to me to put the question directly to myself:  
‘Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in 
institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely 
effected at this very instant:  would this be a great joy and happiness to you?’  
And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, ‘No!’  At this my 
heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell 
down.  All my happiness was to have been found in continual pursuit of this end.  
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The end had ceased to charm, and how could there ever again be any interest in 
the means?  I seemed to have nothing left to live for.  (Mill (1944 (1873)) p. 94) 
 
Mill says that one of the important "changes in his opinions" when the crisis had passed 
was that “…I, for the first time, gave its proper place, among the prime necessities of 
human well-being, to the internal culture of the individual.”  Later in discussing the 
importance Wordsworth had for him at the time he says  
What made Wordsworth’s poems a medicine for my state of mind, was that they 
expressed, not mere outward beauty, but states of feeling, and of thought 
coloured by feeling, under the excitement of beauty.  They seemed to be the very 
culture of the feelings, which I was in quest of.  (Mill (1944 (1873)) p. 104) 
 
Here I present an interpretation of Thoreau’s moral philosophy that sees it as addressing 
this problem, the problem of finding that one doesn’t care about life.  Thoreau develops 
an account of self-culture or "culture of the feelings" focused on the development and 
appreciation of the role of the imagination in experience.  While this is not exactly Mill’s 
way out, it shares the emphasis placed on the importance of the self.  This is a neglected 
topic in much contemporary moral philosophy which, ironically, leads us to expect 
philosophical work on ethics and morality to do what Mill does in Utilitarianism, a 
mainstay of introductory courses:  address the normative question and tell us what, as 
human beings simpliciter, to do.  As a result Thoreau’s significance as a moral 
philosopher is either neglected or distorted by the attempt to draw a normative account 
from his writings. 
 Thoreau’s approach is a part of a historical tendency to see moral philosophy as less 
about what we may and may not do and more about understanding what the possibilities 
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are for living lives of meaning, where these possibilities are tested against actual 
experience and where they emerge out of particular experience.  My thesis about Thoreau 
is that he thinks that the active involvement and appreciation of the creative imagination 
in experience is what makes a life meaningful, and that the atrophy of the imagination 
caused by a variety of factors in modern life leads to the "quiet desperation" with which 
so many of his neighbors are afflicted.  Walden is the account of a part of his life spent 
living through his imagination.  I focus here on the central chapters called "Baker Farm" 
and "Higher Laws" because they offer an alternative model to the one that dominates 
contemporary philosophy:  in them, Thoreau takes the occasion of an unsettling 
experience to imagine his way to a new sense of his connection with his neighbors.  He is 
not interested in formally valid or defensible general principles. 
 Thoreau’s response to the problem of “quiet desperation” is the cultivation of the 
self, accomplished in part by recognizing and developing the imagination’s role in 
ordinary experience.  But this raises the question of the relevance to moral philosophy, to 
the question of our obligations to others.  In fact Walden is aimed directly at the other, as 
a kind of challenge to conventional ways of responding to moral questions.  Typically 
Thoreau’s encounters with his neighbors involve challenging them to examine their way 
of life.  In the two chapters, "Baker Farm" and "Higher Laws," Thoreau is challenged 
himself by the gulf that separates his experience from that of the poor Irish family, and 
this leads to an attempt to reconstruct his experience.   
 "Baker Farm" begins with Thoreau in full stride, experiencing a world infused with 
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sacred significance: “Sometimes I rambled to pine groves, standing like temples..." 
(Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 190).  The first long paragraph ends, “These were the shrines I 
visited both summer and winter"  (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 191).  In the next paragraph 
Thoreau describes standing “in the very abutment of a rainbow’s arch,” and, he says, “for 
a short while, I lived like a dolphin" (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 191).  The language is 
poetic and suggestive. 
   The chapter goes on to describe his happening, in the middle of a rainstorm, to find 
himself in the squalid cabin of the family of John Field, a poor Irish laborer.  Reading the 
chapter one gets the impression that Thoreau lectured Field in front of his wife and all the 
children about how much better he, Thoreau, was at making his little money go a long 
way.  Thoreau says that he "tried to help him with my experience" (Thoreau (2000 
(1854)) p. 193), but this effort fails.  As he is leaving Thoreau says that his present 
preoccupations (loafing, fishing) “appeared for an instant trivial to me who had been sent 
to school and college" (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) pp. 195-196). 
   What happened at Baker Farm was a failure to merge experiences, a failure to 
genuinely bring his experience to bear upon Field’s life.  Instead Thoreau reflects on his 
inability to “find the flower and fruit” (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 73) of the man.  At the 
end of the chapter he is rationalizing: “Poor John Field! - I trust he does not read this...” 
(Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 197).  But that thought – that he doesn’t have to worry because 
John Field won’t read the book – is unsettling because it means avoiding confronting the 
real issue – he had merely presented his manners to the Fields, and so he had failed to 
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acknowledge their humanity.  Thoreau’s failure to have much to offer the Field family is 
particularly unsettling because it is a failure of what Thoreau considers “love for one’s 
fellow-man in the broadest sense” (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 71).  It is the failure to find 
“the flower and fruit of a man: that some fragrance be wafted over from him to me, and 
some ripeness flavour our intercourse”  (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 73). 
 When he finds that he has nothing to offer to John Field, he is faced with a problem 
that challenges his entire conception; his experience is no longer infused with thoughts of 
the sacred.   And so, in the next chapter, “Higher Laws,” we find Thoreau turning to a 
wide-ranging examination of his psychology.  He is prompted by his difficulty knowing 
what to say to John Field to try to understand his own sympathies.  The chapter begins 
with a description of the real "savage delight" he feels at the thought of devouring a 
woodchuck raw; he says he has in himself two instincts – a higher and a "primitive rank 
and savage one," and that he ‘reverences’ them both (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 198).  
This intense focus on the particular – on his experience with the Fields and on his own 
temperament – contrasts with the central role played by the perfectly general in 
contemporary moral philosophy. 
 Thoreau brings to the fore tensions within his own thinking here and, for a time, 
tries to resolve them by appealing to principles, higher laws, that will achieve a kind of 
unity that the experience at Baker Farm has unsettled.   But these are principles of 
imagination, not general and formal principles of reason.  For example, he says animal 
food, tea and coffee "were not agreeable to my imagination" (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 
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202) (Field’s coffee-drinking was one of the things Thoreau was critical of).  Again, he 
says that "it appeared more beautiful to live low and fare hard in many respects" (Thoreau 
(2000 (1854)) p. 202).  And finally he says "it may be vain to ask why the imagination 
will not be reconciled to flesh and fat.  I am satisfied that it is not" (Thoreau (2000 
(1854)) p. 203).  This work of finding principles of the imagination was prompted, I 
suggest, by his failing to have anything to say to John Field.   He may have something to 
say, next time he sees him.  In fact the last strange paragraph of the chapter, which 
suddenly shifts to a present-tense description of a “John Farmer” relaxing and recreating 
after a hard day’s work, may have been written as a poetical description of how John 
Field might start to imagine himself into a different world: 
A voice said to him, -Why do you stay here and live this mean moiling life, when 
a glorious existence is possible for you?  Those same stars twinkle over other 
fields than these.  -But how to come out of this condition and migrate thither?  
All that he could think of was to practice some new austerity, to let his mind 
descend into his body and redeem it, and treat himself with ever increasing 
respect. (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 209) 
This trick, of imagining the other places from which the stars are visible, is one of the 
"simple tests" (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 10) Thoreau mentions in chapter 1 that can help 
to relieve the "tedium and ennui" (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 9) of ordinary life.  In other 
words this whole chapter, focused as it is on resolving a very specific kind of failure to 
meet an obligation, is a kind of moral experiment.  This is what is distinctive of Thoreau's 
approach:  he thinks of moral philosophy not as the pursuit of timeless questions through 
formal analysis but as practical problems that each require unique solutions.  Thoreau 
does not "mean to prescribe rules" (Thoreau (2000 (1854)) p. 15) to everyone; rather he 
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speaks "mainly to the mass of men who are discontented, and idly complaining of the 
hardness of their lot or of the times, when they might improve them"  (Thoreau (2000 
(1854)) p. 15).  That is to say that he is not trying to answer a timeless philosophical 
question but to speak to particular problems that arise in particular contexts.  He is for 
experiments in ways of living: 
I would not have any one adopt my mode of living on any account; for, beside 
that before he has fairly learned it I may have found out another for myself, I 
desire that there be as many different persons in the world as possible; but I 
would have each one be very careful to find out and pursue his own way, and 
not his father’s or his mother’s or his neighbor’s instead.  (Thoreau (2000 
(1854)) p. 67) 
 
This pluralistic, contextualized approach to moral philosophy itself has a long history that 
is worth preserving.   
 
VI.  Conclusion 
 The previous chapter highlighted the role logic plays in contemporary philosophy.  
Its commitment to the conception of valid inference as the model of good thinking 
privileges the search for very general, if not universal, principles to serve as premises in 
arguments.  This characterizes much contemporary work in moral philosophy.  Moral 
philosophers typically look for a general principle or at least a theoretical model; the 
connection to particular problems is secondary.  Such a focus establishes the discipline as 
one concerned primarily with general questions and in such a way that formal analysis as 
developed in discussion of axiomatic and other inferential systems is the primary tool for 
doing philosophy. 
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 This conception is part of the professional image of philosophy; it is used even in 
the interpretation of historical philosophers like Dewey and Thoreau who privileged the 
particular difficulties people face in ordinary life.  The discipline of philosophy loses the 
chance to utilize their insights when they are read through the professional image.   
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Chapter 7 Conclusion:  Tensions in the Professional Image 
One of the most immediate duties of philosophical reconstruction with 
respect to the development of viable instruments for inquiry into human or 
moral facts is to deal systematically with human processes. 
 -Dewey, introduction to reprint of Reconstruction in Philosophy 
 
I.  Introduction 
Today the dominant conception of philosophy among professional philosophers is 
that there are a number of central philosophical questions that have been around for a 
long time because they are very difficult.  They are also fundamental in the sense that 
they concern the foundations of all of our knowledge.  The fundamental nature of these 
questions implies that specialized disciplines or forms of inquiry cannot cope with them.  
The questions are so basic that they challenge the assumptions and methodologies of 
particular disciplines.  But logic, on this conception, provides a normative account of 
reasoning that is not limited by particular disciplinary assumptions or methodologies.  
This logic formalizes principles of deductive inference, which means it privileges claims 
of perfect generality or sweeping universality.  The importance of philosophy, on the 
dominant picture, is that, since these questions bedevil any kind of inquiry, philosophy 
has to be of central importance to everyone, and it is implicated in all thinking.   
I have argued in the previous chapters that this conception of philosophy 
crystallized relatively recently, in the mid- to late twentieth century, in part as a result of 
the demands of professionalization and the importance of disciplinary identity in the 
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contemporary university.  The image exercises an influence not only over philosophers 
reading and writing about historical philosophers; it also shapes the practice of 
philosophers as teachers.  In this conclusion I identify some tensions within the 
professional image that have consequences for the experience students have of 
philosophy and also for the way philosophy is seen by the wider university community.  I 
then very briefly sketch a possible way of going forward that addresses these tensions. 
 
II.  Tensions and unsettlement 
John Dewey said that thinking "…is occasioned by an unsettlement and it aims at 
overcoming a disturbance" (Dewey MW 9, p. 336).  The discipline of philosophy is 
currently in a state of unsettlement.  The unsettlement is tied up with the professional 
image of philosophy, and the way to overcome it is to try to understand how philosophy 
gets practiced, the "human processes" involved in doing philosophy.  This means 
recognizing that determinants of the practice are real but not rationally guided, that is that 
social pressures determine the content of work philosophers do, and that philosophy in 
the future will continue to be shaped by factors beyond our control. 
 In the introduction to this dissertation I mentioned a number of reasons for 
thinking the discipline of philosophy is facing a crisis.  Increasingly African American 
and Hispanic scholars are writing about their sense of being excluded from the 
mainstream of the discipline.  Linda Martín Alcoff says that 
[a]s a Latina in the academic world of North American philosophy, I 
regularly feel that, indeed, I have lost, or am in the process of losing, my 
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marbles.  Neither my general lived experience, nor my reference points in 
argumentation, nor my routine affective responses to events, nor my 
philosophical intuitions are shared with most people in my immediate 
milieu.  (Alcoff (2012) p. 23) 
 
(See also Sullivan and Tuana (2007) and the other articles in Yancy (2012)).   
In 2009 Kathryn Norlock estimated that only about 21% of college-level 
philosophy instructors are women; in the humanities generally there is a roughly 50-50 
split between male and female instructors.89  The American Philosophical Association 
has recently vowed to improve the status of women in the profession, an indication that 
there is a serious problem.90   
 Finally, in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, as colleges and universities 
look to cut expenses, philosophy departments have increasingly been targeted.  Most 
recently (as of January 2013) the board of trustees at Cedarville University has 
recommended getting rid of the philosophy department.91 
 While each of these crises has received attention, less attention has been paid to 
drawing a connection between them and the disciplinary identity of philosophy.  In what 
follows I make a modest attempt to identify some possible ways in which tensions within 
the professional image of philosophy generate unsettlements. 
 
                                                
89https://docs.google.com/a/fsmn.org/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbnx
hcGFjb21taXR0ZWVvbnRoZXN0YXR1c29md29tZW58Z3g6MTBkMjEyYmExMDg2NDZjY
Q 
90 See also Buckwalter and Stich (2010); Paxton, Figdor and Tiberius (2012)). 
91 http://ourcuprotest.wordpress.com 
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III.  An external tension  
 Brian Leiter notes that the term 'philosophy'  
… has a currency in everyday parlance and ordinary self-reflection that 
'linguistics' or 'sociology' or 'anthropology' do not.  One doesn't need an 
advanced degree to have a 'philosophy of life,' and this has bred an 
expectation, even among those with advanced degrees, that the discipline of 
philosophy ought to be continuous with ordinary attempts to forge a 
philosophy of life.  (Leiter (2004) p. 1) 
 
Leiter goes on to say that professional philosophy does not meet these expectations.  But 
Leiter tends to see this as a kind of marketing problem:  he thinks philosophers should try 
to convince the wider public that what professional philosophers do is what philosophy 
really is, and that the everyday associations of the word are out dated and should be put to 
rest.   
 The problem is that philosophers also tend to use the everyday associations of the 
word when pressed to explain the significance of philosophy.  Earlier I noted that, in 
moral philosophy, philosophers tend to defend their approach by saying that they are 
working on the big problems but by analyzing them into small, manageable bits.  It is 
common for articles in moral philosophy to begin by talking about justice, or evil, or the 
good life, but then to quickly shift to a focused formal analysis of some (often fantastic or 
contrived) example.  Philosophical outsiders tend to quickly lose interest, even as the 
philosophers point to the introductory sentiments as proof of the work's significance. 
 It is this tension – between the professional image of philosophy and the ordinary 
idea of philosophy – that allows administrators and boards of trustees to call for the 
elimination of philosophy departments.  If philosophy is not playing its historical role of 
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addressing the question of a "philosophy of life," as Leiter puts it, then it isn't clear (to 
those outside the practice) what role it is playing that distinguishes it from the rest of the 
humanities.  By a "philosophy of life," Leiter has in mind the idea that philosophy should 
be of help when one is faced with a difficult choice, for example, or that it might help to 
allay the fear of death or of loneliness.  The scholarly work of philosophers is seldom 
about these ordinary problems of life that a philosophy of life might be expected to 
address; and anyways it is mostly inaccessible to those lacking training in formal logic.  
This tension conspires to make philosophy the low hanging fruit of the university in a 
context where identifying budget items to cut is a priority.   
 
IV.  Internal tensions 
The professional image of philosophy supplies philosophers with a clear 
disciplinary identity and unifies the research they do.  But it is merely an image and not 
an explicitly articulated organizing principle.  It has developed over time as a result of a 
variety of pressures, both internal and external to philosophy.  It isn't surprising, then, 
that it contains some important internal tensions that end up affecting the way philosophy 
is experienced. 
 
IV.1 History 
W. V. Quine was an influential twentieth-century philosopher.  In his book about 
him, Peter Hylton says that Quine "… is surely among the best known analytic 
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philosophers of the second half of the twentieth century" (Hylton (2007) p. 1).  He taught 
for many years at Harvard, and some of his papers have been very influential.  Most 
philosophers know of his antipathy to the history of philosophy.  In his autobiography, 
just after reporting how dismal he thought it was to have to try to explain what Hume 
thought and why it was wrong, he says this about science, clearly thinking of philosophy 
as a kind of science: 
Science and the history of science appeal to very different tempers.  An 
advance in science resolves an obscurity, a tangle, a complexity, an 
inelegance, that the scientist then gratefully dismisses and forgets.  The 
historian of science tries to recapture the very tangles, confusions, and 
obscurities from which the scientist is so eager to free himself.  (Quine 
(1985) p. 194) 
 
This conception of philosophy as a discipline that should pursue its subject without 
paying attention to its history is a part of the professional image:  the proposals of 
historical philosophers are of interest if they are true, but then that is only because they 
provide solutions to problems that we have anyway.  There is nothing philosophically 
important, on this conception, in knowing the history of the discipline.   
 But it is also true that philosophers typically do spend a lot of time writing about, 
reading and teaching historical figures.  Students in introductory courses are usually 
expected to read (or at least read about) Plato, Aristotle, Descartes and Kant, at a 
minimum.  Often philosophers identify the questions they are pursuing by using the name 
of an historical philosopher:  Hume's problem of induction, for example, or Locke's 
question about personal identity. Even the views themselves that philosophers hold and 
defend are often named after historical figures:  there are Platonists in the philosophy of 
  183 
math, Aristotelians in ethics, Humeans in moral psychology, and (these days, only a few) 
Cartesian dualists in the philosophy of mind. 
 So there is a tension:  many philosophers think of their discipline as a kind of 
science, where what defines it is the pursuit of truth concerning some very general 
questions.   The history of such disciplines is not obviously relevant to practitioners.  Yet 
philosophical practice implies that the history is relevant.  This tension is the subject of a 
large and still expanding literature,92 but it also contributes to some incoherence in the 
undergraduate experience of philosophy.  As the professional image gets solidified by 
departments through hiring and curriculum, fewer historians of philosophy are employed 
in philosophy departments.  Yet historical figures continue to dominate philosophical 
discussions.  The writings of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), for example, are a staple of 
introductory courses in political philosophy, yet there tends not to be an attempt to fill in 
the historical context of his life or of his writings – he lived through a tumultuous time in 
English political history, and he often had the ear of powerful people.  Some students, of 
course, are almost immediately able to see the philosophical (in the narrow sense implied 
by the professional image) interest of his writings, but many are left confused by the 
inattention to what he was actually writing about.93   
                                                
92 See for example Garber (2005), Glock (2008(a)), Mash (1987), Preston (2007), and the papers 
collected in Rorty, Schneewind and Skinner (1984). 
93 My evidence for the claims made in this paragraph and the ones following is mostly my 
experience of taking such classes and being the teaching assistant for these classes, though I have 
also looked at publicly available syllabi and listened to recordings of lectures for such classes.  
Textbooks that are aimed at undergraduate courses in political philosophy will usually provide a 
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IV.2  Reasoning and writing 
A more disruptive tension is generated by the idea that logic codifies the 
principles of sound reasoning.  We have seen that logic is understood by contemporary 
philosophers narrowly to be the study of deductive inference.  Now, since philosophers 
see themselves as committed to sound reasoning and not to any particular or novel 
methodological practices, there is very little attention paid in courses other than logic to 
the actual patterns of reasoning that philosophers track.  This means that students who 
have not taken a logic course, and so who do not identify reason with deductive 
inference, have a difficult time identifying what philosophers see as the significant moves 
in arguments.  The tension is felt most clearly by students, because even as philosophy 
presents itself as just good, clear thinking, it, like any other discipline, makes use of 
distinctive patterns of reasoning, common tropes (the use of familiar (to philosophers) 
short-hand references to well known examples; the impulse to construct counter-
examples, no matter how outlandish, to any proffered thesis; the imagery of war and 
battle that pervades philosophical discussions), and has a preferred specialized language. 
This conception of philosophy as the discipline that privileges pure or general 
reason is in tension with the idea that there are important cultural differences in patterns 
of reasoning or in the weight to be given to experience.  
                                                                                                                                            
paragraph or two about Hobbes's historical context, but the philosophical import of his writings is 
treated as separable from that context. 
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 The tension with respect to students is most obvious when it comes to writing.  
Most students in philosophy courses are evaluated based on their written work, yet very 
little instruction is given in philosophy courses in how to write philosophically.94  This is 
because many philosophers think that what they expect is just good writing, not anything 
that is native or peculiar to philosophy.95  But research shows that, as the title of one 
article says, "Writing is not Just a Basic Skill" (Richardson (2008)).  And there are 
writing practices that are uniquely rewarded in philosophy (the use, for example, of the 
tropes listed above).  Students expect to learn how to write and think philosophically, but 
the professional image of philosophy suggests that there is nothing unique to writing and 
thinking in philosophy.  Students come away confused, or worse:  if philosophy rewards 
sound thinking and clear writing, and a student struggles in a philosophy course, he may 
naturally conclude that he is deficient.   
The tension is evident in some guides to philosophical writing.  For example, in 
his Writing Philosophy: A Student's Guide to Writing Philosophy Essays, Lewis Vaughn 
acknowledges in the preface that there are "unique demands of philosophical writing" 
(Vaughn (2006) p. vii), but in the text he explains how to write an "argumentative essay," 
which type of essay he says is familiar from "advertising, political speeches, 
philosophical writing, letters to the editor, legal cases, special interest advocacy, press 
                                                
94 Again, my evidence here is primarily my experience of having taken philosophy courses at 
several different colleges and universities, of having been the teaching assistant for many 
introductory level philosophy courses, and of talking with philosophers about their teaching.   
95 One professor for whom I was a teaching assistant said: "Good philosophy writing is just good 
writing." 
  186 
releases, position papers, and business communications of all kinds…" (Vaughn (2006) 
p. 56).  In other words, the dominant form of writing in philosophy is, according to 
Vaughn, a perfectly common and ordinary form of essay.  The implication is that there 
are no special skills or formulae for writing a paper in philosophy.  This is belied by our 
practice, which privileges writing that conforms to particular disciplinary conceptions of 
clarity and rigor and that uses "in-house" references to key examples and central debates. 
 
IV. 3 Knowing nothing means knowing everything 
In her book, How Professors Think, the sociologist Michele Lamont notes four 
common views other scholars have about philosophers: 
(1) philosophers live in a world apart from other humanists, (2) 
nonphilosophers have problems evaluating philosophical work, and they are 
often perceived by philosophers as not qualified to do so, (3) philosophers 
do not explain the significance of their work, and (4) increasingly, what 
philosophers do is irrelevant, sterile, and self-indulgent. (Lamont (2009) p. 
64) 
 
She argues that colleagues see philosophers as arrogant because "…they see their field as 
uniquely demanding" (Lamont (2009) p. 65).  Philosophers, according to Lamont, think 
philosophy is more rigorous than other disciplines in the humanities, less tolerant of 
unclear writing and thinking, and more difficult.   
 What gives rise to this perception and to the bad relationships that Lamont 
documents between philosophers and their colleagues is the tension between a) thinking 
that philosophy, since it is perfectly general, does not require any specific or particular 
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knowledge96 (Lamont quotes a historian who says, "it's very hard to find a philosopher… 
who has any common ground of discussion with the rest of the world" (Lamont (2009) p. 
66)) and b) thinking that philosophy, since it is committed to the principles of sound 
reasoning in general, is uniquely suited to assess the arguments of scholars in all fields.  
A philosopher need have no knowledge of any particular field to criticize work that, 
according to the philosopher, is unclear, or too rhetorical, or simply not easily assimilated 
to formal logical analysis.  
 As Lamont shows, grant proposals by philosophers are often received poorly 
because of this perceived undeserved arrogance displayed by philosophers.  This 
contributes to the sense that philosophy is isolated – scientists don't recognize the work of 
philosophers as scientific, but philosophers typically do not get along with scholars in the 
other humanities, either.  The professional image that helped to establish a disciplinary 
identity for philosophy tends also to undermine its connections to other disciplines.  This 
helps to create the current unsettlement faced by the discipline of philosophy. 
 
V.  Conclusion:  looking back, looking ahead 
 I have argued that these tensions are intrinsic to the picture of philosophy that 
dominates the practice of philosophy today.  The picture developed in large part as a 
response to pressures associated with the need to establish a disciplinary identity in the 
                                                
96 Recall the epigraph to section III.2 in chapter 1:  "Philosophers claim no monopoly on 
conceptual analysis, just generic expertise" (Sorenson (1992) p. 111). 
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contemporary university, pressures associated with professionalization.  Since these 
pressures are, if anything, increasing, simply calling on philosophers to change the way 
they think of philosophy is unlikely to have much effect. 
 But if the diagnosis of the problem given above is accurate, then an approach to 
remedying it is clear:  to confront the current "crisis of philosophy,"97 philosophers 
should attend to the practice of philosophy.98  Consider that it was by just slightly 
diverting the gaze of practitioners from patients and their diseases to the practices of 
doctors treating those patients that the discovery of the role of germs in disease 
transmission was made.  Something similar is possible for philosophy.  After all, there is 
no reason philosophical attention should not be directed at the way philosophical 
knowledge is produced, communicated and taught.  Many of the texts in our canon 
feature extended discussions of the way knowledge is produced and transmitted:  the 
Republic devotes considerable space to this question, as does Hobbes in Leviathan; 
Descartes wrote about little else.  It only requires a minor shift in focus to see that these 
questions are, after all, philosophical, and their discussion would increase our 
understanding of the production of knowledge in other fields. 
                                                
97 This is the title of a piece by the prominent philosopher Jason Stanley (Stanley (2010)).  
Stanley notes the low status philosophy has among academics, but his analysis of it is quite 
different from mine:  he blames other academics for misunderstanding the nature of philosophical 
inquiry. 
98 This is happening.  The American Philosophical Association is now committed to improving 
the climate in philosophy for people who have traditionally been excluded.  And scholars like 
Naomi Scheman are focusing their attention on what it means to think of philosophy as a practice. 
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 John Dewey, in 1949, arrived at a diagnosis of the problems facing the 
professionalized discipline of philosophy (it is this diagnosis that was the inspiration for 
this dissertation).  He wrote of a movement 
active and even assertive within its own chosen but narrow limits, [that] 
identifies philosophy exclusively with search for forms simply as forms; it 
engages in an attempt to discover forms that are comprehensive only 
because they are so abstract as to have no connection with any specific 
subject whatever, human or otherwise.  This movement, in spite of or rather 
because of its devotion to acquisition of merely technical skill, results in 
forms that are useful only in producing more forms of the same empty type.  
(Dewey LW 16, pp. 361-362) 
 
Dewey identified the professionalization of philosophy as the factor that encouraged such 
a movement.  And he thought one way out of the crisis philosophy was facing in his time 
was for it to focus on the methods of producing knowledge and understanding: 
… the one thing of prime importance today is development of methods of 
scientific inquiry to supply us with the humane or moral knowledge now 
conspicuously lacking.  The work needs to be done.  It is not of urgent 
importance that it be done by philosophers, or by any other special group of 
intellectuals.  It is, however, in harmony with the claim of philosophers to 
deal with what is comprehensive and fundamental that they take a hand, 
perhaps a leading one, in promoting methods that will result in the 
understanding that is now absent.  This type of activity at least seems to be 
the only way to halt the decline of philosophy in influence and in public 
esteem and bring about something like restoration.  (Dewey LW 16, pp. 
375-376) 
 
60 years later philosophy has yet to slow its decline in "influence and in public esteem."  
Philosophy has become even more professionalized.  If it is to experience "something 
like a restoration," it can only be by confronting its own practice, which means reflecting 
upon its contemporary image.  This work would result in a kind of synthesis of 
philosophy, understood in the common way as primarily concerned with the problems of 
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life (the production of knowledge is one of the problems of life, after all), with the 
professional image of philosophy.   
!
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